Two new power indices based on winning coalitions
| Data(s) |
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
2011
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|---|---|
| Resumo |
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field. |
| Identificador |
10.1080/10236190903200677 J. M. Alonso-Meijide , F. Ferreira , M. Álvarez-Mozos & A. A. Pinto (2011) Two new power indices based on winning coalitions, Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, 17:7, 1095-1100, DOI: 10.1080/10236190903200677 http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6687 10.1080/10236190903200677 10.1080/10236190903200677 |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Taylor & Francis |
| Direitos |
openAccess |
| Palavras-Chave | #Power indices #Simple games #Decision-making processes |
| Tipo |
article |
