Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

A divulgação de provisões e passivos contingentes ambientais pelas empresas do setor de energia elétrica em comparação ao desenvolvimento da normatização da evidenciação contábil

O pressuposto desta pesquisa é de que a divulgação de informações ambientais, no âmbito das provisões e passivos contingentes, reagiu aos avanços na normatização contábil. A normatização contábil genérica sobre evidenciação de obrigações incertas era restrita, em meados de 1976, à Lei no 6.404, e assim permaneceu ao longo de pelo menos uma década e meia, quando começou a ser desenvolvida. Ao longo dos anos foram criados padrões obrigatórios de divulgação, com critérios de julgamento mais detalhados para a classificação da obrigação incerta em provável, possível ou remota. Embora ainda apresente algum grau de subjetividade, o desenvolvimento destes critérios pode ter contribuído para a diminuição da assimetria informacional: a empresa passou a contar com um conjunto de orientações mais claras e, portanto, com melhores condições de averiguar e divulgar suas obrigações incertas. Esse avanço contribuiu para que as obrigações ambientais passassem a ter maior exposição, principalmente no âmbito das empresas potencialmente poluidoras, como as do setor de energia elétrica, que utilizam recursos naturais e modificam o meio ambiente. Neste contexto, o objetivo deste estudo foi analisar as evidências de passivo ambiental divulgadas pelas empresas do setor de energia elétrica, de 1997 a 2014. Para tanto, foi desenvolvido um estudo qualitativo, descritivo e longitudinal, por meio da análise de conteúdo de 941 notas explicativas, de uma população de 64 empresas do setor de energia elétrica, de acordo com listagem na BM&FBovespa, em maio de 2015. A amostra foi constituída de 26 empresas, que divulgaram o total de 468 notas explicativas no site da CVM, de 1997 a 2014. Ao longo destes 18 anos, 14 empresas da amostra (53,85%) evidenciaram passivos ambientais ao menos uma vez e 12 instituições (46,15%) não o fizeram e, do total de 468 notas explicativas, 100 (21,37%) evidenciaram passivo ambiental. O número de evidências de passivos ambientais era pequeno em meados de 1997, mas ascendeu, com um aumento mais consistente a partir de 2006, ano que coincide com a aprovação da Norma e Procedimento de Contabilidade 22 - Provisões, Passivos, Contingências Passivas e Contingências Ativas, emitida pelo IBRACON. Adicionalmente, a materialidade quantitativa estava na média de 0,61% para provisões ambientais e 0,89% para os passivos contingentes ambientais, desconsiderando-se os outliers. A dimensão das notas explicativas, em termos de quantidade de palavras, foi crescente e diversificada. Em conclusão, a evidenciação contábil pode, em adição à evidenciação voluntária, ser um meio plausível para a divulgação de questões ambientais e redução da assimetria informacional, principalmente quando a normatização contábil se faz mais clara e detalhada.

Public Lawyers and Marijuana Regulation

Although 23 states and the District of Columbia have now legalized marijuana for medical purposes, marijuana remains a prohibited substance under federal law. Because the production, sale, possession and use of marijuana remain illegal, there is a risk of prosecution under federal laws. Furthermore, those who help marijuana users and providers put themselves at risk — federal law punishes not only those who violate drug laws but also those who assist or conspire with them to do so. In the case of lawyers representing marijuana users and businesspeople, this means not only the real (though remote) risk of criminal prosecution but also the more immediate risk of professional discipline. Elsewhere, we wrote about the difficult place in which lawyers find themselves when representing marijuana clients. We argued that while both the criminal law and the rules of professional conduct rightly require legal obedience from lawyers, other countervailing factors must be considered when evaluating lawyers’ representation of marijuana clients. In particular, we asserted that considerations of equity and access to justice weigh dispositively in favor of protecting lawyers who endeavor to help their clients comply with state marijuana laws, and we suggested means of interpreting relevant criminal law provisions and rules of professional conduct to achieve this result. This article builds on that analysis, taking on the particular issue of the public lawyer’s’ role in marijuana regulation. For government lawyers, the key issues in exercising discretion in the context of marijuana are not clients’ access to the law and equality but rather determining the clients’ wishes and serving them diligently and ethically. Lawyers representing state agencies, legislatures and the executive branch of government draft and interpret the rules and regulations regarding marijuana. Lawyers for federal, state and local governments then interpret those rules to determine the obligations and responsibilities of those they represent and to help their clients meet those obligations and carry out their required tasks. Both state and federal prosecutors are charged with determining what conduct remains illegal under the new rules and, perhaps more importantly, with exercising discretion regarding whom to prosecute and to what extent. Marijuana regulation is not a niche area of government regulation; it will influence the practice of virtually every public lawyer in the years to come. Public lawyers must understand the changes in marijuana law and the implications for government clients. Given the pervasiveness of the modern regulatory state, the situation is no easier — and, in many ways, it is more complicated — for public lawyers than it is for private ones. Public lawyers face myriad practice challenges with respect to marijuana law reform, and while we do not purport to identify and resolve all of the issues that are sure to arise in this short paper, we hope that the article helps alert public lawyers to some of the risks involved in participating in marijuana regulation so that they can think carefully about their obligations when these issues arise.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Consumer Driven Health Care: An Examination of the Disadvantages to Low Income Employees

As health care costs for companies continue to rise, more organizations are considering a consumer driven health plan option with the goal to engage employees so that they make better health care decisions. Although consumer driven health plan options present advantages to the employer and some employee groups, low income employees are negatively impacted by this option. Two major disadvantages include missed care and out of pocket obligations. This capstone reviews the current literature on consumer driven health care and discusses the disadvantages to low income employees. It also provides strategies and recommendations to employers who are considering a consumer driven health option plan to minimize the disadvantages to low income employees.

Letter from Artemas Ward to Benjamin Stone, 1787 July 18

Artemas Ward wrote this letter to Benjamin Stone on July 18, 1787, expressing his concern about the expense of his son, Henry Dana Ward's, imminent studies at Harvard. Ward complains to Stone about his own debts and the failure of the government to honor their financial obligations to him, and he also expresses hope that the President of Harvard will allow his son to spend part of his time "keeping a school" during his freshman and sophomore years, thus earning an income sufficient to pay for his studies. Ward also suggests that it might be preferable that his son board with a respectable family, rather than live at the College.

Guarantee of financial support for student James Savage, signed by William Tudor and John Cooper, 1799 July 25

This legal agreement, a guarantee of financial support for entering student James Savage (A.B. 1803), was signed on July 25, 1799 by his two guarantors, William Tudor and John Cooper. The document was also signed by two witnesses, William Tudor's sons John Henry Tudor and Frederic Tudor. The agreement specifies that, in the event of Savage's failure to settle all financial obligations to the President and Fellows of Harvard College during the course of his studies, the two guarantors would be responsible for a payment of two hundred ounces of silver. It seems that the Tudors and Cooper were relatives of Savage, thus explaining their desire to assure his entry to Harvard by entering into this financial obligation.

John Oldham counterbond to James Clarke & Richard Moores, 1722 May 14

This legal document, a counterbond, was created on May 14, 1722 and involved John Oldham, James Clark, and Richard Moores. All three men were residents of Cambridge at the time of its creation. The document specifies Oldham's financial obligations to Clark, a cordwainer, and Moores, a tailor and was "Sign[ed], sealed & [delivered] in the presence of Nathaniel Sparhawk and Noah Sparkhawk." The document also refers to the "trustees for the town of Cambridge" Spencer Shipps, Nathaniel Sparhawk and John Dickson.

Vasiyet etmek hakkında risâle : manuscript, undated

On general obligations of Muslims: what to do and how to make the testament in order to reach Paradise.

Türk Kanunu Medenisi

Turkish Civil Code.

Need To Be Adored

Faced with a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, I began with the objective of discovering methods for creating art that were still accessible to me. Along the way, I encountered others who had travelled this road before me. Their experiences led me to examine, not only my art, but also my political orientations, my love obligations and my transitioning self. In my varied art pieces, I conjure something from diverse sources and different worldviews, including contemporary feminist performance art and disability cultural theory. My thesis is a project. I make things: puppets, videos and performances, which included the exhibition, Need to be Adored (2014), staged in the digital media lab of the Isabel Bader Centre for the Performing Arts in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The exhibition introduced thirteen of my puppets and a thirty-two-minute looped video. Following the exhibition, I put the puppets away and spent two years reading. Finally, taking my inspiration from Carolyn Ellis’s The Autoethnographic I (Ellis 2004), I turned my processes into words. I wrote out my experiences. I created an alternative text of my identity from an able-bodied cis-identified woman into a disabled trans-feminist artist academic. The writing required an uncomfortably intimate examination of my life. Nothing less than complete honesty would allow me to understand my new location. The resulting text is a lyrical and sometimes whimsical flow of consciousness that invites the reader to imagine what it might be like to engage in such a candid review of everything one holds close to one’s heart. Contained within are all my identities. In this text I let some out. This is a story of unsettling. I am working on my art practices, creating a cast of characters from cloth. Puppets. El becomes the exulted main character of a fictional accounting. She uncovers her queer roots and begins to see that she is at the centre of a very strange geography. Her desire to make film is revealed as she re-remembers her childhood through a disability lens.

spotlight europe #2013/03 – March 2013: The European Union and Russia at a Crossroads

The European Union and Russia are strategic partners – through their geographic situation, their common history, through social and economic obligations. Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia are under pressure for innovation. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political integration. For that reason, the EU’s relations with Russia depend on the Union’s ability to overcome the crisis and undertake reforms.

Survey on Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 57, 30 August 2013

This paper offers a picture of the obligations existing under international and European law in respect of the loss of nationality. It describes international instruments including obligations in this field with direct relevancy for the loss of nationality of Member States of the European Union, but also obligations regarding loss of nationality in regional non-European treaties. Attention is given to two important judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice (Janko Rottmann) and the European Court of Human Rights (Genovese v Malta) regarding nationality. Special attention is devoted to Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which forbids the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. A survey is provided of possible sub-principles that can be derived from this rule. Finally, some observations are made on the burden of proof in cases of loss of nationality.

Reviewing the EU's market abuse rules. ECMI Policy Brief No. 19, 27 February 2012

Updated May 2012 and reposted: In 2011, an EU legislative package on market abuse was proposed, which comprises two sets of documents: 1) a draft Regulation that will largely replace the existing Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and the level 2 measures; and a new Directive dealing with criminal sanctions. Market abuse rules are needed to ensure market integrity and investor confidence, and to allow companies to raise capital and contribute to economic growth, thereby increasing employment. This ECMI Policy Brief argues that rules on market abuse should be technically well designed, proportionate and crystal clear, but also subject to more efficient and harmonised supervision than before. The paper focuses particularly on the draft Regulation. The use of a regulation is welcome, as (in integrated financial markets) abuses should be regulated in a harmonised manner by member states, which has not always been the case, as the 2007 report from the European Securities Markets Expert (ESME) Group extensively demonstrated. At the same time, this paper criticises some of the provisions contained in the draft Regulation, notably the new notion of inside information not to abuse (Art. 6(e)) and the unchanged definition of inside information for listed companies to disclose, and it proposes new definitions. The extension of disclosure obligations to issuers whose shares are traded on demand only on ‘listing’ multilateral trading facilities is also widely criticised. Other comments deal with the proposed rules on managers’ transactions, insiders’ lists and accepted market practices.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).