Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Aspects of Iwasawa theory over function fields

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Generic Nekhoroshev theory without small divisors

In this article, we present a new approach of Nekhoroshev theory for a generic unperturbed Hamiltonian which completely avoids small divisors problems. The proof is an extension of a method introduced by P. Lochak which combines averaging along periodic orbits with simultaneous Diophantine approximation and uses geometric arguments designed by the second author to handle generic integrable Hamiltonians. This method allows to deal with generic non-analytic Hamiltonians and to obtain new results of generic stability around linearly stable tori.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

A critical application of securitization theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security

This article addresses the normative dilemma located within the application of `securitization,’ as a method of understanding the social construction of threats and security policies. Securitization as a theoretical and practical undertaking is being increasingly used by scholars and practitioners. This scholarly endeavour wishes to provide those wishing to engage with securitization with an alternative application of this theory; one which is sensitive to and self-reflective of the possible normative consequences of its employment. This article argues that discussing and analyzing securitization processes have normative implications, which is understood here to be the negative securitization of a referent. The negative securitization of a referent is asserted to be carried out through the unchallenged analysis of securitization processes which have emerged through relations of exclusion and power. It then offers a critical understanding and application of securitization studies as a way of overcoming the identified normative dilemma. First, it examines how the Copenhagen School’s formation of securitization theory gives rise to a normative dilemma, which is situated in the performative and symbolic power of security as a political invocation and theoretical concept. Second, it evaluates previous attempts to overcome the normative dilemma of securitization studies, outlining the obstacles that each individual proposal faces. Third, this article argues that the normative dilemma of applying securitization can be avoided by firstly, deconstructing the institutional power of security actors and dominant security subjectivities and secondly, by addressing countering or alternative approaches to security and incorporating different security subjectivities. Examples of the securitization of international terrorism and immigration are prominent throughout.

Theory of mind tasks and executive functions: A systematic review of group studies in neurology.

A growing number of studies have been addressing the relationship between theory of mind (TOM) and executive functions (EF) in patients with acquired neurological pathology. In order to provide a global overview on the main findings, we conducted a systematic review on group studies where we aimed to (1) evaluate the patterns of impaired and preserved abilities of both TOM and EF in groups of patients with acquired neurological pathology and (2) investigate the existence of particular relations between different EF domains and TOM tasks. The search was conducted in Pubmed/Medline. A total of 24 articles met the inclusion criteria. We considered for analysis classical clinically accepted TOM tasks (first- and second-order false belief stories, the Faux Pas test, Happe's stories, the Mind in the Eyes task, and Cartoon's tasks) and EF domains (updating, shifting, inhibition, and access). The review suggests that (1) EF and TOM appear tightly associated. However, the few dissociations observed suggest they cannot be reduced to a single function; (2) no executive subprocess could be specifically associated with TOM performances; (3) the first-order false belief task and the Happe's story task seem to be less sensitive to neurological pathologies and less associated to EF. Even though the analysis of the reviewed studies demonstrates a close relationship between TOM and EF in patients with acquired neurological pathology, the nature of this relationship must be further investigated. Studies investigating ecological consequences of TOM and EF deficits, and intervention researches may bring further contributions to this question.

Reconsideration of dimensions and curve fitting practice in economics ellaborating on Georgescu-Roegen’s economic methodology

This paper is to examine the proper use of dimensions and curve fitting practices elaborating on Georgescu-Roegen’s economic methodology in relation to the three main concerns of his epistemological orientation. Section 2 introduces two critical issues in relation to dimensions and curve fitting practices in economics in view of Georgescu-Roegen’s economic methodology. Section 3 deals with the logarithmic function (ln z) and shows that z must be a dimensionless pure number, otherwise it is nonsensical. Several unfortunate examples of this analytical error are presented including macroeconomic data analysis conducted by a representative figure in this field. Section 4 deals with the standard Cobb-Douglas function. It is shown that the operational meaning cannot be obtained for capital or labor within the Cobb-Douglas function. Section 4 also deals with economists "curve fitting fetishism". Section 5 concludes thispaper with several epistemological issues in relation to dimensions and curve fitting practices in economics.

Index theory for basic Dirac operators on Riemannian foliations

In this paper we prove a formula for the analytic index of a basic Dirac-type operator on a Riemannian foliation, solving a problem that has been open for many years. We also consider more general indices given by twisting the basic Dirac operator by a representation of the orthogonal group. The formula is a sum of integrals over blowups of the strata of the foliation and also involves eta invariants of associated elliptic operators. As a special case, a Gauss-Bonnet formula for the basic Euler characteristic is obtained using two independent proofs.

Generalized descriptive set theory and classification theory

Descriptive set theory is mainly concerned with studying subsets of the space of all countable binary sequences. In this paper we study the generalization where countable is replaced by uncountable. We explore properties of generalized Baire and Cantor spaces, equivalence relations and their Borel reducibility. The study shows that the descriptive set theory looks very different in this generalized setting compared to the classical, countable case. We also draw the connection between the stability theoretic complexity of first-order theories and the descriptive set theoretic complexity of their isomorphism relations. Our results suggest that Borel reducibility on uncountable structures is a model theoretically natural way to compare the complexity of isomorphism relations.

Strong isomorphism reductions in complexity theory

We give the first systematic study of strong isomorphism reductions, a notion of reduction more appropriate than polynomial time reduction when, for example, comparing the computational complexity of the isomorphim problem for different classes of structures. We show that the partial ordering of its degrees is quite rich. We analyze its relationship to a further type of reduction between classes of structures based on purely comparing for every n the number of nonisomorphic structures of cardinality at most n in both classes. Furthermore, in a more general setting we address the question of the existence of a maximal element in the partial ordering of the degrees.

Vintage capital growth theory: three breakthroughs

Vintage capital growth models have been at the heart of growth theory in the 60s. This research line collapsed in the late 60s with the so-called embodiment controversy and the technical sophisitication of the vintage models. This paper analyzes the astonishing revival of this literature in the 90s. In particular, it outlines three methodological breakthroughs explaining this resurgence: a growth accounting revolution, taking advantage of the availability of new time series, an optimal control revolution allowing to safely study vintage capital optimal growth models, and a vintage human capital revolution, along with the rise of economic demography, accounting for the vintage structure of human capital similarly to physical capital age structuring. The related literature is surveyed.