Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

On the Profitability of Production Constraints in a Dynamic Natural Resource Oligopoly

Static oligopoly analysis predicts that if a single firm in Cournot equilibrium were to be constrained to contract its production marginally, its profits would fall. on the other hand, if all the firms were simultaneously constrained to reduce their productino, thus moving the industry towards monopoly output, each firm's profit would rise. We show that these very intuitive results may not hold in a dynamic oligopoly.

On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited.

Consider a general equilibrium framework where the marginal cost of extraction from several deposits of an exhaustible resource is constant in terms of an inexhaustible perfect substitute and differs between deposits. the instantaneous rate of production form the inexhaustible resource is subject to a capacity constraint.

The Efficient Use of Multiple Sources of a Nonrenewable Resource under Supply Cost Uncertainty

Uncertainties as to future supply costs of nonrenewable natural resources, such as oil and gas, raise the issue of the choice of supply sources. In a perfectly deterministic world, an efficient use of multiple sources of supply requires that any given market exhausts the supply it can draw from a low cost source before moving on to a higher cost one; supply sources should be exploited in strict sequence of increasing marginal cost, with a high cost source being left untouched as long as a less costly source is available. We find that this may not be the efficient thing to do in a stochastic world. We show that there exist conditions under which it can be efficient to use a risky supply source in order to conserve a cheaper non risky source. The benefit of doing this comes from the fact that it leaves open the possibility of using it instead of the risky source in the event the latter’s future cost conditions suddenly deteriorate. There are also conditions under which it will be efficient to use a more costly non risky source while a less costly risky source is still available. The reason is that this conserves the less costly risky source in order to use it in the event of a possible future drop in its cost.

Le rôle de l’évaluation économique dans la pratique des médecins de famille = The role of economic evaluation in the practice of family physicians

L’évaluation économique en santé consiste en l’analyse comparative d’alternatives de services en regard à la fois de leurs coûts et de leurs conséquences. Elle est un outil d’aide à la décision. La grande majorité des décisions concernant l’allocation des ressources sont prises en clinique; particulièrement au niveau des soins primaires. Puisque chaque décision est associée à un coût d’opportunité, la non-prise en compte des considérations économiques dans les pratiques des médecins de famille peut avoir un impact important sur l’efficience du système de santé. Il existe peu de connaissances quant à l’influence des évaluations économiques sur la pratique clinique. L’objet de la thèse est de comprendre le rôle de l’évaluation économique dans la pratique des médecins de famille. Ses contributions font l’objet de quatre articles originaux (philosophique, théorique, méthodologique et empirique). L’article philosophique suggère l’importance des questions de complexité et de réflexivité en évaluation économique. La complexité est la perspective philosophique, (approche générale épistémologique) qui sous-tend la thèse. Cette vision du monde met l’attention sur l’explication et la compréhension et sur les relations et les interactions (causalité interactive). Cet accent sur le contexte et le processus de production des données souligne l’importance de la réflexivité dans le processus de recherche. L’article théorique développe une conception nouvelle et différente du problème de recherche. L’originalité de la thèse réside également dans son approche qui s’appuie sur la perspective de la théorie sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu; une approche théorique cohérente avec la complexité. Opposé aux modèles individualistes de l’action rationnelle, Bourdieu préconise une approche sociologique qui s’inscrit dans la recherche d’une compréhension plus complète et plus complexe des phénomènes sociaux en mettant en lumière les influences souvent implicites qui viennent chaque jour exercer des pressions sur les individus et leurs pratiques. L’article méthodologique présente le protocole d’une étude qualitative de cas multiples avec niveaux d’analyse imbriqués : les médecins de famille (niveau micro-individuel) et le champ de la médecine familiale (niveau macro-structurel). Huit études de cas furent réalisées avec le médecin de famille comme unité principale d’analyse. Pour le niveau micro, la collecte des informations fut réalisée à l’aide d’entrevues de type histoire de vie, de documents et d’observation. Pour le niveau macro, la collecte des informations fut réalisée à l’aide de documents, et d’entrevues de type semi-structuré auprès de huit informateurs clés, de neuf organisations médicales. L’induction analytique fut utilisée. L’article empirique présente l’ensemble des résultats empiriques de la thèse. Les résultats montrent une intégration croissante de concepts en économie dans le discours officiel des organisations de médecine familiale. Cependant, au niveau de la pratique, l'économisation de ce discours ne semble pas être une représentation fidèle de la réalité puisque la très grande majorité des participants n'incarnent pas ce discours. Les contributions incluent une compréhension approfondie des processus sociaux qui influencent les schèmes de perception, de pensée, d’appréciation et d’action des médecins de famille quant au rôle de l’évaluation économique dans la pratique clinique et la volonté des médecins de famille à contribuer à une allocation efficiente, équitable et légitime des ressources.