Politicians as experts, electoral control, and fiscal restraints

We establish an argument for fiscal restraints which is based on the idea that politicians are experts in the meaning of the credence good literature. A budget maximizing politician is better informed than the electorate about the necessary spending to ensure the states ability to provide services for the economy. Voters, being able to observe the budget but not the necessary level of spending, attenuate the government’s spending level via electoral control. A fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government will choose if the level of spending ensuring the politicians reelection is not sufficient to ensure the state’s ability to provide services to the economy. We determine when such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the opposition in situations where very high levels of spending are required.

Bailing out the FEG : is the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (formerly GEERS) approaching its own fiscal cliff?

This article discusses what recent statistics and public reports reveal about the funding of GEERS (now the FEG) and its bottom line. The article examines (1) whether there has been a “blowout” in the scheme which guarantees the recovery of employee entitlements in liquidations and (2) what might be done to put the scheme on a firmer fiscal footing.

Emergency powers and pandemics : federalism and the management of public health emergencies in Australia

Under the International Health Regulations 2005 Australia is obliged to develop a domestic framework designed to equip it to respond to public health emergencies. The legislative arrangements for the declaration of a public health emergency in Australia are complex, vary across state jurisdictions and intersect with other emergency powers. The task of harmonising laws and other arrangements within a federal system poses both challenges and opportunities for flexibility and choice. This article argues that Australia's current multi-strand and multi-level response provides a coordinated framework which also accommodates desirable levels of flexibility and choice.

Legal rights during pandemics : federalism, rights and public health laws - a view from Australia

Pandemic influenza will cause significant social and economic disruption. Legal frameworks can play an important role in clarifying the rights and duties of individuals, communities and governments for times of crisis. In addressing legal frameworks, there is a need for jurisdictional clarity between different levels of government in responding to public health emergencies. Public health laws are also informed by our understandings of rights and responsibilities for individuals and communities, and the balancing of public health and public freedoms. Consideration of these issues is an essential part of planning for pandemic influenza.

Influence and increased funding in Canadian public libraries : the case of Alberta in fiscal year 2009–10

This exploratory case study examined the role of social influence in the decision-making process to increase public library funding in the Canadian province of Alberta in the 2009–10 fiscal year. Using Robert Cialdini’s theory of factors of influence (i.e., commitment and consistency, authority, liking, social proof, scarcity, and reciprocity) as a framework for analysis, findings show that consistency and commitment and authority were relevant and that liking was also important. These findings are consistent with Cialdini’s theory, which suggests that the quality of relationships is one factor that can most strongly influence a decision maker. This study gives insight into the factors motivating those involved in public library funding allocation decisions. No prior studies have examined the construct of influence in decision making about funding for public libraries at any level of government.

Essays on macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy rules

Economic and Monetary Union can be characterised as a complicated set of legislation and institutions governing monetary and fiscal responsibilities. The measures of fiscal responsibility are to be guided by the Stability and Growth Pact, which sets rules for fiscal policy and makes a discretionary fiscal policy virtually impossible. To analyse the effects of the fiscal and monetary policy mix, we modified the New Keynesian framework to allow for supply effects of fiscal policy. We show that defining a supply-side channel for fiscal policy using an endogenous output gap changes the stabilising properties of monetary policy rules. The stability conditions are affected by fiscal policy, so that the dichotomy between active (passive) monetary policy and passive (active) fiscal policy as stabilising regimes does not hold, and it is possible to have an active monetary - active fiscal policy regime consistent with dynamical stability of the economy. We show that, if we take supply-side effects into ac-count, we get more persistent inflation and output reactions. We also show that the dichotomy does not hold for a variety of different fiscal policy rules based on government debt and budget deficit, using the tax smoothing hypothesis and formulating the tax rules as difference equations. The debt rule with active monetary policy results in indeterminacy, while the deficit rule produces a determinate solution with active monetary policy, even with active fiscal policy. The combination of fiscal requirements in a rule results in cyclical responses to shocks. The amplitude of the cycle is larger with more weight on debt than on deficit. Combining optimised monetary policy with fiscal policy rules means that, under a discretionary monetary policy, the fiscal policy regime affects the size of the inflation bias. We also show that commitment to an optimal monetary policy not only corrects the inflation bias but also increases the persistence of output reactions. With fiscal policy rules based on the deficit we can retain the tax smoothing hypothesis also in a sticky price model.

The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy under a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime

This licentiate's thesis analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy under a flexible exchange rate regime, assuming that the government spends exclusively on domestically produced goods. The motivation for this research comes from the observation that the literature on the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) has focused almost exclusively on two-country global models and the analyses of the effects of fiscal policy on small economies are almost completely ignored. This thesis aims at filling in the gap in the NOEM literature and illustrates how the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy depend on the specification of preferences. The research method is to present two theoretical model that are extensions to the model contained in the Appendix to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). The first model analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, making use of a model that exploits the idea of modelling private and government consumption as substitutes in private utility. The model offers intuitive predictions on how the effects of fiscal policy depend on the marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption. The findings illustrate that the higher the substitutability between private and government consumption, (i) the bigger is the crowding out effect on private consumption (ii) and the smaller is the positive effect on output. The welfare analysis shows that the less fiscal policy decreases welfare the higher is the marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption. The second model of this thesis studies how the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy depend on the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. This model reveals that this elasticity a key variable to explain the exchange rate, current account and output response to a permanent rise in government spending. Finally, the model demonstrates that temporary changes in government spending are an effective stabilization tool when used wisely and timely in response to undesired fluctuations in output. Undesired fluctuations in output can be perfectly offset by an opposite change in government spending without causing any side-effects.

Fiscal imbalances, inflation and sovereign default dynamics

Resumen: La cuestión central que este artículo busca responder es como la política monetaria puede afectar el comportamiento de equilibrio de primas por riesgo soberano y cesación de pagos. El artículo se basa en el modelo de “una-tasa-interés”. La deuda pública se hace riesgosa a causa de una política fiscal activa, como en Uribe (2006), reflejando la habilidad limitada de la autoridad fiscal para controlar el superávit primario. El problema de insolvencia es debido a una oleada de mala suerte (shocks negativos que afectan el superávit primario). Pero en contraste a los resultados de Uribe, a medida que aumenta el costo de la deuda soberana (que resulta de un excedente primario débil), la cesación de pagos se anticipa y es reflejada por una creciente prima de riesgo en el país y una probabilidad de cesación de pagos. La cesación de pagos se define como un incumplimiento de un acuerdo contractual y por ende la decisión es tomada por la autoridad fiscal. Mientras tanto, objetivos conflictivos entre la autoridad monetaria y fiscal juegan un rol importante en llevar a la autoridad fiscal a la cesación de pagos sobre sus pasivos. La característica de la política del gobierno necesaria para restaurar el equilibrio después de la cesación de pagos también es analizada.

Primeiro quadrimestre de 2009, cumprimento de meta fiscal ...

Conteúdo: Cumprimento da meta fiscal no primeiro quadrimestre -- Evolução dos resultados no setor público -- Evolução da dívida pública federal em mercado no quadrimestre -- Receitas e despesas até abril -- Política fiscal : despesas com investimentos -- Segunda avaliação orçamentária -- Cenário macroeconômico e parâmetros fiscais -- Metas quadrimestrais em 2009 -- Arrecadação das receitas administradas no primeiro quadrimestre de 2009 -- Arrecadação das receitas não administradas no primeiro quadrimestre de 2009 -- Receita prevista para o exercício de 2009.

Fundo Soberano do Brasil : fundo fiscal de investimento e estabilização (PL 3.674/08)

Consultoria de Orçamento e Fiscalização Financeira - Núcleo de Assuntos Econômico-Fiscais.

Reprogramação orçamentária de 2012 esforço fiscal contingenciamento de despesas do executivo (Versão Preliminar)

Para atender à necessidade de um exame rápido do primeiro contingenciamento em 2012, seguem-se observações preliminares baseadas nas hipóteses oficiais de comportamento das variáveis macroeconômicas, nos limites de movimentação e empenho das dotações do Executivo dos orçamentos fiscal e da seguridade social anunciados em 15 de fevereiro, nas previsões constantes da proposta e da lei aprovada, e em dados da execução de 2010 e 2011.

O governo do Distrito Federal e a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF)

Consultoria Legislativa - Área IV - Finanças Públicas.

A questão da transparência fiscal dos códigos de conduta parlamentar : estudo comparado da África do Sul, Estados Unidos, Portugal, Reino Unido

Consultoria Legislativa - Área XIX - Ciência Política, Relações Internacionais.

Os crimes fiscais e o Refis : modos para diminuir a evasão fiscal

Consultoria Legislativa - Área III - Tributação, Direito Tributário.

Evolução conceitual e distinção entre cidadania político-eleitoral, cidadania fiscal e cidadania penal aos 16 anos

Consultoria Legislativa - Área I - Direito Constitucional, Eleitoral, Municipal, Direito Administrativo, Processo Legislativo e Poder Judiciário.