Urban environments and situated institutions : everyday governance in west Bengal

How do processes of power shape the urban environment in small Indian cities? On a day-to-day basis, who actually controls access to and the use of environmental resources? How is this done? Answering these questions contributes to our ability to develop a nuanced understanding the urban condition. In order to investigate these questions an actor-oriented approach is developed, drawing on the anthropological literatures on everyday governance and the everyday state. This conceptual framework informs an urban political ecology approach oriented towards everyday practices and the micro-politics of the (re)production of urban socio-natures. This thesis employs a mixed methods approach to qualitative research. Three cases are presented to explore: para (neighbourhood) clubs as governance actors, the governance of the urban pondscape, and the urban political ecology of solid waste management. These case studies serve to highlight how power shapes the (re)production of urban socio-natures through the everyday environmental governance practices of a complex network of governance actors. This work further demonstrates how multiple intersectionalities, including class, caste and access to political and social authority, shape these practices and their outcomes. Finally, the manner in which balances of power, place making and the formation of subject positions may both result from and shape everyday environmental governance practices and their outcomes is explored. This empirical investigation makes a number of contributions to the literature. It has explores the hereto-understudied topics of environmental governance in small cities in India, the urban political ecologies of non-piped water and of solid waste, and the role of clubs as governance actors. It further contributes to conversations within the literature on how to deepen and broaden Urban Political Ecology by engaging with everyday practices, and cases of ordinary, not-openly contested socio-natures. -- Comment les processus de pouvoir influencent-ils l'environnement urbain dans les petites villes indiennes ? Au quotidien, qui contrôle l'accès et l'utilisation des ressources environnementales ? Comment ce contrôle s'exerce-t-il ? Répondre à ces questions contribue au développement d'une compréhension nuancée de la condition urbaine. Afin d'explorer ces questions une approche actor-oriented de la gouvernance quotidienne est développée, faisant appel aux littératures anthropologiques de la gouvernance quotidienne et de l'everyday state. Ce cadre conceptuel établit ainsi une approche d'Urban Political Ecology orientée vers les pratiques quotidiennes et la micro- politique de la (re) production des socio-natures urbaines. Cette thèse emploie des méthodes qualitatives mixtes. Trois cas sont présentés afin d'étudier : les clubs para (quartier) comme acteurs de la gouvernance; la gouvernance de la pondscape urbaine; et l'urban political ecology de la gestion des déchets solides. Ces études de cas permettent de mettre en lumière la façon dont le pouvoir influence la (re)production des socio-natures urbaines par le biais des pratiques quotidiennes de gouvernance environnementale d'un réseau complexe d'acteurs. Ce travail démontre également comment plusieurs intersectionnalités, y compris la classe, la caste et l'accès au pouvoir politique et social, façonnent ces pratiques de gouvernance et leurs produits. Finalement, cette recherche explore la manière dont les équilibres de pouvoir, la fabrication de lieux et la formation de la position du sujet peuvent à la fois résulter de et contribuer à façonner les pratiques quotidiennes de gouvernance environnementale et leurs produits. Cette investigation empirique fait ainsi plusieurs contributions à la littérature. Elle explore les questions jusque-là sous-étudiées de la gouvernance environnementale dans les petites villes en Inde, de l'urban political ecology de l'eau non courante et des déchets solides, ainsi que du rôle des clubs comme acteurs de la gouvernance. Celle-ci contribue également à des débats sur la façon d'approfondir et d'élargir l'urban political ecology en travaillant sur les pratiques quotidiennes, et sur des cas de socio-natures ordinaires, pas ouvertement contestées.

Les services de référence en milieu universitaire : de nouvelles orientations!

Communication présentée dans le cadre du programme de formation continue de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec, vendredi le 11 mars 2005.

La gestion du savoir à l’ère du numérique : Les politiques de choix, de développement et de gestion de collections

Présenté au 36e congrès de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec (CBPQ).

Capital Income Taxation, Depletion, Allowances and Non-Renewable Resource Extraction

Dans Cet Article, Nous Etudions les Distorsions Que Cause L'impot Sur le Revenu des Societes Dans le Profil de Production des Firmes Extractives et Dans L'allocation des Ressources Entre les Secteurs D'extraction et les Autres Secteurs Soumis a L'impot Sur les Societes. Nous Etudions En Particulier L'allocation D'epuisement, Dont Nous Montrons Qu'elle Peut Trouver Sa Justification, Non Pas a Assurer la Neutralite de L'impot, Mais En Permettant L'etablissement de Taux Effectifs D'imposition Identiques Dans les Secteurs D'extraction et Dans les Autres Secteurs.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Les pratiques pédagogiques exemplaires en sciences de l'information : 21 fiches annotées

Ce rapport constitue une version augmentée d’un premier rapport datant d’août 2005. Les 21 fiches annotées peuvent aussi être consultées individuellement (en format HTML) à partir du « Portail des ressources pédagogiques et disciplinaires en sciences de l'information » accessible à l’adresse : http://www.ebsi.umontreal.ca/clip/

Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Landfills

This paper generalizes Hotelling's (1931) theory of nonrenewable resources to situations where resource pools and their users are distributed spacially. Extraction and transport costs are assumed to be linear in the rate of extraction, but utilization of each deposit may require a setup cost.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited.

Consider a general equilibrium framework where the marginal cost of extraction from several deposits of an exhaustible resource is constant in terms of an inexhaustible perfect substitute and differs between deposits. the instantaneous rate of production form the inexhaustible resource is subject to a capacity constraint.

Private Storage of Common Property

This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: Extracted common reserves are aften stored privately rather than immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage.