La lucha por la tierra en la Huasteca Potosina (México): de peones a patrones

El presente trabajo consiste en un análisis acerca de las luchas por la tierra que se han venido produciendo en la región mexicana de la Huasteca Potosina, principalmente a raíz de la puesta en marcha del proyecto Pujal-Coy en 1973, cuando ocurre una transformación espacial que provoca toda una serie de conflictos por la apropiación del territorio a manos de nuevos pobladores frente a las instancias de gobierno encargadas del reparto agrario. Este proceso aparecerá marcado por la transformación del estatus socioeconómico de un importante colectivo en el momento en el que se convierten en propietarios de tierras. La metodología desarrollada es de carácter interdisciplinar al combinar el análisis geopolítico a escala local, el trabajo etnográfico en comunidades rurales y la revisión histórica. El resultado de la investigación ha sido la comprensión de la lógica espacial que define a esta región de México a partir de las contradicciones entre las prácticas espaciales hegemónicas y los contra-espacios que las poblaciones locales construyen como alternativa a las primeras.

Avaliação do efeito de escala no cálculo da perigosidade de incêndio florestal

Dissertação apresentada à Escola Superior Agrária do Instituto Politécnico de Castelo Branco para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Sistemas de Informação Geográfica - Recursos Agro-Florestais e Ambientais.

Notes on cases in Lennox and Worcester, 1789

Contains notes on cases before the Supreme Court in Lennox and Worcester, Massachusetts relating to counterfeiting, libel, and fraud.

The Great Transformation: Memo to the Incoming EU Presidents. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/04, July 2014

The European Union’s leadership spent the last five years fighting an acute and existential crisis. The next five years, under your leadership, will be no less difficult. You will have to tackle difficult economic and institutional questions while being alert to the possibility of a new crisis. You face three central challenges: (1) The feeble economic situation prevents job creation and hobbles attempts to reduce public and private debt; (2) EU institutions and the EU budget need reform and you will have to deal with pressing external matters, including neighbourhood policy and the EU’s position in the world; (3) You will have to prepare and face up to the need for treaty change to put monetary union on a more stable footing, to review the EU’s competences and to re-adjust the relationship between the euro area and the EU, and the United Kingdom in particular.

Flashlight Europe N°2–September 2014: Is It Better To Be Alone Than Lonely Together? Scotland Is Voting On Whether Or Not To Become Independent

On 18 September 2014 the Scots are voting on whether or not to sever their ties with the UK. And the pro-independence camp is catching up fast. A survey conducted at the beginning of the month revealed that for the first time 51 percent of the Scottish electorate say that they will be casting a Yes vote, i.e. that they are in favour of independence. The outcome is now in the hands of the undecided voters, who are currently being heavily courted by the various parties. If the Scots vote in favour of independence, it is bound to cast doubt on the future of the government of David Cameron, the Conservative Party leader. Who is fighting on which side? What are the arguments? And what will happen if the Scots decide to opt out of the United Kingdom? Here are some of the things that are a distinct possibility.

The parliamentary elections in Ukraine: new hope? EPC Policy Brief, 21 October 2014

Ukraine’s parliamentary elections on 26 October 2014 seem set to be the most important and most challenging the country has ever held. For the first time in Ukraine’s history, the presidential election of Petro Poroshenko in May gave many Ukrainians new hope. His victory seemed to unite the country, being the first president to have won in most of the regions despite the ongoing conflict in the East. However, with many corrupt elites still in power, reforms have become hostage to vested interests and in-fighting which has raised fears of ‘business as usual’. This has made this election campaign set against a backdrop of serious challenges dominating the agenda for the foreseeable future. In this policy brief, Amanda Paul and Svitlana Kobzar explore the status of the reform agenda needed for a stable and democratic Ukraine as well as the challenges in the run up to the election including corruption, energy and EU relations.

State-building in Iraq since 2003: the Challenges and Lessons. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 12/2014

Introduction. In 2003, Iraq was invaded by the US coalition forces that ousted Saddam Hussein’s regime from power before occupying the whole country. The intension, declared by the then American George W. Bush, was to ‘build a decent and democratic society at the centre of the Middle East’ that ‘will become a place of progress and peace.’1 In 2014, three years after the withdrawal of the last American soldier, however, it is difficult to overestimate or exaggerate what is at stake. National unity and territorial integrity have never been so seriously threatened since the country is experiencing the internal fighting in its modern history. Many parts of Iraq, including the northern oil city of Kirkuk, long claimed as an integral part of the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, are out of the control of the central government. Large areas in the north including the strategic city of Mosul were seized by the fighters of the Islamic State, an Al-Qaeda offshoot, formerly known as ISIS, who threatened to invade the Kurdistan region before being attacked by airstrikes by the US. They proclaimed a caliphate on both sides of the border with Syria, where they also control vast territory.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh: unfrozen conflicts between Russia and the West. OSW Special Report, 9 July 2008

The Southern Caucasus is the site of three armed conflicts with separatist backgrounds, which have remained unsolved for years: the conflicts in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan's conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (including the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh which were seized by Armenian separatists in the course of the war). Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have had any control over the disputed areas since the early 1990s. Both states are simultaneously in conflict with the separatists' informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia. After over a decade of relative peace during which the conflicts remained frozen, tension has recently risen considerably: in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, large-scale fighting may break out in the coming months, whereas in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian conflict, such a threat may materialise within the next five years. The current formula for politically resolving the conflicts is ineffective and close to exhaustion, and the prospect of any alternative peace plans being developed is rather distant. The conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are of increasing concern to the West, mainly because of the Western actors' constantly growing political and economic involvement in Georgia and Azerbaijan (including support for reforms and development of the gas and oil transmission infrastructures), as well as its less intensive commitments in Armenia. An outbreak of open fighting over the separatist regions would destabilise the Southern Caucasus, largely undoing the results of the actions which the EU, NATO and the USA have taken in the region in recent years. Moreover, the situation in the Southern Caucasus, especially the separatisms themselves, have in fact become an element in the wider geopolitical game between the West and Russia. For Russia, the stakes are maintaining its influence in the region, and for the West, demonstrating its ability to effectively promote democracy and economic modernisation in the countries bordering it.

Chechnya: Between a Caucasian Jihad and ‘hidden’ separatism. OSW Point of View, January 2007

1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. 2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. 3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. 4. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

A Microsimulation of the Impact of Tax Reforms on Child Poverty: the Case of Italy. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 29/February 2014

Microsimulation models have been used in order to find efficient counteractive instruments to poverty. The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of fiscal policy on poverty, insisting on child poverty rates. Empirical analysis suggests that in fighting poverty, a mix of policies need to be in place, fiscal reforms increasing tax allowances such as child benefit granted to parents with dependent children, are not sufficient to reduce child poverty.

Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 156|24.12.2014

On the Day of National Unity, celebrated in Russia every 4 November, members of nationalist movements organise a so-called Russian March in Moscow. In 2014 the nationalists took part in three competing marches, which illustrated the divisions present in these circles. The reason for these divisions is a difference of opinions on the policy pursued by Russia towards Ukraine. The pro-Russian, Russia-inspired protests in south-eastern Ukraine organised under the slogan of ‘defending’ the Russians living there (the ‘Russian Spring’) and the annexation of Crimea were received enthusiastically by the nationalists and contributed to a consolidation of these circles around the Kremlin which lasted for several months. In spite of this, opinions on the Russian government’s current policy towards the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics have been varied. The most radical groups have demanded that military support be offered, and that the ‘confederation’ of these republics, the so-called ‘Novorossiya’, should be officially recognised. They consider the Kremlin’s policy to have been too soft, and see the signing of the peace agreements in Minsk as a betrayal of the interests of the Russians. For the remaining representatives of nationalist circles, who are not so numerous and are less visible in the public sphere, finding a solution for Russia’s domestic problems remains a priority. Some of them oppose the very notion of Russia’s involvement in the conflict. Since the beginning of the ‘Russian Spring’, the Kremlin has fostered active attitudes among the nationalists and solicited their support, hoping to win a valuable ally. This has boosted hopes in these circles that their political position may be strengthened. The involvement in the fighting in Ukraine has led to a radicalisation of attitudes among the nationalists, and demonstrated that this group is ideologically motivated and has considerable potential for mobilisation. Moreover, the ‘Great Russian’ and anti-Western slogans some of them have propagated are reflected in views displayed by average Russians, who have been influenced by the patriotic enthusiasm which followed the annexation of Crimea. Due to all this, from among all the actors active on the opposition side, it is the nationalists – and not the representatives of the liberal and pro-Western opposition – that have the best prospects for access to the political stage in Russia. It cannot be ruled out that a further strengthening of the radical groups might also be boosted by the possible growing social frustration caused by the economic crisis, which additionally increases the risk of political destabilisation.

The economic and financial crisis in Russia – background, symptoms and prospects for the future. OSW Report 02/2015

The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.

Syria: A Roadmap for a Sustainable Political Settlement. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 52, January 2014

On the eve of the Geneva II conference and amid continued fighting on the ground, this short paper seeks to draw up a roadmap, indicating the different stages and steps on the way to a sustainable political settlement of the conflict in Syria. A longer term perspective is put forward, adopting a broad-based and inclusive approach, focused on a Syrian-led transition process under international supervision with the assistance of key third countries, thus preparing the way for a multi-party democratic post-Baath future.

Combating corruption in Ukraine – the beginning of a long march. OSW COMMENTARY Number 170, 06.05.2015

From a public opinion point of view, corruption has been the gravest problem of today’s Ukraine, excepting the armed conflict in the east of the country. The government might be able to delay certain key reforms such as the constitutional reform or the reform of local government structures, however, without stepping up measures to combat corruption they would face the risk of losing social support which has already been weak. There is no single strategy for combating corruption in Ukraine. What has been implemented is a series of often contradictory concepts and actions (initiated by the president’s office, the government, civil society institutions, or launched to meet the requirements of donors). The successes of the new government have included efforts aimed at fighting corruption at the middle level of government and the introduction of legislative changes in compliance with international practice. The main weaknesses, on the other hand, have been the lack of efficient mechanisms to implement the adopted legislation to ensure that an individual charged with corruption (regardless of political connections) could be effectively tried and the money received as bribery could be returned to the state. Similarly, the judiciary system has not been prepared to actively handle corruption cases.