Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Correcting the Errors : A Note on Volatility Forecast Evaluation Based on High-Frequency Data and Realized Volatilities

This note develops general model-free adjustment procedures for the calculation of unbiased volatility loss functions based on practically feasible realized volatility benchmarks. The procedures, which exploit the recent asymptotic distributional results in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2002a), are both easy to implement and highly accurate in empirically realistic situations. On properly accounting for the measurement errors in the volatility forecast evaluations reported in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2003), the adjustments result in markedly higher estimates for the true degree of return-volatility predictability.

Projection-Based Statistical Inference in Linear Structural Models with Possibly Weak Instruments

It is well known that standard asymptotic theory is not valid or is extremely unreliable in models with identification problems or weak instruments [Dufour (1997, Econometrica), Staiger and Stock (1997, Econometrica), Wang and Zivot (1998, Econometrica), Stock and Wright (2000, Econometrica), Dufour and Jasiak (2001, International Economic Review)]. One possible way out consists here in using a variant of the Anderson-Rubin (1949, Ann. Math. Stat.) procedure. The latter, however, allows one to build exact tests and confidence sets only for the full vector of the coefficients of the endogenous explanatory variables in a structural equation, which in general does not allow for individual coefficients. This problem may in principle be overcome by using projection techniques [Dufour (1997, Econometrica), Dufour and Jasiak (2001, International Economic Review)]. AR-types are emphasized because they are robust to both weak instruments and instrument exclusion. However, these techniques can be implemented only by using costly numerical techniques. In this paper, we provide a complete analytic solution to the problem of building projection-based confidence sets from Anderson-Rubin-type confidence sets. The latter involves the geometric properties of “quadrics” and can be viewed as an extension of usual confidence intervals and ellipsoids. Only least squares techniques are required for building the confidence intervals. We also study by simulation how “conservative” projection-based confidence sets are. Finally, we illustrate the methods proposed by applying them to three different examples: the relationship between trade and growth in a cross-section of countries, returns to education, and a study of production functions in the U.S. economy.

Identification, Weak Instruments and Statistical Inference in Econometrics

We discuss statistical inference problems associated with identification and testability in econometrics, and we emphasize the common nature of the two issues. After reviewing the relevant statistical notions, we consider in turn inference in nonparametric models and recent developments on weakly identified models (or weak instruments). We point out that many hypotheses, for which test procedures are commonly proposed, are not testable at all, while some frequently used econometric methods are fundamentally inappropriate for the models considered. Such situations lead to ill-defined statistical problems and are often associated with a misguided use of asymptotic distributional results. Concerning nonparametric hypotheses, we discuss three basic problems for which such difficulties occur: (1) testing a mean (or a moment) under (too) weak distributional assumptions; (2) inference under heteroskedasticity of unknown form; (3) inference in dynamic models with an unlimited number of parameters. Concerning weakly identified models, we stress that valid inference should be based on proper pivotal functions —a condition not satisfied by standard Wald-type methods based on standard errors — and we discuss recent developments in this field, mainly from the viewpoint of building valid tests and confidence sets. The techniques discussed include alternative proposed statistics, bounds, projection, split-sampling, conditioning, Monte Carlo tests. The possibility of deriving a finite-sample distributional theory, robustness to the presence of weak instruments, and robustness to the specification of a model for endogenous explanatory variables are stressed as important criteria assessing alternative procedures.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Short run and long run causality in time series: Inference

We propose methods for testing hypotheses of non-causality at various horizons, as defined in Dufour and Renault (1998, Econometrica). We study in detail the case of VAR models and we propose linear methods based on running vector autoregressions at different horizons. While the hypotheses considered are nonlinear, the proposed methods only require linear regression techniques as well as standard Gaussian asymptotic distributional theory. Bootstrap procedures are also considered. For the case of integrated processes, we propose extended regression methods that avoid nonstandard asymptotics. The methods are applied to a VAR model of the U.S. economy.

A Theory of Random Consumer Demand

This paper presents a new theory of random consumer demand. The primitive is a collection of probability distributions, rather than a binary preference. Various assumptions constrain these distributions, including analogues of common assumptions about preferences such as transitivity, monotonicity and convexity. Two results establish a complete representation of theoretically consistent random demand. The purpose of this theory of random consumer demand is application to empirical consumer demand problems. To this end, the theory has several desirable properties. It is intrinsically stochastic, so the econometrician can apply it directly without adding extrinsic randomness in the form of residuals. Random demand is parsimoniously represented by a single function on the consumption set. Finally, we have a practical method for statistical inference based on the theory, described in McCausland (2004), a companion paper.

Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Tests multiples simulés et tests de normalité basés sur plusieurs moments dans les modèles de régression

Cet article illustre l’applicabilité des méthodes de rééchantillonnage dans le cadre des tests multiples (simultanés), pour divers problèmes économétriques. Les hypothèses simultanées sont une conséquence habituelle de la théorie économique, de sorte que le contrôle de la probabilité de rejet de combinaisons de tests est un problème que l’on rencontre fréquemment dans divers contextes économétriques et statistiques. À ce sujet, on sait que le fait d’ignorer le caractère conjoint des hypothèses multiples peut faire en sorte que le niveau de la procédure globale dépasse considérablement le niveau désiré. Alors que la plupart des méthodes d’inférence multiple sont conservatrices en présence de statistiques non-indépendantes, les tests que nous proposons visent à contrôler exactement le niveau de signification. Pour ce faire, nous considérons des critères de test combinés proposés initialement pour des statistiques indépendantes. En appliquant la méthode des tests de Monte Carlo, nous montrons comment ces méthodes de combinaison de tests peuvent s’appliquer à de tels cas, sans recours à des approximations asymptotiques. Après avoir passé en revue les résultats antérieurs sur ce sujet, nous montrons comment une telle méthodologie peut être utilisée pour construire des tests de normalité basés sur plusieurs moments pour les erreurs de modèles de régression linéaires. Pour ce problème, nous proposons une généralisation valide à distance finie du test asymptotique proposé par Kiefer et Salmon (1983) ainsi que des tests combinés suivant les méthodes de Tippett et de Pearson-Fisher. Nous observons empiriquement que les procédures de test corrigées par la méthode des tests de Monte Carlo ne souffrent pas du problème de biais (ou sous-rejet) souvent rapporté dans cette littérature – notamment contre les lois platikurtiques – et permettent des gains sensibles de puissance par rapport aux méthodes combinées usuelles.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Rational Choice on Arbitrary Domains: A Comprehensive Treatment

The rationalizability of a choice function on arbitrary domains by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. Moreover, characterizations of various versions of consistent rationalizability have appeared in recent contributions. However, not much seems to be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on a rationalization. The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant gap. We provide characterizations of all forms of rationalizability involving quasi-transitive or P-acyclical rationalizations on arbitrary domains.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.