O aprimoramento cognitivo como bem primário em Rawls

The main thesis to be demonstrated in this work is that cognitive enhancement through the use of drugs can be included as a primary good within Rawls' thinking. To develop such notion, the text is structured in two parts. The first part intends to describe the theory of justice as equity in its elements directly related to primary goods. The first information to be verified is the unity of the notion of primary goods in all of Rawls' work. Some elements are modified, for example the distinction of natural and social primary goods. Natural primary goods are intelligence, health, imagination, vigor and chance (luck) and social primary goods are law and liberty, opportunity and power, income and wealth and the social fundaments of self-respect. The perception of some talents such as intelligence has also undergone changes, being altered from "higher intelligence" to "educated intelligence". Such fact highlights education as a primary good that permeates all of Rawls' work in different perspectives. Freedom and self-respect are social-primary goods that will also be deepened. The second part presents the definition of improvement and as to show that the distinction between enhancement and treatment is controversial. The part presents the definition of improvement and as the distinction between enhancement and treatment is controversial. Thus, we have deepened the problems related to practice improvement (enhancement) showing how the concepts of Rawls' primary goods as freedom and self-respect are not in opposition to the practice of improvement, particularly cognitive enhancement. We have shown, instead, that the ban of cognitive improvement could lead to denial of these primary goods. But how could we consider cognitive improvement as a primary social good? What we have done in this thesis is to show how cognitive enhancement is important to ensure that primary products are accessible to citizens, and we rebuilt the process that Rawls uses for choosing his primary goods to test that cognitive enhancement through drugs could perfectly be introduced as such.

Democratic Stability through the Concept of Reasonableness in John Rawls

The paper addresses the question of the stability of a democratic state and shows the shortcomings of the political and institutional structure for this purpose. It argues for the need of an additional factor of reasonableness as defined by John Rawls. We reflect on its articulation with rationality, its role regarding laws and the areas where its presence is crucial to the health and maintenance of a democratic political society. The analysis concludes by justifying the instrumental need of such faculty in the political arena as well as vindicating it as a mandatory civic duty.

Démocratie et justice sociale : Arrow-Harsanyi- Rawls-Sen, un quatuor dissonant

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Démocratie et justice sociale : Arrow-Harsanyi- Rawls-Sen, un quatuor dissonant

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The stewardship paradigm : an enquiry into the ethical obligation associated with being in control of resorces

The resource allocation and utilization discourse is dominated by debates about rights particularly individual property rights and ownership. This is due largely to the philosophic foundations provided by Hobbes and Locke and adopted by Bentham. In our community, though, resources come not merely with rights embedded but also obligations. The relevant laws and equitable principles which give shape to our shared rights and obligations with respect to resources take cognizance not merely of the title to the resource (the proprietary right) but the particular context in which the right is exercised. Moral philosophy regarding resource utilisation has from ancient times taken cognizance of obligations but with ascendance of modernity, the agenda of moral philosophy regarding resources, has been dominated, at least since John Locke, by a preoccupation with property rights; the ethical obligations associated with resource management have been largely ignored. The particular social context has also been ignored. Exploring this applied ethical terrain regarding resource utilisation, this thesis: (1) Revisits the justifications for modem property rights (and in that the exclusion of obligations); (2) Identifies major deficiencies in these justifications and reasons for this; (3) Traces the concept of stewardship as understood in classical Greek writing and in the New Testament, and considers its application in the Patristic period and by Medieval and reformist writers, before turning to investigate its influence on legal and equitable concepts through to the current day; 4) Discusses the nature of the stewardship obligation,maps it and offers a schematic for applying the Stewardship Paradigm to problems arising in daily life; and, (5) Discusses the way in which the Stewardship Paradigm may be applied by, and assists in resolving issues arising from within four dominant philosophic world views: (a) Rawls' social contract theory; (b) Utilitarianism as discussed by Peter Singer; (c) Christianity with particular focus on the theology of Douglas Hall; (d) Feminism particularly as expressed in the ethics of care of Carol Gilligan; and, offers some more general comments about stewardship in the context of an ethically plural community.

A theoretical framework for designing and evaluating strategies to identify cases of serious child abuse and neglect

A central dimension of the State’s responsibility in a liberal democracy and any just society is the protection of individuals’ central rights and freedoms, and the creation of the minimum conditions under which each individual has an opportunity to lead a life of sufficient equality, dignity and value. A special subset of this responsibility is to protect those who are unable to protect themselves from genuine harm. Substantial numbers of children suffer serious physical, emotional and sexual abuse, and neglect at the hands of their parents and caregivers or by other known parties. Child abuse and neglect occurs in a situation of extreme power asymmetry. The physical, social, behavioural and economic costs to the individual, and the social and economic costs to communities, are vast. Children are not generally able to protect themselves from serious abuse and neglect. This enlivens both the State’s responsibility to protect the child, and the debate about how that responsibility can and should be discharged. A core question arises for all societies, given that most serious child maltreatment occurs in the family sphere, is unlikely to be disclosed, causes substantial harm to both individual and community, and infringes fundamental individual rights and freedoms. The question is: how can society identify these situations so that the maltreatment can be interrupted, the child’s needs for security and safety, and health and other rehabilitation can be met, and the family’s needs can be addressed to reduce the likelihood of recurrence? This chapter proposes a theoretical framework applicable for any society that is considering justifiable and effective policy approaches to identify and respond to cases of serious child abuse and neglect. The core of the theoretical framework is based on major principles from both classical liberal political philosophy (Locke and Mill), and leading political philosophers from the twentieth century and the first part of the new millennium (Rawls, Rorty, Okin, Nussbaum), and is further situated within fundamental frameworks of civil and criminal law, and health and economics.

Constructing Ethical Patterns in Times of Globalization : Hans Küng's Global Ethic Project and Beyond

The purpose of this study is to evaluate contemporary philosophical models for global ethics in light of the Catholic theologian Hans Küng s Global Ethic Project (Projekt Weltethos). Küng s project starts with the motto, No survival without world ethos. No global peace without peace between religions. I will use the philosophically multidimensional potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of its possible philosophical interpretations to evaluate the general discussion of global ethics within political philosophy today. This is important in its own right, but also because through it, opportunities will emerge to articulate Küng s relatively general argument in a way that leaves less room for mutually contradictory concretizations of what global ethics ultimately should be like. The most important question in this study is the problem of religious and ideological exclusivism and its relation to the ethically consistent articulation of global ethics. I will first explore the question of the role of religion as the basis for ethics in general and what Küng may mean by his claim that only the unconditional can oblige unconditionally. I will reconstruct two different overall philosophical interpretations of the relationship between religious faith and human rationality, each having two different sub-divisions: a liberal interpretation amounts to either a Kantian-Scheiermacherian or a Jaspersian view, whereas what I call postliberal interpretation amounts to either an Aristotelian-Thomistic or an Augustinian view. Thereafter, I will further clarify how Küng views the nature of ethics beyond the question of its principal foundation in religious faith: Küng searches for a middle way between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethics, a way in which the latter dimension has the final stake. I will then set out to concretize further this more or less general notion of the theoretical potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of certain precise philosophico-political models. I categorize these models according to their liberal or postliberal orientation. The liberal concretization leads me to consider a wide spectrum of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian models from Rawls to Derrida, while the alternative concretization opens up my ultimate argument in favor of a postliberal type of modus vivendi. I will suggest that the only theoretically and practically plausible way to promote global ethics, in itself a major imperative today, is the recognition of a fundamental and necessary contest between mutually exclusive ideologies in the public sphere. On this basis I will proceed to my postliberal proposal, namely, that a constructive and peaceful encountering of exclusive difference as an ethical vantage point for an intercultural and inter-religious peace dialogue is the most acute challenge for global ethics today.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Kateuden luonne ja erityispiirteet filosofisessa pohdinnassa

Kateuden tunnetta ei ole tarkasteltu käytännöllisessä filosofiassa huolimatta sen määräävästä asemasta ihmisen normaalissa päivittäisessä elämässä. Kateus liittyy moniin ilmiöihin yksilöllisenä tai jopa kollektiivisena ryhmätunteena, kun siihen yhdistyvät epäoikeudenmukaisuus ja itsepetoksellisuus. Tutkielma pyrki osoittamaan kateuden vääjäämättömän monipuolisuuden kilpailullisena ja eriarvoisuutta lisäävänä vertailevana kompleksisena negatiivisena tunteena. Jo antiikin Kreikassa kateus liitettiin ihmisten ja jumalien väliseen eriarvoisuuteen, nykypäivänä taas kateutta leimaa liberaalisen yhteiskuntapolitiikan keskiössä ”tietämättömyyden verhon” takana egalitaarisuuden ihanne ja oikeudenmukaisuuden ja reiluuden taju. Tunnekokemuksena kateus on impotenttinen toisen paremmuudesta ja inferioi näin kateuden episodisuuden irrationaaliseen tilanteeseensa nähden antagonistiseksi. Tutkielman neljästä pääluvussa ensimmäisessä kateus yhdistetään poliittisen liberaalin yhteiskuntafilosofian yhdysvaltalaiseen kannattajaan John Rawlsiin (1921−2002). Hänen ajattelussaan ja pääteoksessaan A Theory of Justice (1971) ja siinä erityisesti kateutta käsittelevässä luvussa IX kateus on yhteiskunnassa vaikuttavaa erityispsykologista taipumusta tavoitella parempiosaisten asemaa oikeudenmukaisuuden kontraktuaalisessa valintajärjestelmässä. Rawlsille kateus ei ole tabu, vaan kateuden ongelma koskee kaikkia abstraktissa alkuasetelmassa yhteiskuntasopimuksen piiriin liittyviä sopija−agentteja. Rationaalinen agentti ei kärsi kateudesta, kun epäoikeudenmukaisuutta ei ole hänen ja muiden samojen vapaus− ja eroperiaatteiden nojalla toimivien ihmisten välillä sietämättömästi. Rawls tekee kuitenkin jaon pahantahoisessa kateudessa (proper) yleiseen ja erityiseen ja erottaa sekä emulatiivisen (emulative) eli motivoivan esimerkin sysäämän kilvoittelevan kateuden varsinaisesta kateudesta (proper). Myös anteeksiannettava kateus (excusable general envy) on Rawlsin onnellisuutta ja reiluutta tasa–arvoistavassa sopimusteorian ideaalissa varsinaisen kateuden alaluokkana mukana. Kateus ja tasa-arvo tulevat esille paremmin kilpailullisessa kateudessa, mistä myös viime vuosien merkittävin kateustutkija amerikkalainen Kentuckyn yliopiston psykologian professori Richard H. Smith on ollut kiinnostunut. Hänelle kateus on inferiorisen kompleksista ja liittyy oman arvon tunteeseen ja kognitiiviseen psykologiaan. Kateuden tutkimus on monialaistunut ja vilkastunut viime vuosikymmenen aikana. Sosiaali−psykologia, sosiologia, kulttuuriantropologia ja tunnefilosofia ovat kiinnostuneet ymmärtämään tätä kompleksista negatiivista tunnetta paremmin. Kulttuurissamme kateus toimii universaalisesti yhteydessä muihin rinnakkaistunteisiin, kuten moraaliseen paheksuntaan tai sitä lievempään närkästymiseen. Kateus ei ole perustunne, mutta sille on löydettävissä prototyypillisiä piirteitä, joskin kateus ei helposti antaudu propositionaaliseen tai kognitiiviseen arvostelmasisältöön yksin mentaalisen analyysin välityksellä (Solomon 1976). Siitä pitää huolen kateuden affektuaalnen instrumentaalisuus (feeling) ja kognitiivisen komponentiaalisen tulkinnan vaikeus kateellisen väistellessä oman itsetunnon inferiorisuuden tai omaa toimintavalmiutta heikentävien ilkeämielisten motiiviensa alaisuudessa. Kateelliselle ei ns. perisyntinä riitä, että kadehditulta olisi saatu pois haluttu myönteinen ominaisuus, kohde−esine tai asema, vaan lähietäisyydellä toimivasta kadehditusta pitäisi päästä kokonaan eroon (ns. venäläinen kateus). Siksi kateus approksimoi naapureita, ystäviä, kollegoita tai myös toisen ihmisen aviopuolisoa, mutta usein arkiyhteydessä käsitteellisesti väärinymmärrettynä, koska jälkimmäisessä on kyse kolmepaikkaisesta mustasukkaisuuden tunteesta. Kaksipaikkaisena tunteena (kateellinen & kadehdittu) ja sen vastatunteenaan usein mainittu kiittämättömyys saavat aikaan sen, että kateellinen on myös taipuvainen aggressiivisuuteen ja vihaisuuteen, mutta kun asiaa tarkastelee tarkemmin taustalta paljastuu itsepetoksen elementtejä. Kateellinen hyödyntää itsepetoksen paradoksia eli kahden vastakkaisen uskomuksen (Kateellinen, koska P & Kateellinen, koska ~P) samanaikaista voimassaoloa tilanteessa, jossa omat teot ovat suuntautuneet intentionaalisesti muualle kuin kadehditun komparatiiivisesti parempana näyttäytyvien arvostuserojen kuromiseksi tilanteen tasavertaistamiseksi kiinni. Kateellinen voi olla deliberatiivisen ahne ja nopea epäreilussa reaktiossaan kadehdittua kohtaan. Näin uppiniskainen kateustunne voi tulla eriäväksi havaitun arvioivan arvostelman kanssa. Kateustunne olisi näin määritelmällisesti intensiivistä puutetta (toistuvissa) epätasa−arvoisissa ja irrationalisoituneissa ihmiskohtaamisissa. Tutkimus esitteli kateustunteen adekvaattisena käsitteenä ja toi havaintoja kognitiivisen tunneteorian riittämättömyydestä kateustunteen tutkimukselle. Kiinnostavaa oli, että poliittisessa yhteiskuntafilosofiasta löytyi myös Rawlsin psykologisten erityistaipumuksien ja erityisesti kateuden yhteiskuntapoliittista kritiikkiä. Tunneteoreettisesti kateustunne on kognitiivista perustunnetta holistisempi, intensiivisempi ja intentionaalisempi sekä lisäksi affektuaalisesti motivoiva, joka mahdollistaa myös inhimillisen toiminnan kehittymisen, mutta myös kadehtijan tuhoamisen. Itsepetos sen sijaan tekee kateudesta haavoittuvan ja myös narsismia ruokkivan tunnetilan, jossa kateellinen toimii hedonistisesti ei−kognitiivisen irrationaalisen tietämyksen (envious feeling proper) varassa ja kieltää tunteen konsekventionaaliset usein negatiiviset seuraukset itselleen ja lähiympäristölleen.

Tarvitaanko demokratiassa keskustelua? Julkinen alue demokraattisen legitimiteetin tuottajana

Pyrin Pro gradu -tutkielmassani hahmottamaan ne tekijät, jotka konstituoivat julkista aluetta demokraattista legitimiteettiä tuottavana poliittisena foorumina. Työni keskiössä on deliberatiivisen demokratian teorian ydinajatus, että ihmiset ja ihmisryhmät kykenevät muodostamaan mielipiteensä ja tuomaan sen esille julkisissa keskusteluissa. Hyvin argumentoitu vaade ryhmän oikeuksien puolesta kerää julkista kannatusta muualtakin kuin asianomaisen ryhmän sisältä. Tämä puolestaan saa aikaan poliittisia muutoksia. Ryhmä, jota yhdistää epäoikeudenmukaisuuden kokemus, tuo agendansa julkisuuteen ja pyrkii vaikuttamaan yleiseen mielipiteeseen ja sitä kautta poliittiseen päätöksentekoon. Oleellinen kysymys tässä kontekstissa on, kuinka paljon yleisen mielipiteen tulisi vaikuttaa poliittiseen päätöksentekoon ja minkälaisiin aiheisiin poliittisesti vaikuttava yleinen mielipide on rajattu. Keskustelun julkisen alueen demokraattistra legitimiteettiä tuottavasta voimasta käynnisti Jürgen Habermasin teos Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit vuonna 1962. Olen käyttänyt kyseisen teoksen lisäksi lähteinäni Habermasin myöhäisempää tuotantoa. Habermasin pääasiallisina kommentaattoreina työssäni toimivat John Rawls, Nancy Fraser, Chantal Mouffe ja Seyla Benhabib. Tarkastelutapani on systemaattinen. Pyrin selventämään julkisen alueen käsitettä sekä liittyen julkiselle alueelle postuloituihin funktioihin, episteemiseen asemaan, sosiaaliseen ontologiaan, ekstensioon ja sitä konstituoiviin periaatteisiin. Käyn läpi deliberatiivisen demokratian teorian, poliittisen liberalismin ja agonistisen politiikan teorian käsitykset politiikan ja julkisen alueen luonteesta. Pyrin puolustamaan deliberatiivisen demokratian mukaista näkemystä julkisen alueen funktiosta. Käyn tutkielmassani läpi myös niitä ongelmia, jotka nousevat viime vuosikymmenien aikana demokraattisen päätöksenteon kannalta oleellisissa instituutionaalisissa rakanteissa tapahtuneista muutoksista. Keskeinen kysymys on, kykeneekö habermasilainen teoria vielä säilyttämään deskriptiivisen ja normatiivisen arvonsa globalisoituneessa maailmassa. Tutkimuksessani selvisi, että demokraattinen legitimiteetti vaatii tuekseen julkisen alueen mielipiteenmuodostusta. Julkista aluetta ei kuitenkaan ole tarkoituksenmukaista hahmottaa yhtenä laajana diskursiivisena areenana vaan useiden kommunikatiivisten alueiden verkostona, joista jotkut alueet ovat kattavampia kuin toiset.

An Analysis of the Concept of Citizenship: Legal, Political and Social Dimensions

The thesis aims at analyzing concept of citizenship in political philosophy. The concept of citizenship is a complex one: it does not have a definitive explication, but it nevertheless is a very important category in contemporary world. Citizenship is a powerful ideal, and often the way a person is treated depends on whether he or she has the status of a citizen. Citizenship includes protection of a person’s rights both at home and abroad. It entails legal, political and social dimension: the legal status as a full member of society, the recognition of that status by fellow citizens and acting as a member of society. The thesis discusses these three dimensions. Its objective is to show how all of them, despite being insufficient in some aspects, reach something important about the concept. The main sources of the thesis are Civic Republicanism by Iseult Honohan (Routledge 2002), Republicanism by Philip Pettit (Clarendon Press 1997), and Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin (1997). In addition, the historical part of the thesis relies mainly on the works of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Quentin Skinner, James Pocock and James Tully. The writings of Will Kymlicka, John Rawls, Chantal Mouffe, and Shane Phelan are referred to in the presentation and critique of the liberal tradition of thought. Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib’s analysis of Arendt’s philosophy both address the problematic relations between human rights and nation-states as the main guarantors of rights. The chapter on group rights relies on Peter Jones’ account of corporate and collective rights, after which I continue to Seumas Miller’s essay on the (liberal) account of group rights and their relation to the concept of citizenship. Republicanism and Political Theory (2002) edited by Cécile Laborde and John Maynor is also references. David Miller and Maurizio Viroli represent the more “rooted” version of republicanism. The thesis argues that the full concept of citizenship should be seen as containing legal, political and social dimensions. The concept can be viewed from all of these three angles. The first means that citizenship is connected with certain rights, like the right to vote or stand for election, the right to property and so on. In most societies, the law guarantees these rights to every citizen. Then there is also the social dimension, which can be said to be as important as the legal one: the recognition of equality and identities of others. Finally, there is the political dimension, meaning the importance of citizens’ participation in the society, which is discussed in connection with the contemporary account of republicanism. All these issues are discussed from the point of view of groups demanding for group-specific rights and equal recognition. The challenge with these three aspects of citizenship is, however, that they are difficult to discuss under one heading. Different theories or discourses of citizenship each approach the subject from different starting points, which make reconciling them sometimes hard. The fundamental questions theories try to answer may differ radically depending on the theory. Nevertheless, in order to get the whole image of what the citizenship discourses are about all the aspects deserve to be taken into account.

El estatuto de la persona humana como centro del actual debate justificatorio de los derechos fundamentales y sus consecuencias

Resumen: El presente artículo aborda el tema del estatuto de la persona humana desde distintas concepciones: 1) la concepción política del constructivismo contractualista de Rawls; 2) la concepción relacional de la hermenéutica de Kauffmann; 3) la concepción ontológica del iusnaturalismo clásico de Hervada. Una vez analizadas las distintas concepciones aborda cómo se aplica al caso del embrión humano y cuáles son las consecuencias éticas y jurídicas de cada una de estas posiciones.

Amartya Sen : la idea de la justicia

Resumen: El artículo analiza la importancia del último libro publicado por Amartya Sen, La idea de la justicia, que representa una síntesis de todo su pensamiento. El autor destaca que la importancia de esta obra radica en su dimensión ética, guiada por la razón, y la compara con la teoría de John Rawls, trazando los paralelos y diferencias que existen entre el pensamiento de ambos intelectuales. Luego, Migliore expone los tres grandes temas abordados por Sen en su teoría: la cuestión de la distribución justa de los r ecursos, la democracia o libertad de participación, y los derechos humanos. Finalmente, a modo de conclusión, sugiere que la obra del economista indio tiene interesantes coincidencias con el pensamiento social cristiano.