[Feminismos del siglo XXI] Mary Nash

Mary Nash, entrevistada por Núria Benach, recorre su trayectoria de investigación desde sus inicios hasta la incorporación a sus estudios de una perspectiva multicultural y de género. Empezó a trabajar sobre la "Historia de las mujeres" en el ámbito de la Guerra Civil y la Segunda República, con el objetivo de visualizar la acción de las mujeres y reconstruir la memoria histórica olvidad. En los años 70 esta perspectiva no tenía aún un reconocimiento académico y menos aún, social. Más adelante, entre los 80 y 90, Nash empezó a trabajar sobre el impacto de los flujos migratorios en Occidente. Así, expone la necesidad de unos derechos de las mujeres dependiendo del contexto social de cada cultura, pero acepta la existencia de unos límites que no se pueden transgredir bajo ningún concepto multicultural.

Mujeres en el mundo. Historia, retos y movimientos, Mary Nash

Mary Nash consigue perturbar las conciencias de mujeres y, sobre todo, de hombres del siglo XXI con la historia de las mujeres. No porque exponga el complejo, no lineal y contradictorio movimiento de las mujeres, sino porque esta historia nos desvela en lo profundo de la conciencia la enormidad de tiempo y sufrimiento que llevó a nuestras bisabuelas, abuelas, madres conseguir que algunas de nosotras podamos hoy tener un reconocimiento como sujetos, más o menos autónomos, de nuestras acciones, saberes, voces; para que hoy podamos reconocer, aceptar, tolerar y amar las diferencias entre form

Sorafenib prevents liver fibrosis in a non-alcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) rodent model

Liver fibrosis occurring as an outcome of non-alcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) can precede the development of cirrhosis. We investigated the effects of sorafenib in preventing liver fibrosis in a rodent model of NASH. Adult Sprague-Dawley rats were fed a choline-deficient high-fat diet and exposed to diethylnitrosamine for 6 weeks. The NASH group (n=10) received vehicle and the sorafenib group (n=10) received 2.5 mg·kg-1·day-1 by gavage. A control group (n=4) received only standard diet and vehicle. Following treatment, animals were sacrificed and liver tissue was collected for histologic examination, mRNA isolation, and analysis of mitochondrial function. Genes related to fibrosis (MMP9, TIMP1, TIMP2), oxidative stress (HSP60, HSP90, GST), and mitochondrial biogenesis (PGC1α) were evaluated by real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-qPCR). Liver mitochondrial oxidation activity was measured by a polarographic method, and cytokines by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Sorafenib treatment restored mitochondrial function and reduced collagen deposition by nearly 63% compared to the NASH group. Sorafenib upregulated PGC1α and MMP9 and reduced TIMP1 and TIMP2 mRNA and IL-6 and IL-10 protein expression. There were no differences in HSP60, HSP90 and GST expression. Sorafenib modulated PGC1α expression, improved mitochondrial respiration and prevented collagen deposition. It may, therefore, be useful in the treatment of liver fibrosis in NASH.

Frecuencia de los polimorfismos G-308A y G-238A del gen TNF-a en pacientes con esteatohepatitis no alcohólica (NASH) asociada a obesidad

Tesis (Maestría en Ciencias con Especialidad en Biología Molecular e Ingeniería Genética) UANL

Resultados uniformemente seguros e equilíbrio de Nash em jogos compactos

Nós introduzimos uma condição, resultados uniformemente seguros, para jogos compactos e resultados (“payoffs”) limitados e mensur´aveis nas estrat´egias. Demonstramos que se um jogo compacto tem resultados uniformemente seguros, ent˜ao sua extens˜ao mista tem resultados seguros.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Weak local Nash equilibrium

In this paper, we consider a concept of local Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games - the so-called weak local Nash equilibrium. We prove its existence for a significantly more general class of sets of strategies than compact convex sets. The theorems on existence of the weak local equilibrium presented here are applications of Brouwer and Lefschetz fixed point theorems. © 2013 Juliusz Schauder Centre for Nonlinear Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University.