Overcoming organisational resistance to sustainability innovations in Australian universities

Sustainability is becoming a guiding paradigm to industries, businesses and our societies. Higher education institutions have the potential to take an active part in creating a sustainable future, due to their moral responsibility, social obligation, and their own needs to adapt to new circumstances. By either signing declarations or making public statements, many universities in Australia have expressed their desires to become role models for enhancing sustainability. However, universities in general have been slow to implement sustainability innovations, sometimes even lagging behind private sectors. Accordingly, there is pressing need to promote innovations on campus in order to drive universities’ sustainability goals. Existing seminal literature tend to focus on technological issues. There has been very little research examining the fundamental problems from an organizational perspective. To address the deficiency, the authors designed and carried out 24 semi-structured interviews to investigate the general organizational environment of Australian universities and to identify organizational resistance to sustainability innovations. Based on the data analysis, a set of strategies to reduce or overcome organizational resistance are explored and developed. The expected outcome of this research is to develop a genetic framework to facilitate supportive decision making for promoting sustainability innovations on campus, as a vital step towards achieving sustainability in universities on a practical level.

Uskonto ilman uskontoa : Radikaalin postmodernin uskonnonfilosofian haaste

Religion without religion. The challenge of radical postmodern philosophy of religion. The aim of this study is to examine the central ideas of Mark C. Taylor, Don Cupitt, and Grace Jantzen on the subject of the philosophy of religion. The method is a qualitative, systematic analysis of the works of the aforementioned philosophers. The purpose is to present, analyze, identify, find connections, and to gain an understanding of the original texts. This thesis shows that radical postmodern religion is “religion without religion”. God is “dead” and the concept of God is seen as “writing”, an ideal, a relationship of meanings or a language. In ethics, there are no objective values or principles. People must create their own morality. Reality is each person´s concept of reality. Language is universal in that language and reality cannot be considered separately. The human subject is contingent and formed in the linguistic and social context. According to postmodern feminism, the ideas that men present as facts are often degrading to women, distort reality and support the power of men. For this reason, we should create a new kind of philosophy of religion and a new language that takes women into consideration. Finally, we will study some philosophers, who have used postmodern ideas in a more moderate manner. In this way, we will look for a balanced solution between modernism and postmodernism. This study shows that the postmodern idea of religion is very different from classical Christianity. Ethics becomes subjective, anarchistic and nihilistic. Epistemology is relativistic and the human being becomes the measure of all things. Objective reality becomes blurry. Language is seen to be game-like, and it has no relation to reality. The moral responsibility of a subject becomes problematic. Science and rationality come into question without the permanent core provided by our consciousness. Women are not in an epistemologically privileged position. The truth claims by either men or women must each be evaluated one at a time. Many postmodern ideas can successfully be made of use if used in moderate manner.

Kuka on potilas? : Suomalaisen sikiöseulontakäytännön sosiaalieettistä tarkastelua

Who is the patient? A social-ethical study of the Finnish practice of prenatal screening. The aim of this study is to examine the Finnish practice of prenatal screening from a social-ethical perspective. Analyzing ethical problems in medicine and medical practice only on a general scale may conceal relevant ethical dilemmas. Previous studies have suggested that many pregnant women view the prenatal screening practices customary in the Finnish maternal care system as intimidating and oppressive. This study analyzes the ethical questions of prenatal screening by focusing on the experiences and decision-making of a pregnant woman. Finnish women s experiences of and decision-making on the most common prenatal screening methods are reflected in the basic principles of biomedical ethics described by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics. To concretize women s experiences I refer to studies of Finnish women s experiences of prenatal screenings. This study shows that the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence seem to materialize rather poorly in the Finnish practice of prenatal screening. The main ethical problem with prenatal screening is that the likelihood of a foetal cure is very limited and, upon detection of an affected foetus, the choice is usually whether to continue with the pregnancy or to undergo an abortion. Although informed consent should be required, women s participation in prenatal testing is, in many cases at least, not based on their active decision. Many women experience severe anxiety when they receive a positive screening result and must wait for the final results. Medical studies indicate that long- term anxiety may negatively influence the foetus and the mother-child relationship. This study shows that the practice of prenatal screening as such may cause more harm than benefit to many pregnant women and their foetuses. This study examines the decision-making process of a pregnant woman by using the theory of medical casuistry described in Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade s Clinical Ethics. This study focuses on each of the four points of view recommended by the theory. The main problem seems to be the question of whom the patient of prenatal screening is and whom the practice is intended to benefit: the mother, the foetus, the family or society? This study shows that the concepts of health in Finnish maternal care in general, and of the prenatal screening system in particular, differ considerably. It also demonstrates that the purpose and the aims of prenatal screening, aside from the woman s right to choose, has been expressed neither in Finnish public health programmes nor in the public recommendations of prenatal screening. This study suggests that the practice of prenatal screening is a statement, though unexpressed, of public health policy and as such comprises part of the policy of disability. This study further demonstrates that through a single explicit aim (the woman s right to choose) society actually evades its obligation to women by saddling pregnant women with the entire moral responsibility as well as the possible negative consequences of her choice, such as sorrow, regrets and moral balancing. The study reveals several ethical problems in the Finnish practice of prenatal screening. Such problems should be dealt with as the Finnish practice of prenatal screening advances.

Corporate social responsibilities of Indian public sector enterprises-a case study of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL)

The high level of public accountability attached to Public Sector Enterprises as a result of public ownership makes them socially responsible. The Committee of Public Undertakings in 1992 examined the issue relating to social obligations of Central Public Sector Enterprises and observed that ``being part of the `State', every Public Sector enterprise has a moral responsibility to play an active role in discharging the social obligations endowed on a welfare state, subject to the financial health of the enterprise''. It issued the Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines in 2010 where all Central Public Enterprises, through a Board Resolution, are mandated to create a CSR budget as a specified percentage of net profit of the previous year. This paper examines the CSR activities of the biggest engineering public sector organization in India, Bharath Heavy Electricals Limited. The objectives are twofold, one, to develop a case study of the organization about the funds allocated and utilized for various CSR activities, and two, to examine its status with regard to other organizations, the 2010 guidelines, and the local socio-economic development. Secondary data analysis results show three interesting trends. One, it reveals increasing organizational social orientation with the formal guidelines in place. Two, Firms can no longer continue to exploit environmental resources and escape from their responsibilities by acting separate entities regardless of the interest of the society and Three the thrust of CSR in public sector is on inclusive growth, sustainable development and capacity building with due attention to the socio-economic needs of the neglected and marginalized sections of the society.

Líderes que no obligan al heroísmo

Resumen: El artículo analiza el principio de subsidiariedad en la dirección de personas y gestión intra-empresa en base a la aplicación propuesta en el documento pontificio La vocación del líder empresarial: una reflexión. En primer lugar, analiza a la empresa y al líder empresarial como agentes sociales que deben practicar una caridad inteligente que contribuya al bien común. Luego, se centra en el diseño organizacional, y en su sistema de incentivos y políticas corporativas y en el debate acerca de la posibilidad de atribuir o no responsabilidad moral a la empresa en tanto grupo humano organizado. La autora postula que si bien la organización actúa muchas veces como condicionante de la libertad de sus integrantes, es importante destacar que esto no debe ser determinante, y que un verdadero líder debe actuar regido por el principio de subsidiariedad

A ipseidade na ética argumentativa de Paul Ricoeur

A ipseidade na ética argumentativa de Paul Ricoeur é a referência básica da hermenêutica do si ao qual sempre retorna. Ela estabelece a constante mediação reflexiva em oposição à pretensa posição imediata do sujeito. A mesmidade do si tem como contrapartida o outro. Na comparação, a mesmidade é sinônimo de identidade-idem em oposição à ipseidade-ipse que inclui a alteridade. Esta inclusão questiona a capacidade do si construtivo da ética e, portanto, responsável jurídica e moralmente nas várias injunções do outro. O projeto ético de Ricoeur é compreensível a partir e dentro de sua peculiar metodologia que ele denomina de dialética entre a ética teleológica e a moral deontológica. Esta dialética se fundamenta na tríade do desejo, do dever e da sabedoria prática em recíproca atividade, privilegiando a dimensão teleológica do desejo da vida boa com o outro e para o outro em instituições justas. A ética argumentativa tem a função de dar conteúdo as duas dialéticas pela inclusão do outro no si mesmo sem o qual a reflexão sobre a ipseidade perderia o sentido. A sabedoria prática da ética e do julgamento moral em situação inclui a discussão porque o conflito é insuperável e determina o argumento para o consenso eventual. Nossa tese é a afirmação da capacidade do si mesmo atuar ações construtivas. Além da critica à ideologia e à utopia, Ricoeur fundamenta a dialética entre o princípio-esperança e o princípio de responsabilidade mediante a via utópica do futuro e a via realista da preocupação com o presente diante dos casos inéditos em que a vida e o ecossistema se associam. A imputação pessoal e coletiva desde o passado, no presente para o futuro é devida à responsabilidade. A ipseidade constrói o futuro no presente através de decisões éticas.

How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent

A prominent criticism of compatibilist theories of moral responsibility is that they do not deal adequately with cases of manipulation, and particularly with induced desires. So, for example, accounts that give the conditions for responsibility in terms of the reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism governing one's decisions, as Fischer and Ravizza (1998) do, seem to leave the door open to cases such as the following.

Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ratent leur cible : un nouveau heaume pour le principe des possibilités alternatives

Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt sont inoffensifs contre l’argument de la conséquence (consequence argument), l’argument qui, à partir du principe des possibilités alternatives et du déterminisme, montre que nous ne pouvons être tenus moralement responsables de nos actions. En effet, ils sont formulés soit dans un cadre déterministe, soit dans un cadre indéterministe. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre indéterministe, ils sont inoffensifs parce qu’ils contreviennent à un principe méthodologique que nous défendons : le principe de non-négation des prémisses (PNNP). En fait, nous montrons que pour tout argument donné, il est proscrit de supposer la négation d’une prémisse afin de réfuter une autre prémisse à moins que l’attaque réussisse à réfuter les deux prémisses en question. Or, d’une part, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes supposent explicitement qu’une prémisse de l’argument de la conséquence – le déterminisme est vrai – est fausse; et d’autre part, ils ne peuvent pas nous donner de raisons de croire en l’indéterminisme, ce que nous montrons grâce à des considérations sur la transmission de la justification. Construire des contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes est donc incorrect pour des raisons méthodologiques et logiques. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre déterministe, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt font face à une autre accusation d’entorse argumentative, présentée dans la défense du dilemme (Dilemma Defence) de Kane-Ginet-Widerker : celle de la pétition de principe. Nous inspectons et nuançons cette accusation, mais concluons qu’elle tient puisque les contre-exemples de Frankfurt déterministes supposent au final une analyse des agents contrefactuels dans les mondes déterministes et de la relation « rendre inévitable » que ne peuvent endosser ni les incompatibilistes de la marge de manœuvre (leeway incompatibilists), ni les incompatibilistes de la source (source incompatibilists) ni non plus les semicompatibilistes. Conséquemment, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ne peuvent plus soutenir la forme de compatibilisme à laquelle ils ont donné naissance. L’incompatibilisme de la source ne peut plus être préféré à l’incompatibilisme de la marge de manœuvre ni non plus rejeter toute participation des possibilités alternatives dans l’explication de la responsabilité morale sur cette seule base.

Judging Culpability in Dwyer’s Climate Change “Gaia Commission”: A Response to Dwyer

Commentaire / Commentary

Una perspectiva de las teorías de la emoción: hacia un estudio de las implicaciones de las emociones en la vida del hombre

En esta monografía se propone que las emociones son una forma de relación con el mundo que implica apreciaciones y creencias del sujeto que las experimenta. Si bien es cierto que el cuerpo humano puede ser considerado como un producto de la evolución y, en general, todas sus funciones necesitan del sustento de dicho cuerpo, cuando hablamos de las emociones debemos hablar de su conexión con el carácter, la voluntad, las escalas de valores y muchos otros factores que no pueden ser explicados a partir de una base como la determinación física, dado que las emociones son una variable indispensable para la organización social y, más específicamente, para la moral. Las emociones son definidas, consecuentemente, como una serie de juicios, basados en prioridades y escalas de valor, que califican y median nuestra relación con los objetos del mundo.

"Padre, perdónalos porque no saben lo que hacen": una perspectiva semi-compatibilista

Si se interpreta la primera palabra de Cristo en la cruz, con referencia a los verdugos que causaron su crucifixión, en clave de omnisciencia divina luterana y ausencia de posibilidades alternativas, surgiría una aparente contradicción en cuanto a la responsabilidad moral y el deber de aquellos: ¿Cómo sostener su responsabilidad moral si no contaban con posibilidades alternativas, y si al parecer no sabían lo que hacían, y cómo atribuirles deberes que no podían cumplir? Esto se puede resolver desde de una perspectiva semi-compatibilista, y responder, así, que: 1) la ausencia de posibilidades alternativas y la ignorancia no excluyen el que los verdugos puedan ser considerados moralmente responsables por la crucifixión de Cristo, y 2) la imposibilidad de cumplir con ciertos deberes no excluye el que los verdugos tuviesen dichos deberes y pudieran ser considerados moralmente responsables por su incumplimiento.

Choices, chance and change: luck egalitarianism over time

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone – if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken – that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support.

A narratological analysis of D. M. Thoma`s: the white hotel (1981)

“A Narratological Analysis of D. M. Thomas’s The White Hotel (1981)” originated within a seminar on British Postmodernist Literature during the first Master’s Degree in “British and North-American Culture and Literature” (2001-04) at the Universidade da Madeira set up by the Department of English and German Studies. This dissertation seeks to present a narratological analysis of Thomas’s novel. The White Hotel stands as a paradigmatic example of the kind of literature that has dominated the British literary scene in the past three decades, commonly referred to as postmodernist fiction, owing to its formal craftsmanship (multiplicity of narrative voices and perspectives, mixing of differing genres and text types, inclusion of embedded narratives) alongside the handling of what are deemed as postmodernist topoi (the distinction between truth and lies, history and fantasy, fact and fiction, the questioning of the nature of aesthetic representation, the role the author and the reader hold in the narrative process, the instability of the linguistic sign, the notion of originality and the moral responsibility the author has towards his/her work), The narratological approach carried out in this research reveals that Thomas’s text constitutes an aesthetic endeavour to challenge the teleological drive that is inherent in any narrative, i. e., the inevitable progression towards a reassuring end. Hence, the subversion of narrative telling, which is a recurrent feature in Thomas’s remaining literary output, mirrors the contemporary distrust in totalising, hierarchised and allencompassing narratives. In its handling of historical events, namely of the Holocaust, The White Hotel invites us to reassess the most profound beliefs we were taught to take for granted: progress, reality and truth. In their place the novel proposes a more flexible conception of both the world and art, especially of literary fiction. In other terms, the world appears as a brutal chaotic place the subject is forced to adjust to. Accordingly, the literary work is deemed hybrid, fragmented and open. So as to put forth the above-mentioned issues, this research work is structured in three main chapters. The initial chapter – “What is Postmodernism?” – advances a scrutiny not only of the seminal but also of more recent studies on postmodernist literary criticism. Following this, in Chapter II – “Postmodernist British Fiction” – a brief overview of postmodernist British fiction is carried out, focusing on the fictional works that, in my opinion, are fundamental for the periodising of British postmodernism. In addition, I felt the need to include a section – “D. M. Thomas as a Postmodernist Novelist” – in which the author’s remaining literary output is briefly examined. Finally, Chapter III – “A Narratological Analysis of The White Hotel” – proposes a narratological analysis of the novel according to the particular Genettian analytical model. To conclude, my dissertation constitutes an approach to D. M. Thomas’s The White Hotel as a text whose very existence is substantiated in the foregrounding of the contingency of all discourses, meeting the postmodernist precepts of openness and subversion of any narrative that claims to be true, globalising and all-inclusive.

Must We Forgive?: Exploring the Limits and Possibilities of Forgiveness and Resentment

Conflict has marked civilization from Biblical times to the present day. Each of us, with our different and competing interests, and our desires to pursue those interests, have over time wronged another person. Not surprisingly then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and groups¿communities, countries, religious groups, races¿yet it is a complex idea that philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and psychologists have grappled with. Some have argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness is often portrayed as a coping mechanism¿how often we hear the phrase, ¿forgive and forget,¿ as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the complications of disagreement. But forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for forgiveness, is counted as an admirable trait and virtue. This essay will explore the nature of forgiveness, which in Christian dogma is often posited as an unqualified virtue. The secular world has appropriated the Christian notion of forgiveness as such a virtue¿but are there instances wherein offering forgiveness is morally inappropriate or dangerous? I will consider the situations in which forgiveness, understood in this essay as the overcoming of resentment, may not be a virtue¿when perhaps maintaining resentment is as virtuous, if not more virtuous, than forgiving. I will explain the various ethical frameworks involved in understanding forgiveness as a virtue, and the relationship between them. I will argue that within Divine Command Theory forgiveness is a virtue¿and thus morally right¿because God commands it. This ethical system has established forgiveness as unconditional, an idea which has been adopted into popular culture. With virtue ethics in mind, which holds virtues to be those traits which benefit the person who possesses them, contributing to the good life, I will argue unqualified forgiveness is not always a virtue, as it will not always benefit the victim. Because there is no way to avoid wrongdoing, humans are confronted with the question of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its relationship to one¿s character¿forgiveness is a concern of all people at some time if for no other reason than the plain fact that the past cannot be undone. I will be evaluating the idea of forgiveness as a virtue, in contrast to its counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to renounce resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? And what happens when a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to reconcile with the Christian (and now, secularized imperative of) forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive? In an attempt to answer that question I will argue that there are indeed times when forgiveness is not a virtue, specifically: when forgiveness compromises one¿s own self-respect; when it is not compatible with respect for the moral community; and when the offender is unapologetic. The kind of offense I have in mind is a dehumanizing one, one that intends to diminish another person¿s worth or humanity. These are moral injuries, to which I will argue resentment is a better response than forgiveness when the three qualifications cannot be met.

Implications of the sustainable development paradigm for Switzerland

The sustainable development paradigm raises issues of global, intra- and intergenerational social equity as well as respect for nature, and economic welfare. Switzerland is confronted by these issues within its own country, and has a moral responsibility vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Syndromes of global change are affecting many eco-regions, not only in developing and transition countries, but to a lesser extent also the affluent countries. Switzerland as a nation has an impact on syndromes through its far-reaching economic activities, which are non-sustainable. At the global level, more modest consumption patterns, a considerably slowed demographic change, a nonconsumptive but sustainable use of natural resources, and conflict transformation are the main prerequisites for improving sustainability. Switzerland's current contribution to sustainability is much less than what it could be, hence the need for additional action along general principles in,accordance with Swiss traditions and innovative potentials. A number of concrete actions could be taken immediately. These are: labelling the socially and ecologically sustainable production of goods and services, and their negotiation at WTO level; enhancing international cooperation and research; strengthening education and research for sustainability, and emphasizing energy and material flux efficiency at home and abroad.