Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism

This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative definition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.

Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being

This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provides an introduction to social-choice theory with interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We argue that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s theorem is to use a richer informational environment than ordinal measurability and the absence of interpersonal comparability of well-being. We discuss welfarist social evaluation (which requires that the levels of individual well-being in two alternatives are the only determinants of their social ranking) and present characterizations of some important social-evaluation orderings.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

Reference Groups and Individual Deprivation

We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyes in the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model. Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically possible reference groups, whereas we employ the standard definition of the reference group as the set of all agents in a society. As a consequence of this modification, some of the axioms used by Ebert and Moyes can no longer be applied and we provide alternative formulations.

Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

Tests multiples simulés et tests de normalité basés sur plusieurs moments dans les modèles de régression

Cet article illustre l’applicabilité des méthodes de rééchantillonnage dans le cadre des tests multiples (simultanés), pour divers problèmes économétriques. Les hypothèses simultanées sont une conséquence habituelle de la théorie économique, de sorte que le contrôle de la probabilité de rejet de combinaisons de tests est un problème que l’on rencontre fréquemment dans divers contextes économétriques et statistiques. À ce sujet, on sait que le fait d’ignorer le caractère conjoint des hypothèses multiples peut faire en sorte que le niveau de la procédure globale dépasse considérablement le niveau désiré. Alors que la plupart des méthodes d’inférence multiple sont conservatrices en présence de statistiques non-indépendantes, les tests que nous proposons visent à contrôler exactement le niveau de signification. Pour ce faire, nous considérons des critères de test combinés proposés initialement pour des statistiques indépendantes. En appliquant la méthode des tests de Monte Carlo, nous montrons comment ces méthodes de combinaison de tests peuvent s’appliquer à de tels cas, sans recours à des approximations asymptotiques. Après avoir passé en revue les résultats antérieurs sur ce sujet, nous montrons comment une telle méthodologie peut être utilisée pour construire des tests de normalité basés sur plusieurs moments pour les erreurs de modèles de régression linéaires. Pour ce problème, nous proposons une généralisation valide à distance finie du test asymptotique proposé par Kiefer et Salmon (1983) ainsi que des tests combinés suivant les méthodes de Tippett et de Pearson-Fisher. Nous observons empiriquement que les procédures de test corrigées par la méthode des tests de Monte Carlo ne souffrent pas du problème de biais (ou sous-rejet) souvent rapporté dans cette littérature – notamment contre les lois platikurtiques – et permettent des gains sensibles de puissance par rapport aux méthodes combinées usuelles.

Consistent House Allocation

In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e. it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except -maybe- for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

La zone fictive de l'infra-droit : l'intégration des règles administratives dans la catégories des textes réglementaires

Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.

De l'acte et du fait juridique ou d'un critère de distinction incertain

Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.

Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments.

We instillate rational cognition and learning in seemingly riskless choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. the theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test of the status quo bias drawn from a field study.