Trust-based trade

There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efticacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufliciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade fiows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents. The model allows extensions in several directions. We outline two of them, indicating how one could study transnational networks and the effects of firm heterogeneity within our structure.

Testando as hipóteses do modelo de Mincer para o Brasil: uma abordagem não paramétrica

Na literatura empírica, várias estimativas de taxas de retorno para educação têm sido reportadas, baseadas no modelo de Mincer (1958, 1974). No entanto, para que o coeficiente dos anos de estudo, em uma regressão do logaritmo da renda contra educação e experiência, seja entendido como taxa de retorno diversas hipóteses devem ser válidas. Baseado em Heckman, Lochner e Todd (2006) e Heckman, Ichimura, Smith e Todd (1998), testamos algumas de tais hipóteses como: linearidade nos anos estudo e separabilidade entre educação e experiência (paralelismo). Para isso, utilizamos dados da PNAD (1992-2004) e do Censo (1970-2000) e lançamos mão de regressões paramétricas e não-paramétricas (regressão linear local); e acabamos rejeitando tanto linearidade como paralelismo. Adicionalmente, relaxamos tais hipóteses e estimamos as taxas internas de retorno (T1Rs), baseado em Becker (1993), para se medir a ordem do viés em relação ao coeficiente escolar do modelo original de Mincer. Esta medida permite mensurar o tamanho do erro em diversos estudos quando os mesmos utilizam o modelo de Mincer. Obtemos vieses que chegaram a ordem de mais de 200%, como por exemplo a TIR em 2000 passando de 17.2% para todos níveis educacionais (retorno "minceriano") para 5.61% para mestrado/doutorado em relação ao nível superior, quando estimada não parametricamente, relaxando linearidade e paralelismo. Assim, diversos estudos no Brasil não consideram tais hipóteses e, conseqüentemente suas estimativas estão erradas e mais ainda, a magnitude deste erro é grande, podendo levar à conclusões distorcidas ou mal interpretadas. Assim, provemos também novas estimativas das TIRs, as quais devem ser tomadas como referência para a análise do comportamento dos agentes nos movimentos de demanda por educação e oferta de mão-de-obra. Por fim, corroboramos a evidência da literatura que os retornos educacionais estão decaindo ao longo das décadas, com exceção do nível superior que aponta para um crescimento nesta última década, mas em magnitude menor das obtidas em diversos estudos recentes, que se baseiam no modelo de Mincer.

Do equity and foreign currency risk premiums display common patterns?

In da Costa et al. (2006) we have shown how a same pricing kernel can account for the excess returns of the S&:P500 over the US short term bond and of the uncovered over the covered trading of foreign government bonds. In this paper we estimate and test the overidentifying restrictiom; of Euler equations associated with "ix different versions of the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing I\Iodel. Our main finding is that the same (however often unreasonable) values for the parameters are estimated for ali models in both nmrkets. In most cases, the rejections or otherwise of overidentifying restrictions occurs for the two markets, suggesting that success and failure stories for the equity premium repeat themselves in foreign exchange markets. Our results corroborate the findings in da Costa et al. (2006) that indicate a strong similarity between the behavior of excess returns in the two markets when modeled as risk premiums, providing empirical grounds to believe that the proposed preference-based solutions to puzzles in domestic financiaI markets can certainly shed light on the Forward Premium Puzzle.

Equilibria in exchange economies with financial constraints : beyond the Cass trick

We consider an exchange economy under incomplete financiaI markets with purely financiaI securities and finitely many agents. When portfolios are not constrained, Cass [4], Duffie [7] and Florenzano-Gourdel [12] proved that arbitrage-free security prices fully characterize equilibrium security prices. This result is based on a trick initiated by Cass [4] in which one unconstrained agent behaves as if he were in complete markets. This approach is unsatisfactory since it is asymmetric and no more valid when every agent is subject to frictions. We propose a new and symmetric approach to prove that arbitrage-free security prices still fully characterize equilibrium security prices in the more realistic situation where the financiaI market is constrained by convex restrictions, provided that financiaI markets are collectively frictionless.

Evidence on the relationship between incentives and exogenous risk

Theoretical models on moral hazard provide competing predictions on the incentive-risk relationship. These predictions are derived under the assumptions of homogeneous agents and exogenous risk. However, the existing empirical evidence does not account for risk-aversion heterogeneity and risk endogeneity. This paper uses a well-built database on tenancy contracts to address these issues. Detailed information on cropping activities is used to measure the exogenous risk. Risk-aversion heterogeneity and other self-selection problems are addressed through a portfolio schedule and a subsample of farmers who simultaneously own and sharecrop different farms. This controlled exercise finds a direct relation between incentives and exogenous risk.

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.

Why designate market makers? affirmative obligations and market quality

We study why most financiaI markets designate one or more agents who precommit to provide more liquidity than they would endogenously choose, and identify two reasons that such affirmative obligations can improve welfare. The first relies on the insight that the informational component of the competi tive bid-ask spread represents a transfer across traders, not a social cost to completing trades. As such, this trading cost dissuades efficient trading, while a restriction on spread widths encourages efficient trading. Secondly, a restriction on spread widths encourages traders to become informed, which speeds the rate at which market prices move toward true asset values in the wake of information events. We consider the setting where competition ensures that affirmative obligations impose net trading losses on designated market makers that must be compensated by side payments, as observed on the Euronext limit order market, and also the setting where the designated market maker is allowed some advantages relative to limit order traders so that profits can be eamed during tranquil periods to offset losses incurred when affirmative obligations are binding, as observed on the NYSE.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Deunionization in the US: a panel data analysis from 1973 to 1999

There are four different hypotheses analyzed in the literature that explain deunionization, namely: the decrease in the demand for union representation by the workers; the impaet of globalization over unionization rates; teehnieal ehange and ehanges in the legal and politieal systems against unions. This paper aims to test alI ofthem. We estimate a logistie regression using panel data proeedure with 35 industries from 1973 to 1999 and eonclude that the four hypotheses ean not be rejeeted by the data. We also use a varianee analysis deeomposition to study the impaet of these variables over the drop in unionization rates. In the model with no demographic variables the results show that these economic (tested) variables can account from 10% to 12% of the drop in unionization. However, when we include demographic variables these tested variables can account from 10% to 35% in the total variation of unionization rates. In this case the four hypotheses tested can explain up to 50% ofthe total drop in unionization rates explained by the model.

Information learning and the stability of fiat money

We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in a decentralized economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and agents only learn from their personal trading experiences. We show that in poorly informed economies, monetary stability depends heavily on the government's commitment to the long run value of money, whereas in economies where agents gather information more easily, monetary stability can be an endogenous outcome. We generate a dynamics on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual colIapse of overissued paper money. Moreover, our results provide an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is a very recent development.

The long-run economic impact of AIDS

This paper studies the long-run impact of HIV / AIDS on per capita income and education. We introduce a channel from HIV / AIDS to long-run income that has been overlooked by the literature, the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity. We work with a continuous time overlapping generations mo deI in which life cycle features of savings and education decision play key roles. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, a quarter poorer than they would be without AIDS, due only to the direct (human capital reduction) and indirect (decline in savings and investment) effects of life-expectancy reductions. Schooling will decline on average by half. These findings are well above previous results in the literature and indicate that, as pessimistic as they may be, at least in economic terms the worst could be yet to come.

O prêmio pela maturidade na estrutura a termo das taxas de juros brasileiras

Este artigo estuda a validade da Hipótese das Expectativas (HE) racionais para o Brasil, utilizando dados diários de Julho de 1996 a Dezembro de 2002 para prazos entre 1 dia e 1 ano. (i) Os coeficientes do diferencial endimento (yield spread) estimados na equação de mudança de curto prazo da taxa de longo prazo são imprecisos e não permitem conclusão. (ii) A estimação da equação de mudança de curto prazo da taxa curta indica que o diferencial tem poder preditivo. (iii) Os coeficientes do diferencial na equação de mudança de longo prazo da taxa curta são mais precisamente estimados e não são significativamente diferentes da unidade. (iv) A previsão de expectativas racionais da mudança de longo prazo da taxa curta é altamente correlacionada com o diferencial, e (iv) o diferencial observado é mais volátil que o diferencial teórico. Os resultados dos testes rejeitam a hipótese particular coeficiente unitário, porém reconhecem o poder preditivo do diferencial observado.

Optimal water use: is anyone getting the right incentives in California?

This paper discusses ~he widespread inefficiency in water pricing today and uses the State of California as an example. After solving the Planner' s Problem I conclude that water for irrigation should cost more than for domestic use. The optimal price leveI can be calculated from a correct measure of the true marginal cost of supply.