Chart of estimate of cost of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway extension Line no. 1

Chart of estimate of cost of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway extension Line no. 1 signed by Mr. Shanly, Mar. 12, 1857.

Chart of the estimated cost of Line no. 1

Chart of the estimated cost of Line no. 1, n.d.

Chart outlining Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway cost of planks, bridge, railway crossing and approaches thereto

Chart outlining Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway cost of planks, bridge, railway crossing and approaches thereto, n.d.

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson (2 pages, handwritten), n.d.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from John I. Mackenzie regarding 1 share of the Long Point Company transferred from Alexander McInnes and 2 shares transferred from E.C. Clark

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from John I. Mackenzie regarding 1 share of the Long Point Company transferred from Alexander McInnes and 2 shares transferred from E.C. Clark. The shares were transferred to John I Mackenzie, Sept. 6, 1870.

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff regarding Long Point shooting share

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff regarding Long Point shooting shares. Jan. 14, 1886.

Letter (typed) from the H.H. Warner Co. to S.D. Woodruff which was enclosed with a payment of $2,500.00 for the shooting share transferred to Mr. Warner

Letter (typed) from the H.H. Warner Co. to S.D. Woodruff which was enclosed with a payment of $2,500.00 for the shooting share transferred to Mr. Warner. The letter also requests that Mr. Woodruff send a note explaining the general customs of the club, May 21, 1886.

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns, January, 1878.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Le "Dollar Cost Averaging", modèle conditionnel d'investissement, et modèle de régression prévisionnel.

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