The Arabidopsis NPR1 Protein Is a Receptor for the Plant Defense Hormone Salicylic Acid

Systemic Acquired Resistance (SAR) is a type of plant systemic resistance occurring against a broad spectrum of pathogens. It can be activated in response to pathogen infection in the model plant Arabidopsis thaliana and many agriculturally important crops. Upon SAR activation, the infected plant undergoes transcriptional reprogramming, marked by the induction of a battery of defense genes, including Pathogenesis-related (PR) genes. Activation of the PR-1 gene serves as a molecular marker for the deployment of SAR. The accumulation of a defense hormone, salicylic acid (SA) is crucial for the infected plant to mount SAR. Increased cellular levels of SA lead to the downstream activation of the PR-1 gene, triggered by the combined action of the Non-expressor of Pathogenesis-related Gene 1 (NPR1) protein and the TGA II-clade transcription factor (namely TGA2). Despite the importance of SA, its receptor has remained elusive for decades. In this study, we demonstrated that in Arabidopsis the NPR1 protein is a receptor for SA. SA physically binds to the C-terminal transactivation domain of NPR1. The two cysteines (Cys521 and Cys529), which are important for NPR1’s coactivator function, within this transactivation domain are critical for the binding of SA to NPR1. The interaction between SA and NPR1 requires a transition metal, copper, as a cofactor. Our results also suggested a conformational change in NPR1 upon SA binding, releasing the C-terminal transactivation domain from the N-terminal autoinhibitory BTB/POZ domain. These results advance our understanding of the plant immune function, specifically related to the molecular mechanisms underlying SAR. The discovery of NPR1 as a SA receptor enables future chemical screening for small molecules that activate plant immune responses through their interaction with NPR1 or NPR1-like proteins in commercially important plants. This will help in identifying the next generation of non-biocidal pesticides.

Modeling short-range ballistic missile defense and Israel's Iron Dome system

This paper develops a model of short-range ballistic missile defense and uses it to study the performance of Israel’s Iron Dome system. The deterministic base model allows for inaccurate missiles, unsuccessful interceptions, and civil defense. Model enhancements consider the trade-offs in attacking the interception system, the difficulties faced by militants in assembling large salvos, and the effects of imperfect missile classification by the defender. A stochastic model is also developed. Analysis shows that system performance can be highly sensitive to the missile salvo size, and that systems with higher interception rates are more “fragile” when overloaded. The model is calibrated using publically available data about Iron Dome’s use during Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. If the systems performed as claimed, they saved Israel an estimated 1778 casualties and $80 million in property damage, and thereby made preemptive strikes on Gaza about 8 times less valuable to Israel. Gaza militants could have inflicted far more damage by grouping their rockets into large salvos, but this may have been difficult given Israel’s suppression efforts. Counter-battery fire by the militants is unlikely to be worthwhile unless they can obtain much more accurate missiles.

In Defense of Welfarism

This paper characterizes welfarist social evaluation in a multi-profile setting where, in addition to multiple utility profiles, it is assumed that there are several profiles of non-welfare information. We prove new versions of the welfarism theorems in this alternative framework, and we illustrate that a very plausible and weak anonymity property is sufficient to generate anonymous social-evaluation orderings.

Capital Income Taxation, Depletion, Allowances and Non-Renewable Resource Extraction

Dans Cet Article, Nous Etudions les Distorsions Que Cause L'impot Sur le Revenu des Societes Dans le Profil de Production des Firmes Extractives et Dans L'allocation des Ressources Entre les Secteurs D'extraction et les Autres Secteurs Soumis a L'impot Sur les Societes. Nous Etudions En Particulier L'allocation D'epuisement, Dont Nous Montrons Qu'elle Peut Trouver Sa Justification, Non Pas a Assurer la Neutralite de L'impot, Mais En Permettant L'etablissement de Taux Effectifs D'imposition Identiques Dans les Secteurs D'extraction et Dans les Autres Secteurs.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.