La incidencia del nuevo sistema general de regalías en la descentralización fiscal en los departamentos de Cundinamarca y Meta

El proyecto tiene como objetivo principal analizar la incidencia del Nuevo Sistema General de Regalías en el proceso de descentralización fiscal en Colombia iniciado por la Constitución de 1991, tomando como estudio de caso los departamentos de Cundinamarca y Meta. Para esto, se hace un análisis de la legislación a través de la historia, examinando los factores más importantes que inciden tanto en la descentralización fiscal, como en el régimen de las regalías. El Gobierno de Juan Manuel Santos propuso la reforma al sistema de regalías exponiendo cuatro objetivos: ahorro, equidad, competitividad y buen gobierno. Todo esto eliminando las regalías directas y centralizando los recursos por el Gobierno Central, lo que generó una fuerte discusión de los gobernantes de los entes territoriales. Es en este contexto que Cundinamarca como departamento no productor y el Meta como uno de los principales receptores de regalías directas constituyen una fuente de análisis importante.

El principio de corresponsabilidad fiscal: fundamento y límites de los ingresos en la Constitución española (Tema Central)

Consiste en un estudio desde el ordenamiento constitucional español del marco hacendístico autonómico y local en perspectiva nacional, contrastado con el desarrollo legal vigente en la materia y que propicia, en el contexto de la descentralización fiscal, la revisión del principio de corresponsabilidad fiscal a la hora de examinar las prerrogativas de orden financiero de estos niveles de gobierno.

El estado de la descentralización fiscal en el Ecuador (Tema Central)

La descentralización fiscal ha tenido un mejor desarrollo relativo si se la compara con la descentralización administrativa de la que es su complemento, se pueden mostrar resultados visibles en dos escenarios que forman parte de su contenido esencial: por una parte, la transferencia de recursos del presupuesto general del Estado a favor de los gobiernos autónomos descentralizados que observan los criterios de asignación contemplados en la Constitución, ha logrado definir el sistema de transferencia de recursos que cumple con sus características esenciales: ser predecible, automática y oportuna. Por otra parte, está el sistema impositivo subnacional que, con su base constitucional, se ha desarrollado en la legislación secundaria, de manera que tres de los cuatro niveles de gobierno subnacional tienen la posibilidad real de incrementar sus recursos propios, a través del ejercicio de la potestad tributaria que les permite crear, modificar y exonerar tasas y contribuciones especiales de mejoras, dentro del ámbito de competencias de cada nivel.

Autonomía financiera de los municipios en Colombia. Contenido, alcance y principales dificultades en el Estado unitario

Informe final de investigación en el que se define el contenido y se delimita el alcance de la autonomía financiera en los entes municipales en Colombia. Lo anterior, partiendo del premisa del artículo 311 de la C.N., en donde el Municipio es concebido como la “entidad fundamental de la división político-administrativa del Estado (…)”, al cual se le arrogó autonomía como derecho y como garantía institucional, para destinarlo a ser la piedra angular de la organización territorial del Estado, autonomía para la gestión de sus intereses que se manifiesta en la facultad de administrar sus recursos, establecer tributos y participar en las rentas nacionales; indicando que es éste el objeto de análisis del presente documento. La autonomía financiera en los municipios será analizada desde el punto de vista constitucional, normativo, jurisprudencial y doctrinal. Se demostrará que ésta es el resultado de la evolución en la forma en la cual se ha hecho y se hace el gasto público en Colombia, una transición que de manera simultánea al proceso político administrativo, ha demostrado que sólo a través del empoderamiento de los municipios puede concretarse la eficiencia como principio orientador del gasto público. Además, se examinará la autonomía financiera municipal en sus dos manifestaciones esenciales, es decir, revisando la forma en que los municipios obtienen sus recursos y la forma en que posteriormente los ejecutan.

Viabilidad fiscal de la supresión de departamentos y la creación de regiones como entidades territoriales

El sistema de organización territorial ha pervivido hasta el día de hoy con algunas modificaciones como por ejemplo la elección popular de alcaldes y gobernadores o el ascenso a la categoría de departamentos de las intendencias y comisarías

Politicians as experts, electoral control, and fiscal restraints

We establish an argument for fiscal restraints which is based on the idea that politicians are experts in the meaning of the credence good literature. A budget maximizing politician is better informed than the electorate about the necessary spending to ensure the states ability to provide services for the economy. Voters, being able to observe the budget but not the necessary level of spending, attenuate the government’s spending level via electoral control. A fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government will choose if the level of spending ensuring the politicians reelection is not sufficient to ensure the state’s ability to provide services to the economy. We determine when such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the opposition in situations where very high levels of spending are required.

Bailing out the FEG : is the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (formerly GEERS) approaching its own fiscal cliff?

This article discusses what recent statistics and public reports reveal about the funding of GEERS (now the FEG) and its bottom line. The article examines (1) whether there has been a “blowout” in the scheme which guarantees the recovery of employee entitlements in liquidations and (2) what might be done to put the scheme on a firmer fiscal footing.

Influence and increased funding in Canadian public libraries : the case of Alberta in fiscal year 2009–10

This exploratory case study examined the role of social influence in the decision-making process to increase public library funding in the Canadian province of Alberta in the 2009–10 fiscal year. Using Robert Cialdini’s theory of factors of influence (i.e., commitment and consistency, authority, liking, social proof, scarcity, and reciprocity) as a framework for analysis, findings show that consistency and commitment and authority were relevant and that liking was also important. These findings are consistent with Cialdini’s theory, which suggests that the quality of relationships is one factor that can most strongly influence a decision maker. This study gives insight into the factors motivating those involved in public library funding allocation decisions. No prior studies have examined the construct of influence in decision making about funding for public libraries at any level of government.

Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers : the case of India

This paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in India. Especially, we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal. Simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services. Optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods. Illustrations are also provided for India.

Essays on macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy rules

Economic and Monetary Union can be characterised as a complicated set of legislation and institutions governing monetary and fiscal responsibilities. The measures of fiscal responsibility are to be guided by the Stability and Growth Pact, which sets rules for fiscal policy and makes a discretionary fiscal policy virtually impossible. To analyse the effects of the fiscal and monetary policy mix, we modified the New Keynesian framework to allow for supply effects of fiscal policy. We show that defining a supply-side channel for fiscal policy using an endogenous output gap changes the stabilising properties of monetary policy rules. The stability conditions are affected by fiscal policy, so that the dichotomy between active (passive) monetary policy and passive (active) fiscal policy as stabilising regimes does not hold, and it is possible to have an active monetary - active fiscal policy regime consistent with dynamical stability of the economy. We show that, if we take supply-side effects into ac-count, we get more persistent inflation and output reactions. We also show that the dichotomy does not hold for a variety of different fiscal policy rules based on government debt and budget deficit, using the tax smoothing hypothesis and formulating the tax rules as difference equations. The debt rule with active monetary policy results in indeterminacy, while the deficit rule produces a determinate solution with active monetary policy, even with active fiscal policy. The combination of fiscal requirements in a rule results in cyclical responses to shocks. The amplitude of the cycle is larger with more weight on debt than on deficit. Combining optimised monetary policy with fiscal policy rules means that, under a discretionary monetary policy, the fiscal policy regime affects the size of the inflation bias. We also show that commitment to an optimal monetary policy not only corrects the inflation bias but also increases the persistence of output reactions. With fiscal policy rules based on the deficit we can retain the tax smoothing hypothesis also in a sticky price model.

The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy under a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime

This licentiate's thesis analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy under a flexible exchange rate regime, assuming that the government spends exclusively on domestically produced goods. The motivation for this research comes from the observation that the literature on the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) has focused almost exclusively on two-country global models and the analyses of the effects of fiscal policy on small economies are almost completely ignored. This thesis aims at filling in the gap in the NOEM literature and illustrates how the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy depend on the specification of preferences. The research method is to present two theoretical model that are extensions to the model contained in the Appendix to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). The first model analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, making use of a model that exploits the idea of modelling private and government consumption as substitutes in private utility. The model offers intuitive predictions on how the effects of fiscal policy depend on the marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption. The findings illustrate that the higher the substitutability between private and government consumption, (i) the bigger is the crowding out effect on private consumption (ii) and the smaller is the positive effect on output. The welfare analysis shows that the less fiscal policy decreases welfare the higher is the marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption. The second model of this thesis studies how the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy depend on the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. This model reveals that this elasticity a key variable to explain the exchange rate, current account and output response to a permanent rise in government spending. Finally, the model demonstrates that temporary changes in government spending are an effective stabilization tool when used wisely and timely in response to undesired fluctuations in output. Undesired fluctuations in output can be perfectly offset by an opposite change in government spending without causing any side-effects.