The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

Reference Groups and Individual Deprivation

We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyes in the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model. Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically possible reference groups, whereas we employ the standard definition of the reference group as the set of all agents in a society. As a consequence of this modification, some of the axioms used by Ebert and Moyes can no longer be applied and we provide alternative formulations.

Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Consistent House Allocation

In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e. it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except -maybe- for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering.

Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

Contentious Contracts

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

Le service minimum et les services essentiels : étude française confrontée au droit québécois

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (L.L.D)"

Organic inputs and farmers' management strategies in millet fields of western Niger

Research on soil fertility management in sub-Saharan Africa was criticized lately for largely ignoring farmers’ management strategies and the underlying principles. To fill this gap of knowledge, detailed interviews were conducted with 108 farm households about their rationale in managing the soil fertility of 307 individual fields in the agro-pastoral village territory of Chikal in western Niger. To amplify the farmers’ information on manuring and corralling practices, repeated measurements of applied amounts of manure were carried out within six 1-km^2 monitoring areas from February to October 1998. The interviews revealed that only 2% of the fields were completely fallowed for a period of 1–15 years, but 40% of the fields were at least partially fallowed. Mulching of crop residues was mainly practiced to fight wind erosion but was restricted to 36% of the surveyed fields given the alternative use of straw as livestock feed. Manure application and livestock corralling, as most effective tools to enhance soil fertility, were targeted to less than 30% of the surveyed fields. The application of complete fallow and manuring and corralling practices were strongly related to the households’ endowment with resources, especially with land and livestock. Within particular fields, measures were mainly applied to spots of poor soil fertility, while the restoration of the productivity of hard pans was of secondary importance. Given the limited spatial coverage of indigenous soil fertility measures and their strong dependence on farmers’ wealth, supplementary strategies to restrict the decline of soil fertility in the drought prone areas of Niger with their heavily weathered soils are needed.

Indirect expropriation in concession contract

 The work aims to demonstrate that an indirect expropriation of rights occurs when mining concession agreements are made for subsoil exploitation. The article looks at examples such as when administrative divesture for public utilities or for social interest is decreed to implement projects or environmental works; when any regulation or administrative action is taken determining protected areas or environment control of type; and when environmental control plans are implemented. The indirect expropriation occurs because a conflict exists between general interests and equality principles of the burdens, the contractual right of adherence to agreed upon provisions and the legality of prior legal regulations for the carrying out of such expropriation. 

European deposit insurance: financing the transition. CEPS Commentary, 6 September 2012

Arguing that the planned move to put the ECB in charge of banking supervision would be incomplete without a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA), Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker spell out in a new CEPS Commentary some underlying principles to guide a gradual transition under which only future risks would be shared while past losses would remain at the national level. They show that ultimately such a new institution would serve as a genuine source of confidence in the European banking system.

Contextualist research: Iterating between methods while following an empirically grounded approach

An alternative approach to research is described that has been developed through a succession of significant construction management research projects. The approach follows the principles of iterative grounded theory, whereby researchers iterate between alternative theoretical frameworks and emergent empirical data. Of particular importance is an orientation toward mixing methods, thereby overcoming the existing tendency to dichotomize quantitative and qualitative approaches. The approach is positioned against the existing contested literature on grounded theory, and the possibility of engaging with empirical data in a “theory free” manner is discounted. Emphasis instead is given to the way in which researchers must be theoretically sensitive as a result of being steeped in relevant literatures. Knowledge of existing literatures therefore shapes the initial research design; but emergent empirical findings cause fresh theoretical perspectives to be mobilized. The advocated approach is further aligned with notions of knowledge coproduction and the underlying principles of contextualist research. It is this unique combination of ideas which characterizes the paper's contribution to the research methodology literature within the field of construction management. Examples are provided and consideration is given to the extent to which the emergent findings are generalizable beyond the specific context from which they are derived.

Joint criminal enterprise

The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is in disarray. Despite repeated judicial scrutiny at the highest level, the doctrine's scope, proper doctrinal basis and function in relation to other modes of complicity remain uncertain. This article examines the doctrine's elements and underlying principles. It argues that while joint criminal enterprise is largely used to make individuals liable for offences committed by their associates in excess of the common criminal purpose, its proper function is to police the limits of associate liability and thus to exculpate rather than inculpate. The doctrine governs not only instances of accessorial liability; it also applies where the parties involved are joint principal offenders. As this puts into question the prevalent view that joint criminal enterprise is a form of secondary participation that results in accessorial liability, the article concludes that it is best seen as a doctrine sui generis.