Valuation equilibrium with crubs

This paper considers model worlds in which there are a continuum of individuaIs who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show that if there are a finite set of types and the commodity space contains lotteries, then the c1assicaI equilibrium results on convex economies can be reinterpreted to apply. Furthermore, in this lottery economy deterministic aIlocations (that is, degenerate lotteries) are generally not Pareto optimal, nor are they equilibria. In the interests of making the model seem more "natural," we show that the set of equilibria in a decentraIization in which individuaIs first gamble over vaIue transfers and then trade commodities in a deterministic competitive market economy are equivalent to those of our competi tive economy with a lottery commodity space.

Stabilization, volatility and the equilibrium real exchange rate

In a general equilibrium model. we show that the value of the equilibrium real exchange rate is affected by its own volatility. Risk averse exporters. that make their exporting decision before observing the realization of the real exchange rate. choose to export less the more volatile is the real exchange rate. Therefore the trude balance and the variance of the real exchange rate are negatively related. An increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate for instance deteriorates the trade balance and to restore equilibrium a real exchange rate depreciation has to take place. In the empirical part of the paper we use the traditional (unconditional) standard deviation of RER changes as our measure of RER volatility.We describe the behavior of the RER volatility for Brazil,Argentina and Mexico.Monthly data for the three countries are used. and also daily data for Bruzil. Interesting patterns of volatility could be associated to the nature of the several stabilization plans adopted in those countries and to changes in the exchange rate regimes .

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions

We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a very restrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’s main implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence. From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibrium existence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue ranking of auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributions considered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterization of PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenue differences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.

The effects of government deficit on equilibrium real exchange rates and stock prices

This paper studies the effect of government deficits on equilibrium real exchange rates and stock prices. The theoretical part modifies a two-country cash-in-advance model like used in Lucas(1982) and Sargent(1987) in order to accommodate an exchange rate market and a government that pursues fiscal and monetary policy targets. The implied result is that unanticipated shocks in government deficits raise expectations of both taxes and inflation and, therefore, are associated with real exchange rate devaluations and lower stock prices. This finding is strongly supported by empirical evidence for a group of 19 countries, representing 76% of world production

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Comparing equilibrium real interest rates : different approaches to measure Brazilian rates

Despite the difficulties involved in the precise determination of equilibrium real interest rates, it seems clear that nominal interest rates has been higher in Brazil than in similar emerging economies. This paper aims to shed light on the possible reasons for this feature of the Brazilian economy. We extend Miranda and Muinhos (2003) one-country study to a sample of 20 countries, using many methods to compare measures of the real interest: (i) extracting equilibrium interest rates from IS curves; (ii) extracting steady state interest rates from marginal product of capital; (iii) capturing relevant variables and the fixed effects having real interest rates as dependent variable in a panel for emerging countries; and (iv) extracting inflation expectation from the spread between fixed rate and inflation-indexed treasure notes.

Monetary dynamics in a general equilibrium version of the Baumol-Tobin model

I study the welfare cost of inflation and the effect on prices after a permanent increase in the interest rate. In the steady state, the real money demand is homogeneous of degree one in income and its interest-rate elasticity is approximately equal to −1/2. Consumers are indifferent between an economy with 10% p.a. inflation and one with zero inflation if their income is 1% higher in the first economy. A permanent increase in the interest rate makes the price level to drop initially and inflation to adjust slowly to its steady state level.

Phase transition of demand explained by the heterogeneity of consumers' intrinsic preferences

In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.

On uniqueness of equilibrium in the Kyle Model

A longstanding unresolved question is whether the one-period Kyle Model of an informed trader and a noisily informed market maker has an equilibrium that is different from the closed-form solution derived by Kyle (1985). This note advances what is known about this open problem.

Intrinsic and relational perspectives of relationship value: an integrated framework in buyer-supplier relationships

O relacionamento entre firmas vem sendo estudado como um fator que amplia os limites do valor criado pelas firmas individualmente, por meio da construção conjunta de benefícios que não poderia ocorrer caso o relacionamento não se estabelecesse. O valor total criado no nível da díade, que é capturado pelas partes, é o valor do relacionamento. Os benefícios obtidos transcendem as características financeiras da transação, podendo converter-se em outros aspectos da relação entre as firmas, tais como capacitação técnica, oferta de serviços, capacidade de inovação e reputação. Os recursos compartilhados e trocados entre as partes são fontes de criação de valor no relacionamento, mas originam-se de duas perspectivas diferentes. Eles podem pertencer previamente a uma delas, compondo um valor que é intrínseco, ou desenvolverem-se ao longo do relacionamento em si, resultando numa parcela de valor relacional. Neste contexto, este estudo propõe-se a investigar as diferentes características das partes que são fonte de criação de valor em um relacionamento, bem como analisar os aspectos que influenciam sua captura pelas partes. O estudo envolveu três etapas. A primeira, de cunho teórico, visou a explorar as dimensões do valor do relacionamento, no que se refere à sua definição e suas fontes. As duas etapas seguintes objetivaram testar empiricamente o efeito das fontes do valor do relacionamento na criação e captura de valor, por meio de uma survey transversal e um estudo de casos múltiplos. A perspectiva teórica que permeia o estudo é a Visão Baseada em Recursos, uma vez que ela pressupõe que os recursos das firmas produzem valor econômico que transcende os limites delas e é capturado por seus clientes e fornecedores. A abordagem ontológica é a do realismo crítico, a qual permite um melhor entendimento dos acontecimentos empiricamente observados. Os resultados contribuem para um melhor entendimento teórico sobre valor do relacionamento, uma vez que os construtos de valor intrínseco e valor relacional integram diferentes fontes de benefícios que podem advir de relacionamentos. A relação entre esses construtos e sua influência individual na captura de valor também trazem uma contribuição teórica ao estudo de relacionamentos comprador-fornecedor. As principais contribuições gerenciais dizem respeito ao fato de que é possível capturar valor mesmo que o relacionamento não seja colaborativo. Adicionalmente, os resultados enfatizam que as empresas deveriam explorar mais como fazer para extrair mais benefícios da outra parte e do relacionamento em si, em especial de fontes não-financeiras.

Some notes about the determination of current account equilibrium real exchange rate and the relation between real exchange rate and productive specialization

The objective of these notes is to present a simple mathematical model of the determination of current account real exchange rate as defined by Bresser-Pereira (2010); i.e. the real exchange rate that guarantees the inter temporal equilibrium of balance of payments and to show the relation between Real Exchange rate and Productive Specialization at theoretical and empirical level.