Practical implementation of species' recovery plans - Lessons from the White-backed Woodpecker Action Plan in Sweden

Successful biodiversity conservation requires safeguarding viable populations of species. To work with this challenge Sweden has introduced a concept of Action Plans, which focus on the recovery of one or more species; while keeping in mind the philosophy of addressing ecosystems in a more comprehensive way, following the umbrella concept. In this paper we investigate the implementationprocess of the ActionPlanfor one umbrella species, the White-backed Woodpecker (WBW) Dendrocopos leucotos. We describe the plan's organisation and goals, and investigate its implementation and accomplishment of particular targets, based on interviewing and surveying the key actors. The achievement of the targets in 2005-2008 was on average much lower than planned, explained partially by the lack of knowledge/data, experienced workers, and administrative flexibility. Surprisingly, the perceived importance of particular conservation measures, the investment priority accorded to them, the money available and various practical obstacles all failed to kg? explain the target levels achieved. However qualitative data from both the interviews and the survey highlight possible implementation obstacles: competing interests with other conservation actions and the level of engagement of particular implementing actors. Therefore we suggest that for successful implementation of recovery plans, there is aneed for initial and inclusive scoping prior to embarking on the plan, where not only issues like ecological knowledge and practical resources are considered, but also possible conflicts and synergies with other conservation actions. An adaptive approach with regular review of the conservation process is essential, particularly in the case of such complex action plans as the one for the WBW.

The space of make: A topological account of the studio

Approaches to art-practice-as-research tend to draw a distinction between the processes of creative practice and scholarly reflection. According to this template, the two sites of activity – studio/desk, work/writing, body/mind – form the ‘correlative’ entity known as research. Creative research is said to be produced by the navigation of world and thought: spaces that exist in a continual state of tension with one another. Either we have the studio tethered to brute reality while the desk floats free as a site for the fluid cross-pollination of texts and concepts. Or alternatively, the studio is characterized by the amorphous, intuitive play of forms and ideas, while the desk represents its cartography, mapping and fixing its various fluidities. In either case, the research status of art practice is figured as a fundamentally riven space. However, the nascent philosophy of Speculative Realism proposes a different ontology – one in which the space of human activity comprises its own reality, independent of human perception. The challenge it poses to traditional metaphysics is to rethink the world as if it were a real space. When applied to practice-led research, this reconceptualization challenges the creative researcher to consider creative research as a contiguous space – a topology where thinking and making are not dichotomous points but inflections in an amorphous and dynamic field. Instead of being subject to the vertical tension between earth and air, a topology of practice emphasizes its encapsulated, undulating reality – an agentive ‘object’ formed according to properties of connectedness, movement and differentiation. Taking the central ideas of Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman as a point of departure, this paper will provide a speculative account of the interplay of spatialities that characterise the author’s studio practice. In so doing, the paper will model the innovative methodological potential produced by the analysis of topological dimensions of the studio and the way they can be said to move beyond the ‘geo-critical’ divide.

Encounters with the Virtual : The Experience of Art In Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy

My thesis concerns the notion of existence as an encounter, as developed in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925 1995). What this denotes is a critical stance towards a major current in Western philosophical tradition which Deleuze nominates as representational thinking. Such thinking strives to provide a stable ground for identities by appealing to transcendent structures behind the apparent reality and explaining the manifest diversity of the given by such notions as essence, idea, God, or totality of the world. In contrast to this, Deleuze states that abstractions such as these do not explain anything, but rather that they need to be explained. Yet, Deleuze does not appeal merely to the given. He sees that one must posit a genetic element that accounts for experience, and this element must not be naïvely traced from the empirical. Deleuze nominates his philosophy as transcendental empiricism and he seeks to bring together the approaches of both empiricism and transcendental philosophy. In chapter one I look into the motivations of Deleuze s transcendental empiricism and analyse it as an encounter between Deleuze s readings of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. This encounter regards, first of all, the question of subjectivity and results in a conception of identity as non-essential process. A pre-given concept of identity does not explain the nature of things, but the concept itself must be explained. From this point of view, the process of individualisation must become the central concern. In chapter two I discuss Deleuze s concept of the affect as the basis of identity and his affiliation with the theories of Gilbert Simondon and Jakob von Uexküll. From this basis develops a morphogenetic theory of individuation-as-process. In analysing such a process of individuation, the modal category of the virtual becomes of great value, being an open, indeterminate charge of potentiality. As the virtual concerns becoming or the continuous process of actualisation, then time, rather than space, will be the privileged field of consideration. Chapter three is devoted to the discussion of the temporal aspect of the virtual and difference-without-identity. The essentially temporal process of subjectification results in a conception of the subject as composition: an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. Therefore art and aesthetic experience is valued by Deleuze because they disclose the construct-like nature of subjectivity in the sensations they produce. Through the domain of the aesthetic the subject is immersed in the network of affectivity that is the material diversity of the world. Chapter four addresses a phenomenon displaying this diversified indentity: the simulacrum an identity that is not grounded in an essence. Developed on the basis of the simulacrum, a theory of identity as assemblage emerges in chapter five. As the problematic of simulacra concerns perhaps foremost the artistic presentation, I shall look into the identity of a work of art as assemblage. To take an example of a concrete artistic practice and to remain within the problematic of the simulacrum, I shall finally address the question of reproduction particularly in the case recorded music and its identity regarding the work of art. In conclusion, I propose that by overturning its initial representational schema, phonographic music addresses its own medium and turns it into an inscription of difference, exposing the listener to an encounter with the virtual.

On the Origin of Ideas : An Abductivist Approach to Discovery

The purpose of this study is to analyze and develop various forms of abduction as a means of conceptualizing processes of discovery. Abduction was originally presented by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) as a "weak", third main mode of inference -- besides deduction and induction -- one which, he proposed, is closely related to many kinds of cognitive processes, such as instincts, perception, practices and mediated activity in general. Both abduction and discovery are controversial issues in philosophy of science. It is often claimed that discovery cannot be a proper subject area for conceptual analysis and, accordingly, abduction cannot serve as a "logic of discovery". I argue, however, that abduction gives essential means for understanding processes of discovery although it cannot give rise to a manual or algorithm for making discoveries. In the first part of the study, I briefly present how the main trend in philosophy of science has, for a long time, been critical towards a systematic account of discovery. Various models have, however, been suggested. I outline a short history of abduction; first Peirce's evolving forms of his theory, and then later developments. Although abduction has not been a major area of research until quite recently, I review some critiques of it and look at the ways it has been analyzed, developed and used in various fields of research. Peirce's own writings and later developments, I argue, leave room for various subsequent interpretations of abduction. The second part of the study consists of six research articles. First I treat "classical" arguments against abduction as a logic of discovery. I show that by developing strategic aspects of abductive inference these arguments can be countered. Nowadays the term 'abduction' is often used as a synonym for the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) model. I argue, however, that it is useful to distinguish between IBE ("Harmanian abduction") and "Hansonian abduction"; the latter concentrating on analyzing processes of discovery. The distinctions between loveliness and likeliness, and between potential and actual explanations are more fruitful within Hansonian abduction. I clarify the nature of abduction by using Peirce's distinction between three areas of "semeiotic": grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Grammar (emphasizing "Firstnesses" and iconicity) and methodeutic (i.e., a processual approach) especially, give new means for understanding abduction. Peirce himself held a controversial view that new abductive ideas are products of an instinct and an inference at the same time. I maintain that it is beneficial to make a clear distinction between abductive inference and abductive instinct, on the basis of which both can be developed further. Besides these, I analyze abduction as a part of distributed cognition which emphasizes a long-term interaction with the material, social and cultural environment as a source for abductive ideas. This approach suggests a "trialogical" model in which inquirers are fundamentally connected both to other inquirers and to the objects of inquiry. As for the classical Meno paradox about discovery, I show that abduction provides more than one answer. As my main example of abductive methodology, I analyze the process of Ignaz Semmelweis' research on childbed fever. A central basis for abduction is the claim that discovery is not a sequence of events governed only by processes of chance. Abduction treats those processes which both constrain and instigate the search for new ideas; starting from the use of clues as a starting point for discovery, but continuing in considerations like elegance and 'loveliness'. The study then continues a Peircean-Hansonian research programme by developing abduction as a way of analyzing processes of discovery.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Poetics of Subjectivity : Existence and Expressivity in Simone de Beauvoir's Philosophy

In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn attention to and re-evaluated the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir (1908 1986). Her philosophical practice has been described as non-systematic, and her literary writing has been viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir s philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir s philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity, paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also clarifies Beauvoir s main reason to turn to literature in order to express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of life. In addition, the thesis gives examples of how Beauvoir s literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. I use the expression poetics of subjectivity to refer to the systematic relation between Beauvoir s existential and phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works, and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in the novel. The thesis is divided into five chapters, of which the first three investigate Beauvoir s philosophy of existence at the intersection of the modern traditions of thought that began with René Descartes and Søren Kierkegaard s intuitions about subjectivity. Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir s notion of ambiguity, as compared to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of Beauvoir s philosophy through a study of her response to early French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My analysis shows that Edmund Husserl s distinction between different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir s understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she uses. Chapter 4 is a study of Beauvoir s reflections on the expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter 5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete subjectivity; Beauvoir s conceptual study of femininity in Le deuxième sexe and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel L Invitée. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir s original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as imaginatively.

Literacy, security, governmentality: Defining spaces, managing populations – How has education become part of whole of government security strategy?

In this paper I conduct a Foucauldian discourse analysis of a political speech given by Brendon Nelson in 2006 when the Australian Minister for Defence in the Howard Coalition Government. The speech connects conceptualisations of terror, globalization, education and literacy as part of a whole of government security strategy. The analysis examines this speech as an example of a liberal way of governing the conduct of diverse and unpredictable populations. My analysis suggests that the apparatus of government has been strategically used in order to biopolitically contain the rise of complex social forces and protect a set of homogenous cultural values. The purposes of education and uses of literacy are seen as instruments for the inscription of a coded set of values understood to be synonymous with civil society.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

The ghost in the city industrial complex: Le Corbusier and the fascist theory of Urbanisme

Le Corbusier participated in an urban dialogue with the first group in France to call itself fascist: the journalist Georges Valois’s militant Faisceau des Combattants et Producteurs (1925-1927), the “Blue Shirts,” inspired by the Italian “Fasci” of Mussolini. Le Corbusier’s portrait photograph materialised on the front cover of the January 1927 issue of the Faisceau League’s newspaper Le Nouveau Siècle edited by the former anarcho-syndicalist journalist Georges Valois, its leader, who fashioned himself as the French Mussolini. Le Corbusier was described in the Revue as one of les animateurs (the “organisers”) of the Party1 – meaning a member of the technical elite who would drive the Faisceau’s plans. On 1 May 1927, the Nouveau Siècle printed a full-page feature “Le Plan Voisin” on Le Corbusier’s 1922 redesign of Paris : the architect’s single-point perspective sketch appeared below an extract lifted from the architect’s original polemic Le Centre de Paris on the pages of Le Corbusier’s second book Urbanisme published two years earlier, a treatise on urbanism.2 Three weeks later, Le Corbusier presented a slide show of his urban plans at a fascist rally for the inauguration of the Faisceau’s new headquarters on the rue du faubourg Poissonniere, thereby crystalising the architect’s hallowed status in the league...

Implications of Bohmian quantum ontology for psychopathology

This article discusses the prospects of quantum psychiatry from a Bohmian point of view, which provides an ontological interpretation of quantum theory, and extends such ontology to include mind. At first, we discuss the more general relevance of quantum theory to psychopathology. The basic idea is that because quantum theory emphasizes the role of wholeness, it might be relevant to psychopathology, where breakdown of unity in the mental domain is a key feature. We then discuss the role of information in psychopathology, and consider the connections with quantum theory in this area. In particular, we discuss David Bohm’s notion of active information, which arises in the ontological interpretation of quantum theory, and is suggested to play a fundamental role as the bridge between mind and matter. Some such bridge is needed if we are to understand how subtle mental properties are able to influence more manifest physical properties in the brain (all the way to the molecular and possibly microtubular level), and how changes in those possibly quantum‐level physical processes are able to influence higher cognitive functions. We also consider the implications of the notion of active information for psychopathology. The prospects of implementing the Bohmian scheme in neuroquantal terms are then briefly considered. Finally, we discuss some possible therapeutic implications of Bohm’s approach to information and the relation of mind and matter.

Implications of Bohmian quantum ontology for psychopathology

This article discusses the prospects of quantum psychiatry from a Bohmian point of view, which provides an ontological interpretation of quantum theory, and extends such ontology to include mind. At first, we discuss the more general relevance of quantum theory to psychopathology. The basic idea is that because quantum theory emphasizes the role of wholeness, it might be relevant to psychopathology, where breakdown of unity in the mental domain is a key feature. We then discuss the role of information in psychopathology, and consider the connections with quantum theory in this area. In particular, we discuss David Bohm’s notion of active information, which arises in the ontological interpretation of quantum theory, and is suggested to play a fundamental role as the bridge between mind and matter. Some such bridge is needed if we are to understand how subtle mental properties are able to influence more manifest physical properties in the brain (all the way to the molecular and possibly microtubular level), and how changes in those possibly quantum‐level physical processes are able to influence higher cognitive functions. We also consider the implications of the notion of active information for psychopathology. The prospects of implementing the Bohmian scheme in neuroquantal terms are then briefly considered. Finally, we discuss some possible therapeutic implications of Bohm’s approach to information and the relation of mind and matter.

Sport, body and power: Reassessing the myth of President Kekkonen

Former President of Finland Urho Kekkonen was not only a powerful politician but also a well-known sportsman and keep-fit enthusiast. The president’s sports hobbies were covered and celebrated in the media and thus became an integral part of his public persona. This paper looks at Kekkonen’s athletic and able-bodied image and its significance for his power from the perspective of gender. In his exercise activities, Kekkonen was able to display his bodily prowess and demonstrate his version of masculinity, which emphasized both physical and mental strength. The union of mind and muscle in turn buttressed his political ascendancy. Kekkonen’s athletic body served as a cornerstone of his dominance over his country and, simultaneously, as a shield protecting Finland from both internal and external threats. Furthermore, Kekkonen’s sports performances were essential elements in the myth that was created around the president during his term and which was carefully conserved after his fall from power. Drawing upon scholarship on men and masculinities, this paper reassesses the still-effective mythical image of Kekkonen as an invincible superman. The article reveals the performative nature of his athletic activities and shows that in part, his pre-eminence in them was nothing more than theatre enacted by him and his entourage. Thus, Kekkonen’s superior and super-masculine image was actually surprisingly vulnerable and dependent on the success of the performance. The president’s ageing, in particular, demonstrates the fragility of his displays of prowess, strength and masculinity, and shows how fragile the entanglement of body and power can be.

The Place of Philosophy in Management

Our purpose is to not to define a particular philosophy of management, but rather to demonstrate some of the ways in which philosophy – ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, logic and æsthetics – contributes to the practice of management. We identify a number of contemporary management questions, procedures or issues where the application of philosophical approaches are relevant, and show how philosophical skills, an understanding of philosophical principles or exposure to philosophical discussion can contribute to improved management practice. In some ways the paper is a report on progress in the quest begun by Nigel Laurie and Christopher Cherry in the first issue of Philosophy of Management, formerly Reason in Practice (2001) when they asked why philosophers have interested themselves so little in the entire field of management. We include some examples where philosophers have written about management, some where managers have shown the direct impact of philosophy on management effectiveness and some where potential remains. In much we see links to process philosophy, and to the need for conversation and reflection by and between managers and philosophers. This does not of itself show how philosophy can contribute to management education. A brief final section discusses the way in which moral creativity skills can be developed through reflection, and describes how this has been done in the Manufacturing Leaders’ Programme at the Institute for Manufacturing at Cambridge and in the International Management Ethics & Values course taught to undergraduate management students in Adelaide, Singapore and Hong Kong. This will be taken up in a subsequent paper.

Differences in the cognitive skills of bonobos and chimpanzees.

While bonobos and chimpanzees are both genetically and behaviorally very similar, they also differ in significant ways. Bonobos are more cautious and socially tolerant while chimpanzees are more dependent on extractive foraging, which requires tools. The similarities suggest the two species should be cognitively similar while the behavioral differences predict where the two species should differ cognitively. We compared both species on a wide range of cognitive problems testing their understanding of the physical and social world. Bonobos were more skilled at solving tasks related to theory of mind or an understanding of social causality, while chimpanzees were more skilled at tasks requiring the use of tools and an understanding of physical causality. These species differences support the role of ecological and socio-ecological pressures in shaping cognitive skills over relatively short periods of evolutionary time.