Consistent House Allocation
Data(s) |
22/09/2006
22/09/2006
2005
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Resumo |
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e. it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except -maybe- for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering. |
Formato |
766894 bytes application/pdf |
Identificador |
EHLERS, Lars et KLAUS, Bettina, «Consistent House Allocation», Cahier de recherche #2005-08, Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 2005, 13 pages. |
Relação |
Cahier de recherche #2005-08 |
Palavras-Chave | #indivisible objects #priority structure #consistency #strategy-proofness #[JEL:D63] Microeconomics - Welfare Economics - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement #[JEL:D63] Microéconomie - Économie du bien-être - Egalité, justice, inégalité et autres critères normatifs et mesures |
Tipo |
Article |