Arquitectura judicial en Aragón en la última centuria

La arquitectura judicial puede considerarse como la manifestación construida de uno de los aspectos fundamentales que definen una cultura, periodo histórico, o ámbito geográfico, que es la administración de justicia en cada sociedad. La Ley y el Derecho requieren unos ámbitos espaciales singulares en los que desarrollar los procesos que culminan con el acto judicial, el contraste de versiones e investigaciones que tienen como objetivo la búsqueda de la verdad por encima de todo. La arquitectura se configura como el escenario en el que tiene lugar el juicio, y ha de contribuir en este noble cometido. El conocimiento de la arquitectura judicial requiere -en primera instancia- un análisis arquitectónico, pero además esta visión se puede y se tiene que enriquecer con los enfoques que la propia práctica jurídica ha de aportar, y que en gran medida condicionan su creación y proyecto, en todo lo relativo a funcionalidad y simbología. Sin olvidar que nuestra formación es fundamentalmente arquitectónica, cabe plantear que el área de conocimiento a la que va dirigida esta investigación también se abre en diversas vías, que parten de la confluencia de aspectos legales, arquitectónicos, urbanos, y simbológicos. Además, todos estos aspectos son planteados en relación con las particularidades de una región concreta, Aragón, donde la ley ha tenido sus propias manifestaciones y códigos, donde la arquitectura y la ciudad se han contextualizado en un lugar concreto, y donde la simbología ha tenido su manera particular de transmitirse. Respecto a los objetivos que esta tesis plantea, podemos plantear en un primer estadio el análisis del carácter de la arquitectura judicial, como concepto y expresión amplia que manifiesta la función del edificio y su traducción en una simbología propia, y que queda vinculado, por lo tanto, a la funcionalidad de los procedimientos que en él tienen lugar y a la solemnidad alegórica de la Justicia. Para llevar a cabo este estudio se pretende establecer una metodología de estudio propia, que surge de considerar como valores formativos del tipo de arquitectura judicial a la tríada de valores urbanos, funcionales, y simbólicos. En primer lugar se evaluará la repercusión urbana de la arquitectura judicial, conforme a su consideración de equipamiento publico representativo de una sociedad. Se analizará, por lo tanto, si se dan posiciones urbanas concretas o arbitrarias, y si éstas se pueden tratar como una constante histórica. En segundo lugar, la especificidad y delicadeza de los usos que alberga llevan consigo planteamientos funcionales absolutamente complejos y específicos. Se considera que merece la pena analizarlos para evaluar si son propios de este tipo de arquitectura, así como su posible origen e implicación en la construcción del espacio judicial. En tercer lugar, se analizarán los edificios judiciales desde su consideración de soporte de una gran cantidad de materializaciones de simbológicas, no sólo desde un punto de vista iconográfico, sino además vinculadas a los procesos y ordenamientos judiciales, que se traducen en la construcción de espacios con una fuerte carga simbólica y escenográfica. En un segundo estadio se analiza la validez de la aplicación de dichos valores en el estudio de una serie de casos concretos de la arquitectura judicial en el territorio de Aragón en el siglo XX. Se buscará con ello la posibilidad de establecer variantes geográficas y temporales al tipo propias de esta comunidad, con unas particularidades forales que pueden dar lugar a ellas, así como posibles líneas evolutivas, o por el contrario, la imposibilidad de establecer pautas y relaciones a partir del análisis de los casos concretos y su valoración global. ABSTRACT Judicial architecture can be seen as the built manifestation of one of the key aspects that define a culture, a historical period, or a geographic scope, which is the administration of justice in every society. Law requires specific spaces to develop its own proceedings, that culminate with the judicial act. It is the contrast of versions and investigations that have an objective, the search for the truth. Architecture is configured as the stage in which the trial takes place, and has to contribute to this noble task. The knowledge of the judicial architecture requires -in the first instance - an architectural analysis, but in addition this vision can be enriched by some questions from the legal practice. They determine project decissions, specially functional and symbologycal aspects. Our main visión of the theme is architectural, but this research is also opened in many ways, that com from the confluence of legal, architectural, urban, and simbologic aspects In addition, all these questios are considered in relation to the peculiarities of a specific region, Aragon, where the law has its own manifestations and codes, where the architecture and the city have been contextualized in a particular way, and where the symbology has its particular way to be transmitted. About the objectives that this thesis purposes, we can suggest in a first stage the analysis of the character of the judicial architecture, as a concept that expresses the function of a building, and its translation into a particular symbology, allegorical to the solemnity of the Justice. To carry out the investigation proccess is neccesary to define a new methodology. It comes form considering the formative values of the judicial architecture, developed on the triad of urban, functional, and symbolic, values. Firstly, we analyse the urban aspects of judicial architecture, according to its consideration as a main public equipment of a society. Therefore we can search for specific or arbitrary urban locations of the courts, and if they can be considered as historic constants. Secondly, we analyse the specificity an complexity of the judicial uses, their possible origin, and involvement in the construction of judicial space. Thirdly, we analyse the court as scenographic stage, that support lots of symbolic elements and aspects linked to legal system. The second stage applies the values methodology on judicial architecture in Aragon in the twentieth century, with the possibility of establishing geographical and temporal variants os the court type in this community, or on the contrary, the inability to establish patterns and relationships from the analysis of specific cases and their overall rating.

Reconhecimento, mensuração e evidenciação do passivo judicial trabalhista

A má avaliação do passivo judicial pode impactar de modo negativo as disponibilidades financeiras da organização, com consequencias para sua liquidez e para a continuidade das atividades operacionais. O presente trabalho teve como objetivo verificar se o reconhecimento, a mensuração e a evidenciação do Passivo Judicial Trabalhista atendem aos pressupostos da literatura contábil e do direito natural, no que toca ao conceito de fair value. No contexto metodológico, apresentou-se o arcabouço teórico-jurídico do reconhecimento, da mensuração e da evidenciação. Em seguida, dentre as empresas listadas nos segmentos Nível 1, Nível 2 e Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa foram selecionadas, para a amostra, as 40 empresas com maior quantidade de ações em tramitação no TST. Foram analisadas as Notas Explicativas dessas companhias e verificou-se que, a maior parte não divulga informações alusivas à origem do passivo judicial trabalhista, à forma de mensuração das provisões, à quantidade de ações e ao cronograma de desembolsos. Assim, as práticas adotadas por tais empresas não estão em conformidade plena com os pressupostos da literatura contábil e do direito natural pois as determinações contábeis (CPC 25) tem sido observadas em sua forma menos ampla. Também foi constatado que há possibilidade de melhoria no processo de reconhecimento, mensuração e evidenciação eis que há boas práticas, pontuais, nas companhias examinadas que podem ser generalizadas para as demais.

Legislação e judiciatura: o lugar da lei na realização judicial do direito

O presente trabalho questiona o papel da legislação na realização judicial do direito. Para responder a essa questão, empreende-se uma tese conceitual sobre a dinâmica jurídica, que pretende superar a tradicional dicotomia entre a legislação e a função judicial concebida pela doutrina clássica da separação dos poderes. De acordo com a argumentação desenvolvida aqui, o judiciário julga não somente fatos dos casos, mas também as próprias escolhas legislativas, de modo que já não é possível defender que a função judicial consiste em mera declaração da lei nos casos particulares ou ainda em subsunção lógica das lides que lhe são submetidas às normas previamente postas pelo processo legislativo. Assim, a realização judicial do direito não pode ser anteriormente determinada, uma vez que não está condicionada pelo conteúdo legislado. Contudo, os conteúdos da lei transmitem algum sentido para os cidadãos e, por isso, criam expectativas. Confirmar ou não essas expectativas é uma questão relacionada com a justificação e a legitimidade dos Estados racionais modernos, que estabelecem com os cidadãos uma relação de dominação legal-racional. Desse modo, a questão do papel da legislação (direito positivo passado) na realização do direito atual é posta em termos de legitimidade. Se, de um lado, constatamos que não é possível pretender controlar a discricionariedade judicial dentro dos próprios limites do direito, de outro lado defendemos que é legítimo pretender submeter o direito positivo à crítica e ao controle democrático. Isso porque interessa a todos os cidadãos que as decisões judiciais possam ser justificadas de modo razoável, graças a uma argumentação cuja força e a pertinência se reconheçam amplamente na sociedade. A partir dessa perspectiva, propomos um redimensionamento do argumento legal na prática jurídica e passamos a analisar as diversas implicações da questão central posta neste trabalho na realização judicial do direito.

Reforma del estado como mecanismo de control en democracia delegativa: caso reforma judicial Ecuador 2007-2014

The object of this doctoral thesis is the analysis of the political and administrative purpose that is given to the reform process of a vital sector of State powers within the framework of delegate democracy, such as the administration of Justice. The object is also to analyze if State reform in a diminished or non-liberal surrounding increase or improve conditions of democracy in a given situation, based on the constitutional “what should be”, or if what occurs is a process of “seizure” of the functions of State, which becomes an institutional risk. Finally, we will examine the real and effective existence of a horizontal accountability process through the use of institutional resources, which would evidence the existence of an incomplete model of democracy. This analysis implies the relationship between two institutions within public administration: State Reform, as an act of change in State structure in order to improve qualitatively the outcomes and outputs of public policies, and in sum, to make the system work better. This, as it will be examined later, is the case of Latin America as a response of the State to three processes in crisis: fiscal, as in government intervention or in the form of bureaucratic administration. In that scheme of things, this thesis examines the present state of the art in public administration science of this process to prove that in delegate democracy, this type of instruments disregard the constitutive elements of democracy and serve, especially in critical areas of the administration, allowing for Power to dismiss Law. This research seeks to contribute towards an area seldom analyzed regarding public administration doctrine under the light of the theory of law, which is the connection between previous conditions or principal inputs of an execution process of a democracy and, on the other hand, regarding the effects of introducing a reform within models of a changing democracy and new concepts of the rule of law. While reviewing writings regarding State reform, it is clear that no approximations have been previously made in reference to prior conditions of the political system in order to begin operating a reform which respects fundamental rights as an object of this procedure. Furthermore, no analysis has been found regarding structural change of strategic areas in State services as to the effect caused on democratic exercise and the outcome in an open society...

Recuperação judicial de empresas: atuação do juiz

Esta dissertação tem como objeto a análise da atuação judicial no âmbito dos processos de recuperação judicial de empresas, regulados pela Lei nº 11.101 de 9 de fevereiro de 2002 (\"LRE\"). No primeiro capítulo, são introduzidas as limitações do trabalho e as principais questões a serem respondidas ao longo do texto. No segundo capítulo, são expostos os panoramas histórico e jurídico da LRE, para que se extraiam os verdadeiros objetivos tutelados pela lei e o diálogo destes objetivos com a atuação do Poder Judiciário. No terceiro capítulo, são propostos três níveis de intervenção judicial no bojo do processo de recuperação, sendo eles: (a) o controle de legalidade estrita, por meio do qual o juiz verificará a observância aos requisitos e vedações impostos pela LRE ao conteúdo do plano de recuperação e à sua votação; (b) o controle de legalidade material ou controle de juridicidade, por meio do qual o juiz avaliará se o conteúdo do plano e sua votação atendem aos princípios gerais orientadores do ordenamento brasileiro; e (c) o juízo de viabilidade, por meio do qual o juiz, usando de critérios objetivos sugeridos pela doutrina, avaliaria o mérito do plano de recuperação judicial para averiguar se, além de atenderem aos critérios de legalidade, as disposições do plano de recuperação atingem os objetivos traçados pela LRE, no sentido de tutela da empresa viável e tutela institucional do crédito. No quarto capítulo, são retomadas as conclusões alcançadas ao final de cada um dos subcapítulos.

Notes of cases decided in the Superior and Supreme Judicial Courts of Massachusetts from 1772 to 1789: taken by the Hon. William Cushing, one of the judges during that period and most of the time Chief Justice

Notes of cases taken by Judge William Cushing during his tenure on the Massachusetts superior and supreme courts. (Formerly MS 2141.)

Precedents book of Massachusetts law, 1775

A commonplace book kept by Parsons outling various legal issues including getting a negro with child, slander, deceit, bills of exchange, debt,assault and battery, quantum meruit by a physician, ejectment, covenant, and liberty of the yard. Many of these topics include also forms of declaration.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

Controle judicial de políticas públicas no Brasil : limites da intervenção do poder judiciário na execução de políticas públicas para efetivação dos direitos fundamentais sociais à prestação

O Controle judicial das políticas públicas necessárias para a efetivação dos direitos constitucionais sociais à prestação é tema muito polêmico na atividade jurisdicional brasileira. Há os que defendem a intervenção irrestrita na tarefa de impor à administração pública a qualquer custo a efetivação das políticas públicas de sua competência. Contudo o nosso trabalho defende que a intervenção do Poder Judiciário no controle de políticas públicas é possível, segundo comando constitucional contido no artigo 3º da Carta Magna, mas com limitações para evitar a violação do princípio da separação dos poderes. Para demonstrar a nossa concepção sobre o tema partimos da definição e da natureza dos direitos fundamentais sociais e sua concepção na ordem constitucional brasileira. Analisamos as principais funções dos direitos fundamentais, concentrando a nossa atenção na função prestacional, ou direito a prestação em sentido estrito. Nesse particular passamos a discutir as questões que envolvem a efetivação dos direitos fundamentais sociais, a partir de sua eficácia jurídica e social até aos aspectos referentes a sua concretização. Salientamos que a efetivação dos direitos fundamentais sociais “derivados” passa por uma atividade legislativa de conformação antes de sua efetivação e que os “originais” poderiam ser concretizados imediatamente, sem se descurar da necessidade de outra atividade legislativa de destinação dos recurso públicos através da lei orçamentária, na foi ressaltado que deveria ser tomado como um dos critérios para essa destinação o princípio do “mínimo existencial”. Analisamos a tese recorrente de defesa da administração para justificar a não efetivação dos direitos sociais à prestação, a denominada “tese da reserva do possível”, salientamos que embora relevante, não era absoluto esse argumento. Contudo a atuação jurisdicional no controle das políticas públicas, não pode fugir da atenção aos princípios da razoabilidade e da proporcionalidade.

Survey on Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 57, 30 August 2013

This paper offers a picture of the obligations existing under international and European law in respect of the loss of nationality. It describes international instruments including obligations in this field with direct relevancy for the loss of nationality of Member States of the European Union, but also obligations regarding loss of nationality in regional non-European treaties. Attention is given to two important judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice (Janko Rottmann) and the European Court of Human Rights (Genovese v Malta) regarding nationality. Special attention is devoted to Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which forbids the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. A survey is provided of possible sub-principles that can be derived from this rule. Finally, some observations are made on the burden of proof in cases of loss of nationality.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).