An economic model of gun control

Guns stolen from law-abiding households provide the principal source of guns for criminals. The lethality of crime instruments increases with the availability of guns, so the gun market is subject to externalities that generate excessive ownership and inadequate spending on protective measures to deter gun theft. One motive for gun ownership is self defense, and the gun market is subject to coordination failure: the more guns purchased lawfully, the more will be stolen by criminals, so the greater the incentive for lawful . consumers to purchase guns for self defense. As a result, there may be multiple equilibria in the gun market and more than one equilibrium crime rate. We show that a simple refundable deposit for guns will internalize the externalities in the gun market and may cause large downward jumps in gun ownership, the lethality of crime instruments, and the social costs of crime.

Valuation equilibrium with crubs

This paper considers model worlds in which there are a continuum of individuaIs who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show that if there are a finite set of types and the commodity space contains lotteries, then the c1assicaI equilibrium results on convex economies can be reinterpreted to apply. Furthermore, in this lottery economy deterministic aIlocations (that is, degenerate lotteries) are generally not Pareto optimal, nor are they equilibria. In the interests of making the model seem more "natural," we show that the set of equilibria in a decentraIization in which individuaIs first gamble over vaIue transfers and then trade commodities in a deterministic competitive market economy are equivalent to those of our competi tive economy with a lottery commodity space.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Two heads may not be better than one : corporate board structure, managerial self-dealing,and common agency

This paper compares the effects on corporate performance and managerial self-dealing in a situation in which the CEO reports to a single Board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to two Boards, each responsible for a different task. The equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the dual board structure is fully characterized. Compared to a single board, a dual board demands less aggressive performance targets from the CEO, but exerts more monitoring. A consequence of the first feature is that the CEO always exerts less effort toward production with a dual board. The effect of a dual board on CEO self-dealing is ambiguous: there are equilibria in which, in spite of the higher monitoring, self-dealing is higher in a dual system. The model indicates that the strategic interdependence generated by the assignment of different tasks to different boards may yield results that are far from the desired ones.

Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

O conjunto dos equilíbrios dos leilões de primeiro preço

In this note I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions.

Phase transition of demand explained by the heterogeneity of consumers' intrinsic preferences

In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.

Payoff interdependence and information externalities

This paper studies entry under information and payoff externalities. We consider a sequential investment game with uncertain payoffs where each firm is endowed with a private signal about profitability. It is shown that both over- and under-investment characterize the equilibria and that under-investment only occurs when investments are complements. Further we find that a reverse informational externality is present.

Inflation targeting, credibility and coordination aspects

There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal dominance, for inflation targeting framework be implemented in successful (credible) way. Essays on how public targets could be used in the absence of such requirements are unusual. In this papel' we appraise how central banks could use inflation targeting before soundness economic fundamentaIs have been achieved. First, based on concise framework, where confidence crises and imperfect information are neglected, we conclude that less ambitious (greater) target for inflation increases the credibility in the precommitment. Optimal target is higher than the one obtained using the Cukierman-Liviatan [7] model, where increasing credibility effect is not considered. Second, extending the model to make confidence crises possible, multiple equilibria solutions becomes possible too. In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crises and reduce the policymaker credibility. On the other hand, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Finally, when perturbing common knowledge uniqueness is restored even considering confidence crises, as in Morris-Shin[ 14]. The first result, i.e. less ambitious target for inflation increases credibility in precommitment, is also recovered. Adding a precise public signal, cOOl'dinated self-fulfilling actions and equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for some lack of common knowledge (as in Angeleto and Weming[l]). In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crisis again, reducing the policymaker credibility. From another aspect, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. Optimal policy prescriptions depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Results also indicate that more precise public information may open the door for bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more central oank transparency is always good when considering inflation targeting framework.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

A simple analysis of the U.S. emission permits auctions

We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. Sellers and buyers behave strategically. We show that there are two types of equilibria: inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where alI exchange occurs at a uniform price. We also provide examples of the EPA auction game under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold. When the uniform price equilibrium holds, sellers shade their bids up and buyers shade their bids down. In the example where the uniform price equilibrium does not hold, both buyers and sellers shade their bids down in an equilibrium.

Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private valoues

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.

Characterization of volatile substances in apples from rosaceae family by headspace solid‐phase microextraction followed by GC‐qMS

The volatile composition of different apple varieties of Malus domestica Borkh. species from different geographic regions at Madeira Islands, namely Ponta do Pargo (PP), Porto Santo (PS), and Santo da Serra (SS) was established by headspace solid-phase microextraction (HS-SPME) procedure followed by GC-MS (GC-qMS) analysis. Significant parameters affecting sorption process such as fiber coating, extraction temperature,extractiontime,sampleamount,dilutionfactor,ionicstrength,anddesorption time,wereoptimizedanddiscussed.TheSPMEfibercoatedwith50/30 lmdivinylbenzene/carboxen/PDMS (DVB/CAR/PDMS) afforded highest extraction efficiency of volatile compounds, providing the best sensitivity for the target volatiles, particularly whenthesampleswereextractedat508Cfor30 minwithconstantmagneticstirring. A qualitative and semi-quantitative analysis between the investigated apple species has been established. It was possible to identify about 100 of volatile compounds amongpulp(46,45,and39),peel(64,60,and64),andentirefruit(65,43,and50)inPP, PS,andSSapples,respectively.Ethylesters,terpenes,andhigheralcoholswerefound tobethemostrepresentativevolatiles. a-Farnesene,hexan-1-olandhexyl2-methylbutyratewerethecompoundsfoundinthevolatileprofileofstudiedappleswiththelargestGCarea,representing,onaverage,24.71,14.06,and10.80%ofthetotalvolatilefractionfromPP,PS,andSSapples.InPPentireapple,themostabundantcompoundsidentified were a-farnesene (30.49%), the unknown compound m/z (69, 101, 157) (21.82%) andhexylacetate(6.57%).RegardingPSentireapplethemajorcompoundswere a-farnesene(16.87%),estragole(15.43%),hexan-1-ol(10.94),andE-2-hexenal(10.67).a-Farnesene(30.3%),hexan-1-ol(18.90%),2-methylbutanoicacid(4.7%),andpentan-1-ol(4.6%) werealsofoundasSSentireapplevolatilespresentinahigherrelativecontent.Principal component analysis (PCA) of the results clustered the apples into three groups according to geographic origin. Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) was performed in order to detect the volatile compounds able to differentiate the three kinds of apples investigated. The most important contributions to the differentiation of the PP, PS, and SS apples were ethyl hexanoate, hexyl 2-methylbutyrate, E,E-2,4-heptadienal, pethylstyrene,andE-2-hexenal.