915 resultados para Contractual Penalty
Resumo:
Flow represents an optimal psychological state that is intrinsically rewarding. However, to date only a few studies have investigated the conditions for flow in sports. The present research aims to expand our understanding of the psychological factors that promote the flow experience in sports, focusing on the person-goal fit, or more precisely on the athletes’ situational and dispositional goal orientations. We hypothesize that a fit between an athlete’s situational and dispositional approach versus avoidance goal orientation should promote flow, whereas a non-fit will hinder flow during sports. In addition to the flow experience, we hypothesize that an athlete’s affective well-being is also affected by the person-goal fit. Here our assumptions are theoretically rooted in research on person-environment fit. An experimental study in an ecologically valid sport setting was conducted in order to draw causal conclusions and derive useful strategies for the practice of sports. Specifically, we investigated 67 male soccer players from a regional amateur league during a regular training session. They were randomly assigned to an approach or avoidance goal group and asked to take five penalty shots. Immediately afterwards, their flow experience and affective well-being during the penalty shootout were measured. As predicted, soccer players with a strong dispositional approach goal orientation experienced more flow and reported higher affective well-being when they were assigned to the approach goal. In contrast, soccer players with a strong dispositional avoidance goal orientation benefited from being assigned an avoidance goal in terms of their flow experience and affective well-being. The results are discussed critically with respect to their theoretical and practical implications.
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In this article, we develop the a priori and a posteriori error analysis of hp-version interior penalty discontinuous Galerkin finite element methods for strongly monotone quasi-Newtonian fluid flows in a bounded Lipschitz domain Ω ⊂ ℝd, d = 2, 3. In the latter case, computable upper and lower bounds on the error are derived in terms of a natural energy norm, which are explicit in the local mesh size and local polynomial degree of the approximating finite element method. A series of numerical experiments illustrate the performance of the proposed a posteriori error indicators within an automatic hp-adaptive refinement algorithm.
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We introduce and analyze hp-version discontinuous Galerkin (dG) finite element methods for the numerical approximation of linear second-order elliptic boundary-value problems in three-dimensional polyhedral domains. To resolve possible corner-, edge- and corner-edge singularities, we consider hexahedral meshes that are geometrically and anisotropically refined toward the corresponding neighborhoods. Similarly, the local polynomial degrees are increased linearly and possibly anisotropically away from singularities. We design interior penalty hp-dG methods and prove that they are well-defined for problems with singular solutions and stable under the proposed hp-refinements. We establish (abstract) error bounds that will allow us to prove exponential rates of convergence in the second part of this work.
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The goal of this paper is to establish exponential convergence of $hp$-version interior penalty (IP) discontinuous Galerkin (dG) finite element methods for the numerical approximation of linear second-order elliptic boundary-value problems with homogeneous Dirichlet boundary conditions and piecewise analytic data in three-dimensional polyhedral domains. More precisely, we shall analyze the convergence of the $hp$-IP dG methods considered in [D. Schötzau, C. Schwab, T. P. Wihler, SIAM J. Numer. Anal., 51 (2013), pp. 1610--1633] based on axiparallel $\sigma$-geometric anisotropic meshes and $\bm{s}$-linear anisotropic polynomial degree distributions.
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The issuance of the Swiss Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes (CISA) in the year 2007 and the revision thereof in 2013 expanded the possibilities for restructuring of collective investment schemes and simplified the procedures. For instance, in article 95 the CISA contains a provision that deals in a non-conclusive way with the restructuring of open-ended collective investment schemes. As a novelty regulation, this provision allows for mergers not only of contractual funds but also of investment companies with variable capital (SICAV). Additionally, the transformation of an open-ended collective investment into another CISA legal form was also included into the catalogue of possible restructuring processes. Further, a SICAV still maintains the possibility for asset transfer according to article 69 ff. of the Federal Act on Merger, Demerger, Transformation and Transfer of Assets (MerA). However, not all open questions have been clarified. As long as the CISA does not contain restructuring provisions, as is the case with closed-ended collective investment schemes, generally the MerA and/or the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) apply. The interplay of diverse, partly overlapping legislative bases leads to the emergence of unwanted gaps. Moreover, the partial revision of the CISA was not completely implemented at the ordinance level. Among others, the following issues have not been conclusively or clearly regulated: the permitted combinations of mergers, the merger procedure of the SICAV, the permitted restructurings, the transformation procedure as well as the application scope of the asset transfer for collective investment schemes according to the relevant merger regulations. Although these questions will be clarified in the following article through a systematic and teleological analysis of the relevant regulations, it is to be hoped that the gaps will be closed within the next CISA revision in order to guarantee comprehensive legal certainty.
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A patient classification system was developed integrating a patient acuity instrument with a computerized nursing distribution method based on a linear programming model. The system was designed for real-time measurement of patient acuity (workload) and allocation of nursing personnel to optimize the utilization of resources.^ The acuity instrument was a prototype tool with eight categories of patients defined by patient severity and nursing intensity parameters. From this tool, the demand for nursing care was defined in patient points with one point equal to one hour of RN time. Validity and reliability of the instrument was determined as follows: (1) Content validity by a panel of expert nurses; (2) predictive validity through a paired t-test analysis of preshift and postshift categorization of patients; (3) initial reliability by a one month pilot of the instrument in a practice setting; and (4) interrater reliability by the Kappa statistic.^ The nursing distribution system was a linear programming model using a branch and bound technique for obtaining integer solutions. The objective function was to minimize the total number of nursing personnel used by optimally assigning the staff to meet the acuity needs of the units. A penalty weight was used as a coefficient of the objective function variables to define priorities for allocation of staff.^ The demand constraints were requirements to meet the total acuity points needed for each unit and to have a minimum number of RNs on each unit. Supply constraints were: (1) total availability of each type of staff and the value of that staff member (value was determined relative to that type of staff's ability to perform the job function of an RN (i.e., value for eight hours RN = 8 points, LVN = 6 points); (2) number of personnel available for floating between units.^ The capability of the model to assign staff quantitatively and qualitatively equal to the manual method was established by a thirty day comparison. Sensitivity testing demonstrated appropriate adjustment of the optimal solution to changes in penalty coefficients in the objective function and to acuity totals in the demand constraints.^ Further investigation of the model documented: correct adjustment of assignments in response to staff value changes; and cost minimization by an addition of a dollar coefficient to the objective function. ^
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Gaining economic benefits from substantially lower labor costs has been reported as a major reason for offshoring labor-intensive information systems services to low-wage countries. However, if wage differences are so high, why is there such a high level of variation in the economic success between offshored IS projects? This study argues that offshore outsourcing involves a number of extra costs for the ^his paper was recommended for acceptance by Associate Guest Editor Erran Carmel. client organization that account for the economic failure of offshore projects. The objective is to disaggregate these extra costs into their constituent parts and to explain why they differ between offshored software projects. The focus is on software development and maintenance projects that are offshored to Indian vendors. A theoretical framework is developed a priori based on transaction cost economics (TCE) and the knowledge-based view of the firm, comple mented by factors that acknowledge the specific offshore context The framework is empirically explored using a multiple case study design including six offshored software projects in a large German financial service institution. The results of our analysis indicate that the client incurs post contractual extra costs for four types of activities: (1) re quirements specification and design, (2) knowledge transfer, (3) control, and (4) coordination. In projects that require a high level of client-specific knowledge about idiosyncratic business processes and software systems, these extra costs were found to be substantially higher than in projects where more general knowledge was needed. Notably, these costs most often arose independently from the threat of oppor tunistic behavior, challenging the predominant TCE logic of market failure. Rather, the client extra costs were parti cularly high in client-specific projects because the effort for managing the consequences of the knowledge asymmetries between client and vendor was particularly high in these projects. Prior experiences of the vendor with related client projects were found to reduce the level of extra costs but could not fully offset the increase in extra costs in highly client-specific projects. Moreover, cultural and geographic distance between client and vendor as well as personnel turnover were found to increase client extra costs. Slight evidence was found, however, that the cost-increasing impact of these factors was also leveraged in projects with a high level of required client-specific knowledge (moderator effect).
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Introduction of a hydrophobic biphenyl-C-nucleotide pair into a 11-mer RNA duplex is associated with a net penalty in the free energy of duplex formation of 2.0 kcal mol(-1) or 10 degrees C in T(m), relative to DNA. These differential stabilities are of relevance with respect to the transcriptional and translational aspects of hydrophobic base-pairs
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This article seeks to bring some clarity to the publicly held debate on the Swiss federal popular initiative to limit immigration as it was adopted on 9 February 2014 by the Swiss people. It considers the crux of the matter, which is the implementation of the new Swiss constitutional article in the context of public international law. The initiative is stuck in between Swiss constitutional sovereignty and Swiss treaty obligations flowing from the agreement on free movement of persons between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation. Specific attention is paid to the democratic element anchored in the Swiss Constitution which, in contrast to other systems where the judicial element prevails, is of high importance for whole the process of a bilateral contractual relationship between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation.
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Although women are thought to possess sexual power, they risk social and economic penalties (i.e., backlash; Rudman, 1998) when they self-sexualize (i.e., assert their power; Cahoon & Edmonds, 1989; Glick, Larsen, Johnson, & Branstiter, 2005). Why? Drawing on the status incongruity hypothesis (SIH), which predicts backlash against powerful women because they challenge the gender hierarchy, we expected prejudice against self-sexualizing women to be explained by a dominance penalty rather than a communality deficit (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). Two experiments supported this hypothesis, and Experiment 3 further showed that the dominance penalty was explained by ascribing power motives to self-sexualized women. These findings extend the SIH’s utility to the domain of self-sexualization and illuminate the scope of people’s discomfort with female power. Implications for the advancement of gender equality are discussed.
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This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.
Resumo:
Purpose The purpose of this study was to investigate multiple indirect Big Five personality influences on professionals’ annual salary while considering relevant mediators. These are the motivational variables of occupational self-efficacy and career-advancement goals, and the work status variable of contractual work hours. The motivational and work status variables were conceptualized as serial mediators (Big Five → occupational self-efficacy/career-advancement goals → contractual work hours → annual salary). Design/Methodology/Approach We realized a 4 year longitudinal survey study with 432 participants and three points of measurement. We assessed personality prior to the mediators and the mediators prior to annual salary. Findings Results showed that except for openness the other Big Five personality traits exerted indirect influences on annual salary. Career-advancement goals mediated influences of conscientiousness (+), extraversion (+), and agreeableness (−). Occupational self-efficacy mediated influences of neuroticism (–) and conscientiousness (+). Because the influence of occupational self-efficacy on annual salary was fully mediated by contractual work hours, indirect personality influences via occupational self-efficacy always included contractual work hours in a serial mediation. Implications These findings underline the importance of distal personality traits for career success. They give further insights into direct and indirect relationships between personality, goal content, self-efficacy beliefs, and an individual’s career progress. Originality/Value Previous research predominantly investigated direct Big Five influences on salary, and it analyzed cross-sectional data. This study is one of the first to investigate multiple indirect Big Five influences on salary in a longitudinal design. The findings support process-oriented theories of personality influences on career outcomes.
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We prove exponential rates of convergence of hp-version discontinuous Galerkin (dG) interior penalty finite element methods for second-order elliptic problems with mixed Dirichlet-Neumann boundary conditions in axiparallel polyhedra. The dG discretizations are based on axiparallel, σ-geometric anisotropic meshes of mapped hexahedra and anisotropic polynomial degree distributions of μ-bounded variation. We consider piecewise analytic solutions which belong to a larger analytic class than those for the pure Dirichlet problem considered in [11, 12]. For such solutions, we establish the exponential convergence of a nonconforming dG interpolant given by local L 2 -projections on elements away from corners and edges, and by suitable local low-order quasi-interpolants on elements at corners and edges. Due to the appearance of non-homogeneous, weighted norms in the analytic regularity class, new arguments are introduced to bound the dG consistency errors in elements abutting on Neumann edges. The non-homogeneous norms also entail some crucial modifications of the stability and quasi-optimality proofs, as well as of the analysis for the anisotropic interpolation operators. The exponential convergence bounds for the dG interpolant constructed in this paper generalize the results of [11, 12] for the pure Dirichlet case.
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In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.
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A feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical justification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence of repeat offenders because of their diminished employments opportunities. We show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent.