Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derivetaxation are valid in this setup. We incorporate pre-committed goods - those whose consumption must be decided before the resolution of uncertainty - and show that tax prescriptions are also analogous to the existing literature. The robustness of tax rules across these setups is explained by the relaxation of incentive compatibility constraints.

Essays on household taxation and competition between heterogeneous firms

Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: "Tax Filing Choices for the Household", "Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches" e "Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms".

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Collision probabilities in the rarefaction fan of asymmetric exclusion processes

We consider the one-dimensional asymmetric simple exclusion process (ASEP) in which particles jump to the right at rate p is an element of (1/2, 1.] and to the left at rate 1 - p, interacting by exclusion. In the initial state there is a finite region such that to the left of this region all sites are occupied and to the right of it all sites are empty. Under this initial state, the hydrodynamical limit of the process converges to the rarefaction fan of the associated Burgers equation. In particular suppose that the initial state has first-class particles to the left of the origin, second-class particles at sites 0 and I, and holes to the right of site I. We show that the probability that the two second-class particles eventually collide is (1 + p)/(3p), where a collision occurs when one of the particles attempts to jump over the other. This also corresponds to the probability that two ASEP processes. started from appropriate initial states and coupled using the so-called ""basic coupling,"" eventually reach the same state. We give various other results about the behaviour of second-class particles in the ASEP. In the totally asymmetric case (p = 1) we explain a further representation in terms of a multi-type particle system, and also use the collision result to derive the probability of coexistence of both clusters in a two-type version of the corner growth model.

Chiral Triphenylprolinol Ligands for the Efficient Catalytic Asymmetric Arylation of Aldehydes

The synthesis of new chiral amino alcohols by Heck arylation of an enecarbamate is described. These compounds were used as chiral ligands for the catalytic asymmetric arylation of aldehydes and can be easily recovered. Chiral, nonracemic diarylmethanols were obtained in high yields and enantioselectivities.

Organocatalytic asymmetric aldol reactions mediated by a cysteine-derived prolinamide

In this Letter, a cysteine-derived prolinamide is described to act as a robust and effective organocatalyst for enantioselective aldol reactions. (c) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Carbohydrates in asymmetric synthesis: enantioselective allylation of aldehydes

An enantioselective metal-mediated addition of allylic bromides to carbonyl compounds was achieved in the presence of the inexpensive and easily accessible carbohydrates saccharose and beta-cyclodextrin. The desired products were obtained in moderate to excellent yields and with up to 93% enantiomeric excess. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A simple design methodology for elliptical cross-section, transverse, asymmetric, head gradient coils for MRI

A simple design process for the design of elliptical cross-section, transverse gradient coils for use in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is presented. This process is based on a flexible stochastic optimization method and results in designs of high linearity and efficiency with low switching times. A design study of a shielded, transverse asymmetric elliptical coil set for use in neural imaging is presented and includes the minimization of the torques experienced by the gradient set.

Designs for an asymmetric gradient set and a compact superconducting magnet for neural magnetic resonance imaging

Imaging of the head and neck is the most commonly performed clinical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) examination [R. G. Evans and J. R. G. Evans, AJR 157, 603 (1991)]. This is usually undertaken in a generalist MRI instrument containing superconducting magnet system capable of imaging all organs. These generalist instruments are large, typically having a bore of 0.9-1.0 m and a length of 1.7-2.5 m and therefore are expensive to site, somewhat claustrophobic to the patient, and offer little access by attending physicians. In this article, we present the design of a compact, superconducting MRI magnet for head and neck imaging that is less than 0.8 m in length and discuss in detail the design of an asymmetric gradient coil set, tailored to the magnet profile. In particular, the introduction of a radio-frequency FM modulation scheme in concert with a gradient sequence allows the epoch of the linear region of the gradient set to be much closer to the end of the gradient structure than was previously possible. Images from a prototype gradient set demonstrate the effectiveness of the designs. (C) 1999 American Institute of Physics. [S0034-6748(99)04910-2].

Asymmetric MRI magnet design using a hybrid numerical method

This paper describes a hybrid numerical method for the design of asymmetric magnetic resonance imaging magnet systems. The problem is formulated as a field synthesis and the desired current density on the surface of a cylinder is first calculated by solving a Fredholm equation of the first kind. Nonlinear optimization methods are then invoked to fit practical magnet coils to the desired current density. The field calculations are performed using a semi-analytical method. A new type of asymmetric magnet is proposed in this work. The asymmetric MRI magnet allows the diameter spherical imaging volume to be positioned close to one end of the magnet. The main advantages of making the magnet asymmetric include the potential to reduce the perception of claustrophobia for the patient, better access to the patient by attending physicians, and the potential for reduced peripheral nerve stimulation due to the gradient coil configuration. The results highlight that the method can be used to obtain an asymmetric MRI magnet structure and a very homogeneous magnetic field over the central imaging volume in clinical systems of approximately 1.2 m in length. Unshielded designs are the focus of this work. This method is flexible and may be applied to magnets of other geometries. (C) 1999 Academic Press.

Incomplete, asymmetric, and route-dependent cross-tolerance between oxycodone and morphine in the Dark Agouti rat

Our previous studies indicate that oxycodone is a putative kappa-opioid agonist, whereas morphine is a well documented mu-opioid agonist. Because there is limited information regarding the development of tolerance to oxycodone, this study was designed to 1) document the development of tolerance to the antinociceptive effects of chronically infused i.v. oxycodone relative to that for i.v. morphine and 2) quantify the degree of antinociceptive cross-tolerance between morphine and oxycodone in adult male Dark Agouti (DA) rats. Antinociceptive testing was performed using the tail-flick latency test. Complete antinociceptive tolerance was achieved in 48 to 84 h after chronic infusion of equi-antinociceptive doses of i.v. oxycodone (2.5 mg/24 h and 5 mg/24 h) and i.v. morphine (10 mg/24 h and 20 mg/24 h, respectively). Dose-response curves for bolus doses of i.v. and i.c.v. morphine and oxycodone were produced in naive, morphine-tolerant, and oxycodone-tolerant rats. Consistent with our previous findings that oxycodone and morphine produce their intrinsic antinociceptive effects through distinctly different opioid receptor populations, there was no discernible cross-tolerance when i.c.v. oxycodone was given to morphine-tolerant rats. Similarly, only a low degree of cross-tolerance (approximate to 24%) was observed after i.v. oxycodone administration to morphine-tolerant rats. By contrast, both i.v. and i.c.v. morphine showed a high degree of cross-tolerance (approximate to 71% and approximate to 54%, respectively) in rats rendered tolerant to oxycodone. Taken together, these findings suggest that, after parenteral but not supraspinal administration, oxycodone is metabolized to a mu-opioid agonist metabolite, thereby explaining asymmetric and incomplete cross-tolerance between oxycodone and morphine.

Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers

In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.