The effects of consistency and inconsistency between attentional focus and task objective in learning a golf putting task

Converging evidence has demonstrated learning advantages when an individual is instructed to focus their attention externally. However, many of the motor tasks utilized in past research had clear external objectives (i.e., putting accuracy), creating a compatible relationship between an external focus of attention (i.e., outcome) and an external task objective (i.e., putting accuracy). The present study examined whether or not the consistency of instructions and task objective would differentially impact the acquisition of a golf putting task. Participants performed a putting task in a control condition or in one of four experimental conditions resulting from the factorial interaction of task instructions (internal or external) and task objective (internal or external). The retention and transfer data revealed that participants who received an external task objective demonstrated superior outcome scores. Participants who received technique information paired with outcome information demonstrated superior technique scores.

Task-Dependent Oscillatory Brain Activity During Oculomotor Delayed Response Task

This study used three Oculomotor Delayed Response (ODR) tasks to investigate the unique cognitive demands during the delay period. Changes in alpha power were used to index cognitive efforts during the delay period. Continuous EEGs from 25 healthy young adults (18-34 years) were recorded using dense electrode array. The data was analyzed by 6-cycle Morlet wavelet decompositions in the frequency range of 2-30 Hz to create time- frequency decompositions for four midline electrode sites. The 99% confidence intervals using the bootstrapped 20% trimmed mean of the 10 Hz frequency were used to examine the differences among conditions. Compared to two Memory conditions (Match and Non-Match), Control condition yielded significant differences in all frequencies over the entire trial period, suggesting a cognitive state difference. Compared to Match condition, the Non–Match condition had lower alpha activity during the delay period at each midline electrode site reflecting the higher cognitive effort required.

The Influence of Attentional Focus on the Self-Efficacy-Performance Relationship in a Continuous Running Task

The self-efficacy-performance relationship in continuous sport tasks has been shown to be significantly reciprocal yet unequal with stronger influences in the performance-to-self-efficacy pathway rather than self-efficacy-to-performance pathway (e.g., LaForge-MacKenzie & Sullivan, 2014b). Bandura (2012) suggested that sociocognitive variables may influence this relationship. Attention as a sociocognitve factor may bias the processing of performance and self-efficacy information (Bandura, 1982, 1997; Bandura & Jourden, 1991). As confidence and attention are important aspects of peak running performance (Brewer, Van Raalte, Linder, & VanRaalte, 1991), the primary purpose of the present study was to examine the self-efficacy-performance relationship under three conditions of attentional focus. The secondary purpose was to examine self-efficacy and performance as separate constructs under the same conditions of attention. Participants ran continuously for one kilometer in one of three randomly assigned attentional focus conditions: internal-focus (n = 51), external-focus (n = 50), and control (n = 49). Self-efficacy was assessed using a one-item measure every 200 meters. Path analyses examining the primary objective revealed significant self-efficacy-to-performance pathways in all conditions: external-focus (p < .05, βs ranging from -.17 to -.32), internal-focus (p < .05, βs ranging from -.26 to -.36), and control (p < .05, βs ranging from -.29 to -.42). Significant reciprocal relationships were absent in all conditions. ANOVAs examining the secondary objectives found significantly faster performance in the control condition at the start (F (2, 147) = 3.86, p < .05) and end of the task (F (2, 147) = 3.56, p < .05). Self-efficacy was significantly higher in the internal-focus condition at the end of the task (Self-Efficacy 4 (F (2, 147) = 3.21, p < .05) and Self-Efficacy 5 (F (2, 147) = 4.74, p < .05). In contrast to previous within-trial research (e.g., LaForge-MacKenzie & Sullivan, 2014b) self-efficacy-to-performance effects were more significant and robust than performance-to-self-efficacy effects. These results provided support for Bandura’s (2012) suggestion that sociocognitive factors may have the ability to alter the causal structure of the self-efficacy-performance relationship, proposing complexities in the self-efficacy-performance relationship (Sitzmann &Yeo, 2013). Results were discussed from both theoretical and applied perspectives.

The Impact of Personal Trainer’s Leadership Style on Self-Presentational Concerns, Enjoyment, Task Self-Efficacy and Intention to Exercise in an Introductory Weight Training Orientation

The purpose of the present study was to examine two leadership styles of personal trainers (bland versus enriched) to evaluate their effects on exercise-related outcomes. Participants were 103 university women with no previous experience weight training. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two leadership style conditions. They completed primary measures prior to being introduced to the personal trainer. Next, participants completed an introductory weight training session, followed by post-manipulation measures. The leadership styles were successfully manipulated. Participants in the enriched leadership style condition reported significantly higher levels of enjoyment and intention to exercise. Participants in the bland leadership style condition reported significantly higher levels of social anxiety; no differences were found for task self-efficacy, self-presentational efficacy, social physique anxiety, or handgrip performance between groups. Thus, an enriched leadership style of personal trainers can increase positive psychological outcomes.

Examining peer-controlled KR schedules during the learning of a movement-timing task as a function of task experience.

Learners can be provided with feedback in the form of knowledge of results (KR), under self-controlled and peer-controlled schedules. Recently, McRae, Hansen, and Patterson (2015), identified that inexperienced peers can provide KR that can facilitate motor skill acquisition. However, it is currently unknown whether previous task experience differentially impacts how peers present learners with KR and whether this KR impacts motor skill acquisition. In the present study, participants were randomly assigned to become inexperienced peer facilitators, learners with an inexperienced peer, learners with self-control who later became experienced peers, learners with an experienced peer, or learners in a control group. During acquisition learners completed a serial-timing task with a goal of 2500ms and returned approximately twenty four hours later for a delayed retention, time transfer, and pattern transfer test. We predicted that during the delayed tests, learners with self-control would outperform all other groups. Furthermore, we predicted that learners who received KR from experienced peers would outperform learners who received KR from inexperienced peers. However, our results indicated that participants who received peer-controlled and self-controlled KR schedules learned the task in an equivalent manner. Thus, our results are novel as they identify that inexperienced peers can provide KR that is as effective as KR provided by experienced peers and KR requested under self-controlled conditions.

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Patents, the Healthcare System and Benefit-Sharing

Lorraine Sheremeta, Research Associate, Health Law Institute, University of Alberta