Environmental Awareness in Game Agents

Agents make up an important part of game worlds, ranging from the characters and monsters that live in the world to the armies the player controls. Despite their importance, agents in current games rarely display an awareness of their environment or react appropriately, which severely detracts from the believability of the game. Most games use agents that have a basic awareness of the player and other agents, but are still unaware of important game events or environmental conditions. This article describes an agent design that combines cellular automata for environmental modeling with influence maps for agent decision-making. The result is simple, flexible game agents that are able to respond to dynamic changes to the environment (e.g., rain or fire) while pursuing a goal.

Relocating the American Dream : The America of the 1960s as Portrayed by the New Journalists Norman Mailer, Hunter S. Thompson, and Tom Wolfe

The concept of the American Dream was subject to a strong re-evaluation process in the 1960s, as counterculture became a prominent force in American society. A massive generation of young people, moved by the Vietnam War, the hippie movement, and psychedelic experimentation, created substantial social turbulence in their efforts to break out of conventional patterns and to create a new kind of society. This thesis outlines and analyses the concept of the American Dream in popular imagination through three works of new journalism. My primary data consists of Tom Wolfe’s The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test (1967), Hunter S. Thompson’s Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas: A Savage Journey to the Heart of the American Dream (1971), and Norman Mailer’s Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History (1968). In defining the American Dream, I discuss the history of the concept as well as its manifestations in popular culture. Because of its elusive and amorphous nature, the concept of the American Dream can only be examined in cultural texts that portray the values, sentiments, and customs of a certain era. I have divided the analytical section of my thesis into three parts. In the first part I examine how the authors discuss the American society of their time in relation to ideology, capitalism, and the media. In the second part I focus on the Vietnam War and the controversy it creates in relation to the notions of freedom and patriotism. In the third part I discuss how the authors portray the countercultural visions of a better America that challenged the traditional interpretations of the American Dream. I also discuss the dark side of the new dream: the problems and disillusions that came with the effort to change the world. This thesis is an effort to trace the relocation of the American Dream in the context of the 1960s counterculture and new journalism. It hopes to provide a valuable addition to the cultural history of the sixties and to the effort of conceptualizing the American Dream.

Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhtinaskunnan väliset sotatoimet vuosina 1259-83 : Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta sodankäynnistä

In my master thesis I analyse Byzantine warfare in the late period of the empire. I use military operations between Byzantines and crusader Principality of Achaia (1259–83) as a case study. Byzantine strategy was based (in “oriental manner”) on using ambushes, diplomacy, surprise attacks, deception etc. Open field battles that were risky in comparison with their benefits were usually avoided, but the Byzantines were sometimes forced to seek open encounter because their limited ability to keep strong armies in field for long periods of time. Foreign mercenaries had important place in Byzantine armies and they could simply change sides if their paymasters ran out of resources. The use of mercenaries with short contracts made it possible that the composition of an army was flexible but on the other hand heterogeneous – in result Byzantine armies were sometimes ineffective and prone to confusion. In open field battles Byzantines used formation that was made out from several lines placed one after another. This formation was especially suitable for cavalry battles. Byzantines might have also used other kinds of formations. The Byzantines were not considered equal to Latins in close combat. West-Europeans saw mainly horse archers and Latin mercenaries on Byzantine service as threats to themselves in battle. The legitimacy of rulers surrounding the Aegean sea was weak and in many cases political intrigues and personal relationships can have resolved the battles. Especially in sieges the loyalty of population was decisive. In sieges the Byzantines used plenty of siege machines and archers. This made fast conquests possible, but it was expensive. The Byzantines protected their frontiers by building castles. Military operations against the Principality of Achaia were mostly small scale raids following an intensive beginning. Byzantine raids were mostly made by privateers and mountaineers. This does not fit to the traditional picture that warfare belonged to the imperial professional army. It’s unlikely that military operations in war against the Principality of Achaia caused great demographic or economic catastrophe and some regions in the warzone might even have flourished. On the other hand people started to concentrate into villages which (with growing risks for trade) probably caused disturbance in economic development and in result birth rates might have decreased. Both sides of war sought to exchange their prisoners of war. These were treated according to conventional manners that were accepted by both sides. It was possible to sell prisoners, especially women and children, to slavery, but the scale of this trade does not seem to be great in military operations treated in this theses.

Herrat, jätkät ja sotataito : Kansalaissotilas- ja ammattisotilasarmeijan rakentuminen 1920- ja 1930-luvulla

Gentlemen, Lads and the Art of War The Construction of Citizen Soldier- and Professional Soldier Armies into the Miracle of the Winter War During the 1920s and 1930s The Miracle of the Winter War was not a myth - at least according to them, who were making that miracle to happen. This study is not just about the Armed Forces and society, but moreover a study about civil society inside the organization of armed forces. Conscription kept Finnish military organization (and is still keeping) very closely connected with civil society and therefore there is no need to locate the possible critical misunderstandings brought by two different identity-based approaches. The great performance of the Armed Forces during the Second World War was not made of superior art of war. It was not the high level of discipline either. Art of war is basically a (deep level) cultural level equation that has more to do with culturally absorbed schemes of meaning making than rational decision-making. Naturally attrition based approach to effect-making directed the organizational methods in attrition based organisational practices, where there were only minor possibilities to practice any manoeuvre-based organisational behaviour. The practice and method of leadership lent similarly to the attrition-based thinking, which directed the organisational cultural thoughts towards composition that confirmed antagonism between gentlemen and lads . This setting has been absorbed and learned through cultural socialisation and was therefore not a product of the military organisation itself. The Finnish Armed Forces included two different communities (gentlemen and lads) within the same organisation as there were both the official and the unofficial organisations presented. This caused problems as they both made meaning-making processes simultaneously. These organisations had their own overlapping and in most cases also contradictory social meanings. The unofficial organisation has been overshadowed by the vast number of studies concerning the official organisation. The main reason for this systematic neglect is based on the reality of the attitudes and living conditions of the micro-level organisation which produced (perhaps) too realistic and repulsive viewpoints that are presenting a picture of a national level identity process in a way that is separating it from the ideals made to verify the ethos of national values. Complaining, griping, grumbling and moaning are usually situated in a category of abnormal and unwanted behaviour. However, within the context of a citizen soldier army community this was more of a characteristic feature of that organisation (in Finland) and therefore it was crucially important to locate the context of that abnormal behaviour. According to this study, it was not a malicious act but moreover seriously formed efforts in trying to use common sense in the chaos citizen soldiers faced when they were uniformed and placed in an unfamiliar process of disciplinary measures and frictions and competition between different ranks. There is much evidence that reinforces the argument that what seemed to be the most unconventional behaviour was finally the most efficient in a sense of military performance.

The German Military Entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld and His Conduct of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Thirty Years War

The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.

Saber y poder, prodigios ambiguos e interpretación medieval en el Libro de Alexandre y el Poema de Fernán Gonçález

Resumen: Tanto en el Libro de Alexandre como en el Poema de Fernán Gonçález se presentan prodigios de signifi cación ambigua: el eclipse en el LA, el caballero tragado por la tierra y la serpiente voladora en el PFG. Los episodios en que aparecen insertos estos elementos extraordinarios o sobrenaturales ofrecen una serie de similitudes: el temor de los ejércitos y la habilidad retórica que se despliega para reinterpretar el signo, volverlo a favor del héroe y enardecer así a sus hombres. El objetivo de este trabajo es examinar estos episodios y su signifi cación en el marco de cada uno de los poemas, centrándonos en los problemas de la interpretación y la asignación de sentido, y la relación entre saber y poder que se postula.

Soldiers, Peasants, Industry and Towns. The Roman Army in Britain: A Welsh Perspective

Davies, Jeffrey. 'Soldiers, Peasants, Industry and Towns. The Roman Army in Britain: A Welsh Perspective', In: The Roman Army and the Economy (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 2002), pp.169-203 RAE2008

The contribution of warlordism to the disintegration of the western Roman army (c. AD 395-480)

My thesis investigates the dynamics behind the changing nature of the leadership of the western Roman army in the fifth century through the concept of ‘warlordism’. I carried this out by analyzing those cases of insubordination and military unrest in the officer class of the western Roman army, which can be shown to be linked to the slow decline of central authority and the imperial office in the period 395-480. My thesis demonstrates that theories of ‘Warlordism’, as developed in social sciences, can be useful for both the late Imperial west as for other eras of ancient history, such as the late Roman republic. Warlordism was a way of continuing politics, if necessary by military means, when commanders found themselves outside the legitimate framework. Unlike the case of usurpation of the imperial office, when there was little hope of achieving permanent recognition and acceptance, it offered insubordinate officers a chance of returning to the ruling imperial regime depending on circumstances and the success of their resistance. I propose that warlordism functioned as an alternative to usurpation, a tool for military dissidence, fuelled by an economy of violence. Contrary to modern warlordism, the warlordism of the fifth century AD represented a transient phase which no imperial commander was willing to prolong indefinitely. At some stage, given the means, warlords in the western Roman army wanted to become part of the imperial echelon again. Yet these alternative methods of violent opposition, and the acquisition of force through private means, ensured the breakdown of the state’s monopoly on violence and the disintegration of centralized armies. What started as an accidental revolution became a new form of military rule.

‘Martial races’ and ‘imperial subjects’: violence and governance in colonial India, 1857–1914

This essay explores the specificity of colonial violence in India. Although imperial and military historians are familiar with several instances of such violence—notably the rebellion in 1857 and the 1919 massacre at the Jallianwalla Bagh in Amritsar—there is a broader, and arguably more significant, history that has largely escaped attention. In contrast to metropolitan European states, where sovereignty derived, at least in principle, from a covenant between subjects and government, the sovereign power of the colonial state was always predicated on the violent subjugation of ‘the natives’. However, while violence was integral to colonialism, such violence was never a purely metropolitan agency: most of those recruited to serve in the colonial military were, themselves, Indian. Exploring the history of the imperial military in South Asia after 1857, the paper outlines the complex and rather ambiguous relationship between the colonial state and its ‘native armies���. RESUME Cet article se penche sur la spe´cificite´ de la violence coloniale. Malgre´ des exemples familiers—comme la grande re´volte de 1857 en Inde ou le massacre de Jallianwalla Bagh a` Amritsar en 1919—il y a une histoire plus large et plus importante qui a e´chappe´e a` l’attention des historiens. Contrairement aux e´tats europe´ens ou la souverainete´ de´rivait en principe du moins d’un contrat social entre les acteurs sociaux, le pouvoir souverain de l’e´tat colonial restait fonde´ sur la subjugation violente des indige`nes.

Quando todos os caminhos levavam a Portugal:impacto da guerra dos cem anos na vida económica e política de Portugal (séculos XIV-XV)

Tese de doutoramento, História (História Medieval), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, 2014

War and propaganda in the XXth Century

Propaganda represented the sacrifice of soldiers in war and praised the power of the country. It has been around these images that all over the world entire populations were mobilized on the expectation of victory. Through the static image of printed posters or the newspaper news projected in cinemas all over the globe, governments sought to promote a patriotic spirit, encouraging the effort of individual sacrifice by sending a clear set of messages that directly appealed to the voluntary enlistment in the armies, messages that explained the important of rationing essential goods, of the intensification of food production or the purchase of war bonds, exacerbating feelings, arousing emotions and projecting an image divided between the notion of superiority and the idea of fear of the opponent. From press, in the First World War, to radio in World War II, to television and cinema from the 1950s onwards, propaganda proved to be a weapon as deadly as those managed by soldiers in the battlefield. That’s why it is essential to analyse and discuss the topic of War and Propaganda in the Twentieth Century. This conference is organized by the IHC and the CEIS20 and is part of the Centennial Program of the Great War, organized by the IHC, and the International Centennial Program coordinated by the Imperial War Museum in London.

La défense et l'organisation militaire des Gaules de 284 au repli sur Arles des services administratifs romains au début du Ve siècle

L’armée de Gaule sous le Bas-Empire fut une des trois armées principales de l’Empire romain. Son évolution de la fin du IIIe siècle jusqu’au début du Ve fut marquée par une réorganisation graduelle dans le commandement, ainsi que dans l’organisation des troupes et des fortifications. Ces réformes ont fait l’objet d’études qui ont dressé un schéma de déploiement des troupes resté longtemps populaire. À ce schéma s’est ensuite ajoutée l’idée de la stratégie à grande échelle qui y aurait été associée. Ce mémoire tâche de dresser une synthèse des derniers travaux sur l’armée romaine tardive en Gaule. L’approche choisie repose sur une réévaluation des sources sans l’influence d’un schéma défensif préconçu, ainsi que sur une critique de certaines idées reçues concernant l’armée romaine du IVe siècle.

L'innovation dans l'armée française durant la guerre d'Algérie

Au cours des dernières décennies, l’augmentation du nombre de guerres irrégulières place les armées modernes dans une situation délicate. Pour pouvoir relever ce nouveau défi, ces organisations militaires, avant tout destinées à mener des guerres interétatiques, se doivent d’innover. Plusieurs cas historiques montrent comment, face à de nouvelles formes de conflit, certaines armées se sont lancées dans un processus d’innovation. Le cas de l’armée française en Algérie en est un. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre comment l’innovation a émergé lors du conflit, et comment elle s’est diffusée au sein de l’organisation militaire. Un survol de la stratégie française en Algérie va permettre de dégager trois principales innovations : La mise en place de la doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire, la création des Sections Administratives Spécialisées et l’approche de David Galula. L’étude de ses trois cas nous montre que, durant la Guerre d’Algérie, l’innovation provenait principalement des militaires, plus précisément du sommet de la hiérarchie. Cependant, certains exemples d’innovation par le bas existent. Dans ces cas-là, la diffusion se fera via la doctrine informelle. L’exemple de Galula nous prouve néanmoins qu’une innovation se diffuse beaucoup plus difficilement lorsqu’elle émane des hommes de terrain.

Impact de l'art de la guerre napoléonien dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle

Le 18 juin 1815, Napoléon fut renversé à Waterloo, mais son art de la guerre survécut. Il s'agit de cet art militaire qu'il avait révolutionné et dont d'autres firent de nombreuses applications longtemps après sa disparition. S'inspirant des méthodes des théoriciens du XVIIIe siècle, il avait privilégié la stratégie d'anéantissement dans la conduite d'opérations militaires et se classait ainsi dans la catégorie des stratèges recherchant avant tout la bataille décisive en vue de détruire les forces ennemies. À la lumière des tactiques et stratégies que Bonaparte utilisa dans ses plus célèbres campagnes, cette thèse tentera de dégager les méthodes napoléoniennes qui furent le plus souvent utilisées au cours de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle. Les conflits étudiés durant cette période seront la guerre de Crimée (1853-1856), la campagne d'Italie (1859), la guerre de Sécession américaine (1861-1865), la guerre austro-prussienne (1866) et la guerre franco-prussienne (1870-1871). Cette recherche tiendra compte non seulement de l'influence des progrès de l'armement et des moyens de transport et de communication sur l'art de la guerre en général, mais aussi du contexte économique, financier, politique et militaire des États bélligérants de cette époque. Parmi les nombreux exégètes de Bonaparte du XIXe siècle, deux théoriciens militaires en particulier, Clausewitz et Jomini, se distinguèrent dans l'interprétation savante de la guerre napoléonienne. Tout en analysant l'impact des méthodes de l'Empereur dans les guerres selectionnées, nous allons déterminer dans quelle mesure la vision jominienne des campagnes de Bonaparte divergeait de celle de Clausewitz en ce qui concerne les conflits traités. Nous aborderons ensuite l'influence napoléonienne sur l'administration, l'organisation et les marches des armées impliquées dans les guerres en question et nous porterons une attention particulière à l'impact du système militaire de Bonaparte sur certains aspects du déroulement même des combats. Nous terminerons cette étude par un bref aperçu sur les enseignements que les militaires au XIXe siècle purent dégager des campagnes napoléoniennes pour la conduite des guerres de l'avenir.

Le problème goth au IIIe siècle ap. J.-C. : perceptions et réalités, solutions et échecs militaires.

Au coeur de la crise du IIIe siècle, l’Empire subit de toutes parts les assauts de Barbares soudainement plus nombreux et plus virulents. Parmi ces peuples se trouvaient les Goths, nouvellement arrivés, qui tinrent les Romains et leurs armées en échecs pendant vingt longues années. Face aux multiples défaites, parfois catastrophiques, et aux très nombreuses villes capturées et saccagées par les envahisseurs, ce mémoire se propose d’apporter une nouvelle approche à la compréhension des échecs dont les Romains firent l’expérience, mais aussi des solutions militaires qu’ils mirent en oeuvre face aux Goths au IIIe siècle. Les défaites majeures subies durant la décennie 250 sur le bas-Danube puis dans la région de la Mer Noire semblent pouvoir s’expliquer en partie par l’absence de connaissance qu’avaient Romains des Goths. Les premières victoires romaines significatives contre les Goths sous les règnes de Gallien puis Claude II ont été rendues possibles grâce à une évolution de la stratégie romaine face à cet ennemi, privilégiant l’emploi de la cavalerie et anticipant les schémas d’attaques des envahisseurs. Les décisions politiques et militaires d’Aurélien dans la région montrent que les Romains se sont enfin adaptés à la menace en modifiant leur perception des Goths, désormais mieux connus.