Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Should voters be afraid of hard budget constraint legislation? fiscal responsibility law in brazilian municipalities

This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban = Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries

A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése nem egyforma mértékben ment végbe minden posztszocialista gazdaságban. Egyes országokban messzire jutottak ebben a tekintetben, másokban viszont alig változott az indulóállapot. A tanulmány áttekinti a költségvetési korlát puhaságának különböző megnyilvánulásait: az állami támogatásokat, a puha adózást, a nem teljesítő bankkölcsönöket, a vállalatközi tartozások felgyülemlését és a kifizetetlen béreket. A jelenséget sokféle tényező okozza, amelyek többnyire együttesen jelentkeznek. Az állami tulajdon fenntartása kedvez a puha költségvetési szindróma megrögződésének, a privatizálás elősegíti a keményítést, de nem elégséges feltétele a kemény korlát érvényesítésének. Ehhez megfelelő politikai, jogi és gazdasági környezetet kell céltudatosan kialakítani. A posztszocialista átmenet kezdetén sokan azt hitték, hogy a hatékony piacgazdaság létrehozásához elegendő lesz megvalósítani a liberalizáció, privatizáció és stabilizáció "szentháromságát". Mára már kiderült, hogy a költségvetési korlát megkeményítése az említett három feladattal egyenrangúan fontos. Ahol ez nem valósul meg (például Oroszország), ott a privatizáció nem hozza meg a várt eredményt. ___________________ The budget constraint has not hardened to equal degrees in the various post-socialist countries. In some of them, a great deal has been done in this respect, while in others there has been hardly any change from the initial state. This study surveys the typical manifestations of softness of the budget constraint, such as state subsidies, soft taxation, non-performing loans, the accumulation of trade arrears between firms, and the build-up of wage arrears. Softness of the budget constraint is caused by several factors that tend to act in combination. Thus retention of state ownership helps to preserve the soft budget-constraint syndrome, while privatization encourages the budget constraint to harden, although it does not form a sufficient condition for it to happen. Purposeful development of the requisite political, legal and economic conditions is also required. It was widely maintained at the outset of the post-socialist transition that the 'Holy Trinity' of liberalization, privatization and stabilization would suffice to produce an efficient market economy. Since then, it has become clear that hardening the budget constraint needs to be given equal priority with these. Otherwise, the effects of privatization will fall short of expectations, as they have in Russia, for example.

A puha költségvetési korlát szindrómája a kórházi szektorban = The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector

A kutatások eddig főképpen azt vizsgálták, hogyan jelenik meg a puha költségvetési korlát szindrómája a vállalati szférában és a hitelrendszerben. A jelen cikk a kórházi szektorra összpontosítja a figyelmet. Leírja az események öt főszereplőjének, a betegnek, az orvosnak, a kórházigazgatónak, a politikusnak és a kórház tulajdonosának motivációit és magatartásuk ellentmondásos jellegét. A motivációk magyarázzák, miért olyan erőteljes a túlköltési hajlam és a költségvetési korlát felpuhulásának tendenciája. A döntési és finanszírozási folyamatok minden szintjén felfelé hárítják a túlköltés és eladósodás terheit. A cikk kitér a különböző tulajdonformák (állami, nonprofit és forprofit nem állami tulajdonformák) és a puha költségvetési korlát szindrómájának kapcsolatára. Végül normatív szempontból vizsgálja a jelenséget: melyek a költségvetési korlát megkeményítésének kedvező és kedvezőtlen következményei, és hogyan tükröződnek a normatív dilemmák az események résztvevőinek tudatában. ___________ Researches so far have examined mainly how the soft budget constraint syndrome appears in the corporate sphere and the credit system. This article concentrates on the hospital sector. It describes the motivations and the contradictory behaviour of the five main types of participant in the events: patients, doctors, hospital managers, politicians, and hospital owners. The motivations explain why the propensity to overspend and the tendency to soften the budget constraint are so strong. The burdens of overspending and indebtedness are pushed upwards at every level of the decision-making and funding processes. The article considers the connection between the soft budget constraint syn-drome and the various forms of ownership (state ownership and the non-profit and for-profit forms of non-state ownership). Finally, the phenomenon is examined from the normative point of view: what are the favourable and unfavourable consequences of hardening the budget constraint and how these are reflected in the consciousness of the participants in the normative dilemmas and events.

The Soft Budget Constraint. An introductory study to volume IV of the Life’s Work series

The author’s ideas on the soft budget constraint (SBC) were first expressed in 1976. Much progress has been made in understanding the problem over the ensuing four decades. The study takes issue with those who confine the concept to the process of bailing out loss-making socialist firms. It shows how the syndrome can appear in various organizations and forms in many spheres of the economy and points to the various means available for financial rescue. Single bailouts do not as such generate the SBC syndrome. It develops where the SBC becomes built into expectations. Special heed is paid to features generated by the syndrome in rescuer and rescuee organizations. The study reports on the spread of the syndrome in various periods of the socialist and the capitalist system, in various sectors. The author expresses his views on normative questions and on therapies against the harmful effects. He deals first with actual practice, then places the theory of the SBC in the sphere of ideas and models, showing how it relates to other theoretical trends, including institutional and behavioural economics and theories of moral hazard and inconsistency in time. He shows how far the intellectual apparatus of the SBC has spread in theoretical literature and where it has reached in the process of “canonization” by the economics profession. Finally, he reviews the main research tasks ahead.

Introduction of soft budget constraint as an analyzing tool into public management. The case of the Hungarian public administration reform

Public management reforms are usually underpinned by arguments that they will make the public administration system more effective and efficient. In practice, however, it is very hard to determine whether a given reform will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system in the long run. Here, I shall examine how the concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) introduced by János Kornai (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003) can be applied to this problem. In the following, I shall describe the Hungarian public administration reforms implemented by the Orbán government from 2010 onward and analyze its reforms, focusing on which measures harden and which ones soften the budget constraint of the actors of the Hungarian public administration system. In the literature of economics, there is some evidence-based knowledge on how to harden/soften the budget constraint, which improves/reduces the effectiveness and hence the efficiency of the given system. By using the concept of SBC, I also hope to shed some light on the rationale behind the Hungarian government’s introduction of such a contradictory reform package. Previously, the concept of SBC was utilized narrowly in public management studies, mostly in the field of fiscal federalism. My goal is to apply the concept to a broader area of public management studies. My conclusion is that the concept of SBC can significantly contribute to public management studies by deepening our knowledge on the reasons behind the success and failure of public administration reforms.

Are exports and imports cointegrated? Evidence from two Pacific Island countries

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether there is long-run relationship between exports and imports for two Pacific Island Countries -- Fiji and Papua New Guinea (PNG). This is an important issue because long-run convergence will ensure that trade imbalances are sustainable. We explore this issue using the bounds-testing approach to cointegration and find that while exports and imports for Fiji and PNG are indeed cointegrated, the coefficient on exports is unity only in the case of Fiji. These results imply that Fiji satisfies the strong form of its intertemporal budget constraint while PNG satisfies only the weak form of its intertemporal budget constraint.

Panel cointegration tests of the sustainability hypothesis in rich OECD countries

This study reexamines the sustainability hypothesis by testing whether government revenues and expenditures for eight rich OECD countries between 1977Q1 and 2005Q4 are cointegrated. For this purpose, a nonstationary panel data approach is adopted, which is general enough to permit for cross-country dependence as well as structural breaks representing major shifts in fiscal policy. In contrast to many earlier studies, the results reported in this study suggest that the sustainability hypothesis cannot be rejected. © 2010 Taylor & Francis.

Using a panel structure to discuss the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle in developing countries

The purpose of this paper is to test the implications of current account solvency for the savinginvestment correlation in developing countries. Since solvency is a long-run phenomenon, and given that the power of the standard unit root and cointegration tests is low, we exploit the panel structure of the sample of 29 developing countries. We find evidence that saving and investment are cointegrated and that the current account is stationary. Therefore, the Feldstein-Horioka correlations are not a puzzle in the sense they reflect the intertemporal budget constraint. The same results are obtained for different subsamples (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and for different periods of time (1960-74 and 1975-96). We, then, suggest that an error correction model should distinguish between the long-run correlation, which reflects the solvency condition, and the short-run correlation, which could measure capital mobility.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

The sustainability of Fiji's budget deficit : an econometric analysis

The sustainability of Fiji's budget deficit is examined here within the framework of inter-temporal budget constraint theory, where government revenue is modelled as a function of government expenditure. An error-correction mechanism test for cointegration finds that government revenue and expenditure are cointegrated, which provides some support for the position that Fiji's budget deficit is sustainable in the long run. It is argued that more government expenditure on capital investment will ensure a broader revenue base and reduce the risk of a budget deficit explosion.

Optimal control of information epidemics modeled as Maki Thompson rumors

We model the spread of information in a homogeneously mixed population using the Maki Thompson rumor model. We formulate an optimal control problem, from the perspective of single campaigner, to maximize the spread of information when the campaign budget is fixed. Control signals, such as advertising in the mass media, attempt to convert ignorants and stiflers into spreaders. We show the existence of a solution to the optimal control problem when the campaigning incurs non-linear costs under the isoperimetric budget constraint. The solution employs Pontryagin's Minimum Principle and a modified version of forward backward sweep technique for numerical computation to accommodate the isoperimetric budget constraint. The techniques developed in this paper are general and can be applied to similar optimal control problems in other areas. We have allowed the spreading rate of the information epidemic to vary over the campaign duration to model practical situations when the interest level of the population in the subject of the campaign changes with time. The shape of the optimal control signal is studied for different model parameters and spreading rate profiles. We have also studied the variation of the optimal campaigning costs with respect to various model parameters. Results indicate that, for some model parameters, significant improvements can be achieved by the optimal strategy compared to the static control strategy. The static strategy respects the same budget constraint as the optimal strategy and has a constant value throughout the campaign horizon. This work finds application in election and social awareness campaigns, product advertising, movie promotion and crowdfunding campaigns. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Perfil de internamentos por Depressão Major no SNS português nos anos de 2008 e 2013 : variação em período de crise económica

RESUMO - O início da crise económica global colocou Portugal num contexto de restrição orçamental que gerou repercussões em várias áreas, especificamente na saúde mental das pessoas, evidenciadas a partir de 2009. O objetivo deste trabalho foi analisar o impacto da crise económica no perfil de internamentos por Depressão Major na população em idade ativa nos hospitais do SNS em Portugal Continental. Tratou-se de um estudo epidemiológico, observacional, descritivo e transversal. Foi efetuada uma análise individual, concretizada através da análise dos episódios de internamento; e ecológica, ao nível de distritos; nos anos de 2008 e 2013. Foram analisados dados relativos aos episódios de internamento, à população em idade ativa e às camas de internamento de psiquiatria. Os resultados permitem afirmar que os distritos com menores índices de urbanização e de densidade populacional apresentaram taxas de internamento por Depressão Major, na população em idade ativa, mais elevadas, e os seus habitantes apresentaram um risco de internamento superior, em ambos os períodos. Observou-se um aumento da taxa de internamentos e do risco de internamento por Depressão Major, na maioria dos distritos, no período de crise económica. Adicionalmente, verificou-se que a taxa de internamentos foi influenciada positivamente pelo número de camas disponíveis e ocorreu um aumento do número de internamentos por Depressão Major por cama de internamento disponível, no período de crise económica. Este estudo, de carater exploratório e com limitações identificadas, permitiu observar a variação geográfica e temporal do internamento por Depressão Major fomentando a necessidade de investigação futura neste âmbito.

Political intervention in economic activity

This paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.