Damned to fame: The moral rights of the Beckett estate

The Company B production of Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot raises important questions about copyright law, moral rights, and dramatic works. The playwright's nephew and executor, Edward Beckett, threatened to bring a legal action against the Sydney company for breach of contract on the grounds that unauthorised music appeared in the production. The Company B production denied that the contract made any such express provisions. The director Neil Armfield complained: 'In coming here with its narrow prescriptions, its dead controlling hand, the Beckett estate seems to me to be the enemy of art'. In the biography Damned to fame, James Knowlson documents a number of other proceedings taken by Beckett and his agents to control the productions of his work: 'He was often represented as a tyrannical figure, an arch-controller of his work, ready to unleash fiery thunderbolts onto the head of any bold, innovative director, unwilling to follow his text and stage directions to the last counted dot and precisely timed pause.' However, Knowlson notes that Beckett was inconsistent in his willingness to use legal action: 'It made a tremendous difference if he liked and respected the persons involved or if he had been able to listen to their reasons for wanting to attempt something highly innovative or even slightly different'. Famously, in 1988, Beckett brought legal action against a Dutch theatre company, which wanted to stage a production of Waiting for Godot, with women acting all the roles. His lawyer argued that the integrity of the text was violated because actresses were substituted for the male actors asked for in the text. The judge in the Haarlem court ruled that the integrity of the play had not been violated, because the performance showed fidelity to the dialogue and the stage directions of the play. By contrast, in 1992, a French court held a stage director was liable for an infringement of Beckett's moral right of integrity because the director had staged Waiting for Godot with the two lead roles played by women. In 1998, a United States production of Waiting for Godot with a racially mixed cast attracted legal threats amid accusations it had 'injected race into the play'. In the 2000 New York Fringe Festival, a company made light of this ongoing conflict between the Beckett estate and artistic directors. The work was entitled: The complete lost works of Samuel Beckett as found in an envelope (partially burned) in a dustbin in Paris labelled 'Never to be performed. Never. Ever. EVER! Or I'll sue! I'LL SUE FROM THE GRAVE!'. The plot concerned a fight between three producers and the Beckett estate. In the wake of such disputes, Beckett and later his estate sought to tighten production contracts to state that no additions, omissions or alterations should be made to the text of the play or the stage directions and that no music, special effects or other supplements should be added without prior consent.

Moral rights and their application in Australia: a book review

In Moral Rights and Their Application in Australia, Maree Sainsbury offers a summary of the new moral rights regime established in Australia in 2000. It is a decent guide and handbook to moral rights for legal practitioners, the authors of copyright work, and the users of copyright material. As the author notes: "The Australian moral rights legislation impacts on the rights and obligations of many people in diverse circumstances, from the creator of a highly unique work of art to the designer of a web site incorporating factual information or graphics which someone else has created. Any person creating or dealing with copyright material should be aware of the moral rights implications. This book provides a detailed analysis of the moral rights legislation, while stressing the fundamental provisions. It also provides some useful practical guidance for those who are affected, both in general terms and with respect to the more specific situations outlined above." Maree Sainsbury provides an enjoyable account of the history and nature of moral rights. She charts the romantic, Continental origins of moral rights, and explains their translation to countries, such as Australia and the United States.

The Art of Sympathy : Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion in Fiction

"The Art of Sympathy: Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion" in Fiction is an interdisciplinary study that looks closely at the ways that stories evoke sympathy, and the significance of this emotion for the development of moral attitudes and awareness. By linking readers' emotional responses to fiction with the potential impact of such responses on "the moral imagination," the study builds on empirical research conducted by literary scholars and psychologists into the emotional effects of reading fiction, as well as social psychological research into the connections between empathy/sympathy and moral development. I first investigate the dynamics of readers beliefs regarding characters in fictional narratives, and the nature of the emotions that they may experience as a result of those beliefs. The analysis demonstrates that there are important similarities between real emotions and emotions generated by fiction. Recognizing these similarities, I claim, can help us to conceptualize the nature of sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Building on these assertions, I then draw on research from social psychology and philosophy to develop a comprehensive definition of sympathy and to clarify the ways in which sympathy operates, both in people s daily lives and in readers sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Having established this definition and delineated its practical implications, I then examine how particular stories, through a variety of narrative techniques, persuade readers to feel sympathy for characters who are unsympathetic in certain ways. In order to verify my claims about the impact of these stories on readers emotions, I also review the results of tests that I conducted with nearly 200 adolescent readers. Through these tests, which were constructed and scored according to methods prevalent in social psychological research, it was determined that a majority of readers felt sympathy for the protagonists in two of the stories included in the study. These results were combined with data from an additional test, a standard measure of empathy and sympathy in the field of social psychology. The cross-tabulation of these results suggests that there was not a strong connection between readers responses and their general tendencies to feel sympathy for others. This finding would appear to support my hypotheses regarding the sympathetic persuasiveness of the stories in question. In light of these results, finally, I consider the potential contribution that fiction can make to adolescent emotional and moral development and the implications of that potential for future language arts curricula in the schools. In particular, I suggest the pedagogical importance of providing adolescents with opportunities to engage with the lives of fictional characters, and especially to experience feelings of sympathy for individuals towards whom they ordinarily might feel aversion.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

A Literary Turn : Rethinking the Roles of Generalization and Theory in Anglo-American Moral Philosophy

This work investigates the role of narrative literature in late-20th century and contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It aims to show the trend of reading narrative literature for purposes of moral philosophy from the 1970 s and early 80 s to the present day as a part of a larger movement in Anglo-American moral philosophy, and to present a view of its significance for moral philosophy overall. Chapter 1 provides some preliminaries concerning the view of narrative literature which my discussion builds on. In chapter 2 I give an outline of how narrative literature is considered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, and connect this use to the broad trend of neo-Aristotelian ethics in this context. In chapter 3 I connect the use of literature to the idea of the non-generalizability of moral perception and judgment, which is central to the neo-Aristotelian trend, as well as to a range of moral particularisms and anti-theoretical positions of late 20th century and contemporary ethics. The joint task of chapters 2 and 3 is to situate the trend of reading narrative literature for the purposes of moral philosophy in the present context of moral philosophy. In the following two chapters, 4 and 5, I move on from the particularizing power of narrative literature, which is emphasized by neo-Aristotelians and particularists alike, to a broader under-standing of the intellectual potential of narrative literature. In chapter 4 I argue that narrative literature has its own forms of generalization which are enriching for our understanding of the workings of ethical generalizations in philosophy. In chapter 5 I discuss Iris Murdoch s and Martha Nussbaum s respective ways of combining ethical generality and particularity in a philosophical framework where both systematic moral theory and narrative literature are taken seriously. In chapter 6 I analyse the controversy between contemporary anti-theoretical conceptions of ethics and Nussbaum s refutation of these. I present my suggestion for how the significance of the ethics/literature discussion for moral philosophy can be understood if one wants to overcome the limitations of both Nussbaum s theory-centred, equilibrium-seeking perspective, and the anti-theorists repudiation of theory. I call my position the inclusive approach .

Ordering within moral orders to manage classroom trouble

This paper demonstrates how classroom trouble warranting teacher intervention can stem from transgressions in different layers of the complex moral order regulating classroom interactions. The paper builds from Durkheim’s treatment of schooling as the institution responsible for the inculcation of a shared moral order, Bernstein’s distinction between the instructional and regulative discourses in any pedagogic setting, and the concept of verticality in the instructional discourse to illuminate how curricular knowledge might apply across different contexts. This paper proposes a similar vertical dimension of moral gravity in the regulative discourse, such that some moral expectations apply across any context, while others are highly contextualized. This paper then applies this frame to data from classroom observations conducted in prevocational pathways for 16 years olds created under Australia’s “earning or learning till 17” policy. This paper describes the variety of moral premises teachers invoked in different teacher/class combinations, according to their level of moral gravity to display the dominant use of highly contextualized moral premises seeking institutional compliance, and minimal use of broader moral frames for these students on the brink of entry to the adult world.

Karl Josef Scheuermann Collection 1981-1986

Photocopies of correspondence between Scheuermann, Ernst Cramer, Cardinal Ratzinger, Reuben Hecht on Pope John XXIII and his alleged repentance prayer.

Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the moral world

The nature of our moral judgments—and the extent to which we treat others with care—depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration— our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people’s moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals’ moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, “moral” universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one’s life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.

Theories of moral education and implementation in Indonesia: Re-energizing cultural identity and addressing future challenges

School is regarded as a site of moral training for the younger generation to encounter nation’s future challenges as well as to re-energize nation’s cultural identity. The more competitive global society led by free market trade in terms of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), requires the school to adapt and change its curriculum more frequently. Like many other countries, Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture has introduced and nurtured universal values and traditional values respectively through school curriculum reforms to develop students’ ability to participating in global society. This paper will describe classical and contemporary theories related to moral education that have been implemented in Indonesia’s school curriculum and school activities. The theories developed by Durkheim, Alastair MacIntyre, and Basil Bernstein will be discussed. This includes explaining how far the theories have been adopted in Indonesia and how the approaches are currently being used in Indonesian schooling. This paper suggests despite the implementation of those theories in Indonesian schools, the government needs to optimise the operation of those theories to gain significant outcomes.

The church must become the people of Soweto : Manas Buthelezi’s existential-Christocentric understanding of the church

The aim of this study has been to discern what Manas Buthelezi (1935-), a black South African Lutheran theologian and later also a bishop, regards as the requirements a church has to fulfill in order to be credible in the apartheid society. Buthelezi’s dissertation and several articles written between the years 1968 and 1993 are the sources of this study. Also the lectures held in Heidelberg in 1972 are referred to. Systematic analysis is the method used. The question of the credibility of the church is studied through three concepts that play an important role in Buthelezi’s ecclesiological thought, namely the wholeness of life, incarnation and liberation. The notion of the wholeness of life stems from the African tradition. Buthelezi takes the concept into the Christian church: the church should realize that God is the Creator of all life and Christ the lord of every aspect of human existence. Life is one entity coram Deo. However, the church is not to become the world; solidarity between the two must remain critical as the church is also called to play a prophetic role in the society. The church is in an open relationship with the world. It has a unique message of forgiveness and reconciliation. Nevertheless, the message is not a possession of the church but it is addressed to the whole world. The meaning of incarnation comes close to that of the wholeness of life. Following the example of Christ’s incarnation, the church must become human in the reality of the people. The church in Soweto is to become the people of Soweto, that is, the church must become as vulnerable as the people are. An incarnate church cannot be immune to the oppression that people experience, because the people are the church. The church is therefore bound to suffer. Buthelezi’s theology of the cross is pragmatic: the suffering of the church aims at the liberation of the oppressed. At times the physical presence of the church by the side of the suffering people is the only way to preach the incarnate gospel. In the South Africa of the late 1960s onwards the liberation of the oppressed black people was high on the agenda of Black Theology. As a leader of the early South African Black Theology, Buthelezi is concerned about the racial injustice in his country. He urges the churches to join the struggle against it as one people of God. The notions of liberation and the wholeness of life emerge in Buthelezi’s holistic understanding of liberation that involves the inner liberation of the black spirit and the liberation of the economic, social and political aspects of life. Interpreting Tillich’s correlation method in the South African situation, and also paralleling other liberation theologians, Buthelezi takes the existential situation of the people as the starting point for liberation. The gospel has to respond to the existential questions of people. The church is called to work for the liberation of society but it must also be liberated itself. Buthelezi initiated the LWF statement on the status confessionis in South Africa (1977). In line with the statement, he calls for church unity on the human level. For the unity to be true, it has to be experienced on the grassroots’ level. All the three concepts covered urge the church to come down from any ivory tower and out of any spiritual haven it might hide in. A lot of the credibility of the church derives from the behavior of the people. Buthelezi’s concentration on how the people who constitute the church should live their faith leaves less attention to how God constitutes the church. I have labeled Buthelezi’s understanding of the church existential-Christocentric due to the emphasis he lays on the need of the church to take the existential situation of the people seriously and on the other hand, on Christ as the exemplar for the church.

Can moral potency and psychological risk close the gap between ethical beliefs and unacceptable consumer behavior?

Depending on how they perceive risk, consumers may not always act according to their ethical beliefs, exposing a gap between beliefs and behavior. We investigate the effect of moral potency on perceived psychological risk of committing an unacceptable behavior. The results suggest that perceived risk is triggered by moral ownership.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The role of moral disengagement in underage drinking and heavy episodic drinking

Objectives The current study had two aims. First, to develop a moral disengagement scale contextualized to underage drinking. Second, to investigate Bandura’s (1986) self-regulatory model within the context of underage drinking. Method Two different samples of students participated in the study. The first sample included 619 (362 females) adolescents (Mage = 15.3 years, SD = 1.09 years) and the second sample 636 (386 females) adolescents (Mage = 15.3 years, SD = 1.03 years). Students in the first sample completed the Underage Drinking Disengagement Scale (UDDS), and measures of engagement in underage drinking and heavy episodic drinking. Students in the second sample completed these measures as well as scales of general moral disengagement, personal standards and anticipatory guilt associated with underage drinking. Results For the UDDS, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses verified a single factor structure. The UDDS was more strongly associated with engagement in underage drinking and heavy episodic drinking than a general measure of moral disengagement. A moderated mediation analysis revealed that adolescents who negatively evaluated underage drinking reported more anticipatory guilt, and more anticipatory guilt was associated with less engagement in underage drinking and less heavy episodic drinking. This relationship was weaker at high compared to low levels of underage drinking disengagement. Conclusions/Importance Understanding how adolescents self-regulate their drinking, and ways that such self-regulation may be deactivated or disengaged, may help identify those adolescents at increased risk of drinking underage and of engaging in heavy episodic drinking.

"It's not the Jedi way!": Moral ambivalence and delivering the 'good' in Star Wars

This article examines the nature of good and evil through the prism of Star Wars, arguing that the ostensible dichotomy between the ‘good’ Jedi and the ‘evil’ Sith is false, and instead both the Jedi and the Sith engage in violence, which is evil. Anakin Skywalker then arrives as the Christ-figure who becomes evil and ‘dies’ to destroy the old rigid law of the letter adhered to by the Jedi, before resurrecting and sacrificing himself to defeat the Sith transgressors. As Milbank argues, the act of selfless love by Anakin as the Christ-figure therefore produces the good, the end of violent conflict which is ontological peace, and institutes the law of love which leads to life and peace.