914 resultados para Public Good Provision
Resumo:
Az Európai Bizottság nemrég véglegesítette a javaslatait a Közös Agrárpolitika 2014-2020 közötti időszakára vonatkozóan. A javaslatok, amelyek egy korábbi, 2010. novemberi Bizottsági kommunikáción alapulnak, elindították az új szabályozásról való egyeztetések jogi folyamatát. A javaslatok egyik legfontosabb témaköre, amely különösen érdekes a távoli vidéki területek számára, a Közös Agrárpolitika szerepe a közjavak előállításában. A cikk célja kettős: egyrészt áttekinti a főbb megoldási javaslatokat és véleményeket a szakirodalomban és a Bizottsági kommunikációban a közjavak 2013 utáni szabályozását illetően, másrészt kritikus szemmel reagál az ötletekre és igyekszik konkrét megoldásokat javasolni. Az eredmények szerint a mezőgazdasághoz kötődő közjavak előállítása érdekében történő állami beavatkozás egyik legnagyobb problémája a mérési módszerek tökéletlensége. A cikk megkérdőjelezi, hogy vajon a kompenzáció logikája mennyiben illeszkedik a közjavak problematikájához és hogy vajon a kézenfekvő megoldás – a közjavak előállítása államilag finanszírozott kompenzációs kifizetésekkel – ténylegesen megoldást nyújt-e a háttérben meghúzódó problémákra. _____ The European Commission has finalised legislative proposals that set out the overall direction of CAP reform for 2013-2020. These proposals, building on an earlier Communication of the Commission in November 2010, initiate the legislative procedure to agree the new regulations. One of the key issues in the Communications, particularly important for remote areas, was the role of future CAP to ensure the delivery of public goods. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it reviews the major options and opinions being advanced in the literature and the Communication on the role of public goods in the CAP after 2013. Second, through a reflective critique, it reacts to the ideas and tries to identify appropriate solutions. Results suggest that one of the biggest problems with the public intervention for the provision of public goods in agriculture lies in the insufficiency of measurement methods. The paper questions whether the logic of compensation properly appreciates the nature of the public good problems and whether the apparently obvious solution – provision of compensatory payments from the public purse – actually solves any of the underlying problems.
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Nos países ocidentais, a pesquisa científica financiada com recursos públicos vem sofrendo reformas dramáticas nas últimas duas décadas (Simpson, 2003). Considerando os resultados dessas reformas, este artigo investiga como as mesmas aconteceram no Brasil, como os programas de pesquisa foram afetados e qual estilo de organização emergiu das reformas. Pretende-se analisar essas questões empiricamente, usando um estudo de caso. Então, o objetivo específico desse artigo é analisar as inovações organizacionais criadas dentro de um programa de pesquisa público brasileiro – o Programa de melhoraento genético da cana-de-açúcar do IAC (PROCANA) – para enfrentar as reformas nos modelos de atuação do Estado na área de C&T, superar os limites geográficos da pesquisa agrícola, dar mais eficiência à P&D e gerar produtos adaptados às necessidades dos usuários.
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As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two different owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay. This suggests that strategic delay is another source for the inefficient allocation of land, in addition to the public-good type externality pointed out by Grossman and Hart [Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1980) 42] and O'Flaherty [Regional Science and Urban Economics 24 (1994) 287]. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
O presente artigo tem como objetivo identificar e analisar os principais motivos apontados na literatura pertinente como causadores dos sucessivos e reiterados fracassos das tentativas de reforma da administra????o p??blica brasileira. As referidas tentativas foram empreendidas em 1938, quando da cria????o do Departamento Administrativo do Servi??o P??blico (DASP), durante a ditadura do Estado Novo; em 1963, quando Ernani do Amaral Peixoto foi designado ministro extraordin??rio para a Reforma Administrativa; em 1967, quando da edi????o do Decreto-Lei n?? 200, de 25/2/1967 e, tamb??m, em 1986, 1990 e 1995, nos Governos Sarney, Collor e Cardoso, respectivamente. Todas elas visavam, basicamente, a implantar a meritocracia na administra????o p??blica brasileira. Segundo os autores consultados, essas tentativas foram malsucedidas devido aos seguintes fatores: a quest??o da depend??ncia da trajet??ria, as caracter??sticas das organiza????es que dificultam a ocorr??ncia de altera????es institucionais, os elementos de natureza sociol??gica, o fato de a reforma administrativa ser bem p??blico sujeito a problemas de a????o coletiva e, finalmente, as peculiaridades do sistema pol??tico brasileiro.
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O artigo analisa as mudan??as na presta????o de servi??os p??blicos a partir da Constitui????o de 1988, quando um novo pacto federativo acompanhou a redemocratiza????o pol??tica, resultando em ampla descentraliza????o para estados e munic??pios, acompanhada de nova estrutura de reparti????o dos recursos tribut??rios. Com esse objetivo, resgata-se o processo de forma????o de sistemas de presta????o de servi??os baseados na coopera????o entre as tr??s esferas de governo, focalizando as ??reas de educa????o, sa??de e assist??ncia social. Discutem-se as inova????es adotadas com a cria????o de formas organizacionais de negocia????o entre os entes federativos; a incorpora????o da participa????o social na formula????o e controle das pol??ticas p??blicas; a desburocratiza????o dos fluxos de recursos financeiros e de informa????es; e a ado????o de novos instrumentos jur??dicos de descentraliza????o de programas e a????es. O texto aponta ainda os impactos dessa descentraliza????o e das formas de articula????o federativa, indicando a necessidade de novas reformas nos sistemas administrativos e na pol??tica de recursos humanos.
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This work focuses on the appraisal of public and environmental projects and, more specifically, on the calculation of the social discount rate (SDR) for this kind of very long-term investment projects. As a rule, we can state that the instantaneous discount rate must be equal to the hazard rate of the public good or to the mortality rate of the population that the project is intended to. The hazard can be due to technical failures of the system, but, in this paper, we are going to consider different independent variables that can cause the hazard. That is, we are going to consider a multivariate hazard rate. In our empirical application, the Spanish forest surface will be the system and the forest fire will be the fail that can be caused by several factors. The aim of this work is to integrate the different variables that produce the fail in the calculation of the SDR from a multivariate hazard rate approach.
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Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.
Resumo:
O presente relatório, desenvolvido no âmbito do estágio curricular realizado na Cociga-Construções Civis de Gaia, SA, tem como objetivo principal caracterizar as diversas etapas que constituem o desenvolvimento de uma obra, que consiste na reconstrução de um edifício. Para tal, procedeu-se à descrição e análise dos respetivos métodos organizacionais, construtivos e orçamentais aplicados na execução da obra para a Caetano Parts. O trabalho teve início com a caracterização da obra em questão e respetivo enquadramento espacial e regional. De seguida, foram descritas as principais etapas do desenvolvimento da obra, como concurso/adjudicação, preparação, contrato, execução e fecho da mesma. Não esquecendo que uma das tarefas mais importantes na fase inicial da obra, após a adjudicação, foi a organização da documentação necessária para que esta pudesse ter início. Na fase referente à execução, foram descritos de forma detalhada e acompanhados, em alguns casos, de registos de imagens, os procedimentos que constituíram as diferentes fases da obra, assim como os métodos construtivos correspondentes. O presente trabalho engloba o registo e a catalogação dos documentos necessários para as diferentes etapas da obra de reconstrução. Durante a realização das diferentes etapas e respetivo registo das mesmas, foi possível concluir que a boa qualidade da prestação de serviços por parte dos trabalhadores da empresa e dos subempreiteiros, possibilitou a concretização de uma obra com altos padrões de qualidade e de acordo com os objetivos do proprietário e da empresa responsável pela execução da mesma. Por último, a realização deste trabalho possibilitou o registo, análise e posterior reflexão sobre os procedimentos legais, logísticos e técnicos a ter em conta aquando da realização de uma obra e que são fatores fundamentais para que se possam manter os padrões de qualidade, rigor e sucesso da mesma.
Resumo:
In this paper, we apply the following four power indices to the Portuguese Parliament: Shapley–Shubik index, Banzhaf index, Deegan–Packel index and Public Good Index. We also present the main notions related with simple games and discuss the features of each power index by means of their axiomatic characterizations.
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This article develops a latent class model for estimating willingness-to-pay for public goods using simultaneously contingent valuation (CV) and attitudinal data capturing protest attitudes related to the lack of trust in public institutions providing those goods. A measure of the social cost associated with protest responses and the consequent loss in potential contributions for providing the public good is proposed. The presence of potential justification biases is further considered, that is, the possibility that for psychological reasons the response to the CV question affects the answers to the attitudinal questions. The results from our empirical application suggest that psychological factors should not be ignored in CV estimation for policy purposes, allowing for a correct identification of protest responses.
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A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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The present essay focuses on the effectiveness of Portuguese public schools’ provision of 7th, 8th and 9th grades, using data from the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science for 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12. At least two school types offer these grades: Basic and Secondary. Based on previous findings, a production function is estimated for 9th grade students in the regular academic track, including a variable that indicates the specific school type attended by each student. After concluding that Basic Schools add more value, some explanations are presented as well as recommendations and possible further research.
Resumo:
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game
Resumo:
We used incentivized experimental games to manipulate leader power-the number of followers and the discretion leaders had to enforce their will. Leaders had complete autonomy in deciding payouts to themselves and their followers. Although leaders could make prosocial decisions to benefit the public good they could also abuse their power by invoking antisocial decisions, which reduced the total payouts to the group but increased leader's earnings. In Study 1 (N = 478), we found that both amount of followers and discretionary choices independently predicted leader corruption. In Study 2 (N = 240), we examined how power and individual differences (e.g., personality, hormones) affected leader corruption over time; power interacted with testosterone in predicting corruption, which was highest when leader power and baseline testosterone were both high. Honesty predicted initial level of leader antisocial decisions; however, honesty did not shield leaders from the corruptive effect of power.
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In this article we analyze the reasons, within the context of Spanish industrial relations, for trade union members’ active participation in their regional union. The case of Spain is particularly interesting as the unions’ main activity, collective bargaining, is a public good. The text, based on research involving a representative survey of members of a regional branch of the “Workers” Commissions” (Comisiones Obreras) trade union, provides empirical evidence that the union presence in the workplace has a significant influence on members’ propensity for activism. By contrast, the alternative hypothesis based on instrumental reasons appears of little relevance in the Spanish industrial relations context.