Active sound quality control of engine induced cavity noise

Active control solutions appear to be a feasible approach to cope with the steadily increasing requirements for noise reduction in the transportation industry. Active controllers tend to be designed with a target on the sound pressure level reduction. However, the perceived control efficiency for the occupants can be more accurately assessed if psychoacoustic metrics can be taken into account. Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate, numerically and experimentally, the effect of a feedback controller on the sound quality of a vehicle mockup excited with engine noise. The proposed simulation scheme is described and experimentally validated. The engine excitation is provided by a sound quality equivalent engine simulator, running on a real-time platform that delivers harmonic excitation in function of the driving condition. The controller performance is evaluated in terms of specific loudness and roughness. It is shown that the use of a quite simple control strategy, such as a velocity feedback, can result in satisfactory loudness reduction with slightly spread roughness, improving the overall perception of the engine sound. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Analysis of the emissions of volatile organic compounds from the compression ignition engine fueled by diesel-biodiesel blend and diesel oil using gas chromatography

This paper describes the procedures of the analysis Of Pollutant gases, as volatile organic compounds (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, o-xylene, m-xylene and p-xylene) emitted by engines, using high-resolution gas chromatography (HRGC). In a broad sense, CI engine burning diesel was compared with B10 and a drastic reduction was observed in the emissions of the aromatic compounds by using B10. Especially for benzene, the reduction of concentrations occurs on the level of about 19.5%. Although a concentration value below 1 mu g ml(-1) has been obtained, this reduction is extremely significant since benzene is a carcinogenic compound. (c) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Role of price and enforcement in water allocation: Insights from Game Theory

As many countries are moving toward water sector reforms, practical issues of how water management institutions can better effect allocation, regulation, and enforcement of water rights have emerged. The problem of nonavailability of water to tailenders on an irrigation system in developing countries, due to unlicensed upstream diversions is well documented. The reliability of access or equivalently the uncertainty associated with water availability at their diversion point becomes a parameter that is likely to influence the application by users for water licenses, as well as their willingness to pay for licensed use. The ability of a water agency to reduce this uncertainty through effective water rights enforcement is related to the fiscal ability of the agency to monitor and enforce licensed use. In this paper, this interplay across the users and the agency is explored, considering the hydraulic structure or sequence of water use and parameters that define the users and the agency`s economics. The potential for free rider behavior by the users, as well as their proposals for licensed use are derived conditional on this setting. The analyses presented are developed in the framework of the theory of ""Law and Economics,`` with user interactions modeled as a game theoretic enterprise. The state of Ceara, Brazil, is used loosely as an example setting, with parameter values for the experiments indexed to be approximately those relevant for current decisions. The potential for using the ideas in participatory decision making is discussed. This paper is an initial attempt to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing such situations but with a focus on the reservoir-canal system water rights enforcement.

Exergy and thermoeconomic analysis of a turbofan engine during a typical commercial flight

In an energy perspective of cost-reduction and configuration-optimization, it becomes necessary to develop and use advanced tools for the analysis, design and improvement of energy conversion systems. In the aeronautical industry, such trend is fundamental since this industry has evolved to design extremely complex aircrafts, with highly integrated systems, requiring more information in order to evaluate the whole system. The aim of this paper is to present an exergy-based analysis as to evaluate the global performance of a typical turbofan engine and its components. The study presents values for exergy efficiency over the whole flight cycle, critical equipment and flight phases considering exergy destruction and estimating internal and exhaust flow costs. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A vaccination game based on public health actions and personal decisions

Susceptible-infective-removed (SIR) models are commonly used for representing the spread of contagious diseases. A SIR model can be described in terms of a probabilistic cellular automaton (PCA), where each individual (corresponding to a cell of the PCA lattice) is connected to others by a random network favoring local contacts. Here, this framework is employed for investigating the consequences of applying vaccine against the propagation of a contagious infection, by considering vaccination as a game, in the sense of game theory. In this game, the players are the government and the susceptible newborns. In order to maximize their own payoffs, the government attempts to reduce the costs for combating the epidemic, and the newborns may be vaccinated only when infective individuals are found in their neighborhoods and/or the government promotes an immunization program. As a consequence of these strategies supported by cost-benefit analysis and perceived risk, numerical simulations show that the disease is not fully eliminated and the government implements quasi-periodic vaccination campaigns. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of sellers should those transfers be made is the key issue in the description of the algorithm. We assume additively separable utilities and introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with an exogenously defined quota, consuming more than one object but at most one unit of a seller`s good and having multi-dimensional payoffs. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the over-demanded sets than the constructions of these sets for the other assignment games. For this approach, our mechanism yields the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff, which equals the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The symmetry of the model allows to getting the seller-optimal stable payoff and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff can then be also derived.