Limits and possibilities experienced by nurses in the treatment of women with chronic venous ulcers

Objective To understand the experiences and expectations of nurses in the treatment of women with chronic venous ulcers. Method Phenomenological research was based on Alfred Schütz, whose statements were obtained in January, 2012, through semi-structured interviews with seven nurses. Results The nurse reveals the difficulties presented by the woman in performing self-care, the perceived limitations in the treatment anchored in motivation, and the values and beliefs of women. It showed professional frustration because venous leg ulcer recurrence, lack of inputs, interdisciplinary work and training of nursing staff. There was an expected adherence to the treatment of women, and it emphasized the need for ongoing care, supported self-care and standard practices in treatment. Conclusion That treatment of chronic venous leg ulcers constitutes a challenge that requires collective investment, involving women, professionals, managers and health institutions.

Narrative interviews: an important resource in qualitative research

Objetives This methodological study explain and emphasize the extent and fertility of the narrative interview in qualitative research. Methods To describe the narrative method within the qualitative research. Results The qualitative research method is characterized by addressing issues related to the singularities of the field and individuals investigated, being the narrative interviews a powerful method for use by researchers who aggregate it. They allow the deepening of research, the combination of life stories with socio-historical contexts, making the understanding of the senses that produce changes in the beliefs and values that motivate and justify the actions of possible informants. Conclusion The use of narrative is an advantageous investigative resource in qualitative research, in which the narrative is a traditional form of communication whose purpose is to serve content from which the subjective experiences can be transmitted.

Factors influencing Intensive Care Units nurses in end-of-life decisions

OBJECTIVETo identify the factors that influence the Intensive Care Unit nurse in the decision-making process in end-of-life situations.METHODEthnographic case study, which used the theoretical framework of medical anthropology. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 10 nurses.RESULTSThe inductive thematic analysis enabled us to identify four themes:The cultural context of the Intensive Care Unit: decision-making in situations of end-of-life; Beliefs and subjectivity of care in end-of-life situations; Professional experience and context characteristics of end-of-life care situations; and Humanization practices in end-of-life situations: the patient and family centered care.CONCLUSIONProfessional maturity, the ability to transmit information and the ability to negotiate are directly related to the inclusion of nurses in the decision-making process.

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Efficient interval scoring rules

Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefsare time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are validonly when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a classof rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) onthe basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulatean e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single-peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of thebelief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Money doctors

We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.

Biased representation of homothetic preferences on homogeneous sets

In the homogeneous case of one-dimensional objects, we show that any preference relation that is positive and homothetic can be represented by a quantitative utility function and unique bias. This bias may favor or disfavor the preference for an object. In the first case, preferences are complete but not transitive and an object may be preferred even when its utility is lower. In the second case, preferences are asymmetric and transitive but not negatively transitive and it may not be sufficient for an object to have a greater utility for be preferred. In this manner, the bias reflects the extent to which preferences depart from the maximization of a utility function.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

A total order in [0,1] defined through a 'next' operator

A `next' operator, s, is built on the set R1=(0,1]-{ 1-1/e} defining a partial order that, with the help of the axiom of choice, can be extended to a total order in R1. Besides, the orbits {sn(a)}nare all dense in R1 and are constituted by elements of the samearithmetical character: if a is an algebraic irrational of degreek all the elements in a's orbit are algebraic of degree k; if a istranscendental, all are transcendental. Moreover, the asymptoticdistribution function of the sequence formed by the elements in anyof the half-orbits is a continuous, strictly increasing, singularfunction very similar to the well-known Minkowski's ?(×) function.

Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaignrhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over whatpolicy the candidate will implement in case he wins theelection. We develop a model of repeated elections withcomplete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaignpromises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises arebelieved by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtainthat the degree to which promises are credible in equilibriumis an increasing function of the value of a candidate'sreputation.

The benefits of limited feedback in organizations

In most firms, managers periodically assess workers' performance. Evidence suggeststhat managers withhold information during these reviews, and some observersargue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of thisargument when workers have career concerns. Disclosure has two effects: it exposesthe worker to uncertainty about future effort levels, but allows him to use current effortto influence his employer's beliefs about future effort. The surplus-maximizingdisclosure policy reveals output realizations in the center of the distribution, butnot in the tails. Thus, it is efficient for firms to reveal some but not all performanceinformation.

Circulation of private notes during a currency shortage

This paper provides a search theoretical model that captures two phenomena that have characterized several episodes of monetary history: currency shortages and the circulation of privately issued notes. As usual in these models, the media of exchange are determined as part of the equilibrium. We characterize all the different equilibria and specify the conditions under which there is a currency shortage and/or privately issued notes are used as means of payment. There is multiplicity of equilibria for the entire parameter space, but there always exist an equilibrium in which notes circulate, either alone or together with coins. Hence, credit is a self-fulfilling phenomenon that depends on the beliefs of agents about the acceptability and future repayment of notes. The degree of circulation of coins depends on two crucial parameters, the intrinsic utility of holding coins and the extent with which it is possible to find exchange opportunities in the market.