Data Fusion based on Game Theory for Speaker Diarization

A novel algorithm based on bimatrix game theory has been developed to improve the accuracy and reliability of a speaker diarization system. This algorithm fuses the output data of two open-source speaker diarization programs, LIUM and SHoUT, taking advantage of the best properties of each one. The performance of this new system has been tested by means of audio streams from several movies. From preliminary results on fragments of five movies, improvements of 63% in false alarms and missed speech mistakes have been achieved with respect to LIUM and SHoUT systems working alone. Moreover, we also improve in a 20% the number of recognized speakers, getting close to the real number of speakers in the audio stream

Cooperative Multi-robot Patrolling: A study of distributed approaches based on mathematical models of game theory to protect infrastructures

El principio de Teoría de Juegos permite desarrollar modelos estocásticos de patrullaje multi-robot para proteger infraestructuras criticas. La protección de infraestructuras criticas representa un gran reto para los países al rededor del mundo, principalmente después de los ataques terroristas llevados a cabo la década pasada. En este documento el termino infraestructura hace referencia a aeropuertos, plantas nucleares u otros instalaciones. El problema de patrullaje se define como la actividad de patrullar un entorno determinado para monitorear cualquier actividad o sensar algunas variables ambientales. En esta actividad, un grupo de robots debe visitar un conjunto de puntos de interés definidos en un entorno en intervalos de tiempo irregulares con propósitos de seguridad. Los modelos de partullaje multi-robot son utilizados para resolver este problema. Hasta el momento existen trabajos que resuelven este problema utilizando diversos principios matemáticos. Los modelos de patrullaje multi-robot desarrollados en esos trabajos representan un gran avance en este campo de investigación. Sin embargo, los modelos con los mejores resultados no son viables para aplicaciones de seguridad debido a su naturaleza centralizada y determinista. Esta tesis presenta cinco modelos de patrullaje multi-robot distribuidos e impredecibles basados en modelos matemáticos de aprendizaje de Teoría de Juegos. El objetivo del desarrollo de estos modelos está en resolver los inconvenientes presentes en trabajos preliminares. Con esta finalidad, el problema de patrullaje multi-robot se formuló utilizando conceptos de Teoría de Grafos, en la cual se definieron varios juegos en cada vértice de un grafo. Los modelos de patrullaje multi-robot desarrollados en este trabajo de investigación se han validado y comparado con los mejores modelos disponibles en la literatura. Para llevar a cabo tanto la validación como la comparación se ha utilizado un simulador de patrullaje y un grupo de robots reales. Los resultados experimentales muestran que los modelos de patrullaje desarrollados en este trabajo de investigación trabajan mejor que modelos de trabajos previos en el 80% de 150 casos de estudio. Además de esto, estos modelos cuentan con varias características importantes tales como distribución, robustez, escalabilidad y dinamismo. Los avances logrados con este trabajo de investigación dan evidencia del potencial de Teoría de Juegos para desarrollar modelos de patrullaje útiles para proteger infraestructuras. ABSTRACT Game theory principle allows to developing stochastic multi-robot patrolling models to protect critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures protection is a great concern for countries around the world, mainly due to terrorist attacks in the last decade. In this document, the term infrastructures includes airports, nuclear power plants, and many other facilities. The patrolling problem is defined as the activity of traversing a given environment to monitoring any activity or sensing some environmental variables If this activity were performed by a fleet of robots, they would have to visit some places of interest of an environment at irregular intervals of time for security purposes. This problem is solved using multi-robot patrolling models. To date, literature works have been solved this problem applying various mathematical principles.The multi-robot patrolling models developed in those works represent great advances in this field. However, the models that obtain the best results are unfeasible for security applications due to their centralized and predictable nature. This thesis presents five distributed and unpredictable multi-robot patrolling models based on mathematical learning models derived from Game Theory. These multi-robot patrolling models aim at overcoming the disadvantages of previous work. To this end, the multi-robot patrolling problem was formulated using concepts of Graph Theory to represent the environment. Several normal-form games were defined at each vertex of a graph in this formulation. The multi-robot patrolling models developed in this research work have been validated and compared with best ranked multi-robot patrolling models in the literature. Both validation and comparison were preformed by using both a patrolling simulator and real robots. Experimental results show that the multirobot patrolling models developed in this research work improve previous ones in as many as 80% of 150 cases of study. Moreover, these multi-robot patrolling models rely on several features to highlight in security applications such as distribution, robustness, scalability, and dynamism. The achievements obtained in this research work validate the potential of Game Theory to develop patrolling models to protect infrastructures.

A game theory based strategy for reducing energy consumption in cognitive WSN

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are one of the most important users of wireless communication technologies in the coming years and some challenges in this area must be addressed for their complete development. Energy consumption and spectrum availability are two of the most severe constraints of WSNs due to their intrinsic nature. The introduction of cognitive capabilities into these networks has arisen to face the issue of spectrum scarcity but could be used to face energy challenges too due to their new range of communication possibilities. In this paper a new strategy based on game theory for cognitive WSNs is discussed. The presented strategy improves energy consumption by taking advantage of the new change-communication-channel capability. Based on game theory, the strategy decides when to change the transmission channel depending on the behavior of the rest of the network nodes. The strategy presented is lightweight but still has higher energy saving rates as compared to noncognitive networks and even to other strategies based on scheduled spectrum sensing. Simulations are presented for several scenarios that demonstrate energy saving rates of around 65% as compared to WSNs without cognitive techniques.

Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games

We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.

Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory

Recent theoretical advances have dramatically increased the relevance of game theory for predicting human behavior in interactive situations. By relaxing the classical assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect foresight, we obtain much improved explanations of initial decisions, dynamic patterns of learning and adjustment, and equilibrium steady-state distributions.

Game theory and programming; National Science Foundation summer mathematics institute notes.

Bibliography: leaves [87]-[88]

Stochastic dynamic programming for election timing: A game theory approach

In this paper, we consider dynamic programming for the election timing in the majoritarian parliamentary system such as in Australia, where the government has a constitutional right to call an early election. This right can give the government an advantage to remain in power for as long as possible by calling an election, when its popularity is high. On the other hand, the opposition's natural objective is to gain power, and it will apply controls termed as "boosts" to reduce the chance of the government being re-elected by introducing policy and economic responses. In this paper, we explore equilibrium solutions to the government, and the opposition strategies in a political game using stochastic dynamic programming. Results are given in terms of the expected remaining life in power, call and boost probabilities at each time at any level of popularity.

Cooperation in an HMMS-type supply chain: A management application of cooperative game theory = Kooperáció egy HMMS-típusú ellátási láncban: A kooperatív játékelmélet egy menedzsment alkalmazása

We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by the weighted Shapley value, by a transferable utility cooperative game theory tool, where the weights are for the exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the participants of the supply chain. = A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy Holt-Mogigliani-Muth-Simon-típusú ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy kvadratikus készletezési és termelési költség mellett. Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a releváns költségeit. Két működési rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor először a termelő, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevők ebben a transzferálható hasznosságú kooperatív játékban a költség megtakarítást, exogén módon adott tárgyalási pozíció mellett.

Climate change in game theory context

The aim of this paper is to survey the game theory modelling of the behaviour of global players in mitigation and adaptation related to climate change. Three main fields are applied for the specific aspects of temperature rise: behaviour games, CPR problem and negotiation games. The game theory instruments are useful in analyzing strategies in uncertain circumstances, such as the occurrence and impacts of climate change. To analyze the international players’ relations, actions, attitude toward carbon emission, negotiation power and motives, several games are applied for the climate change in this paper. The solution is surveyed, too, for externality problem.

Climate change in game theory

The study provides an overview of the application possibilities of game theory to climate change. The characteristics of games are adapted to the topics of climate and carbon. The importance of uncertainty, probability, marginal value of adaptation, common pool resources, etc. are tailored to the context of international relations and the challenge of global warming.

Modeling security and cooperation in wireless networks using game theory

This research involves the design, development, and theoretical demonstration of models resulting in integrated misbehavior resolution protocols for ad hoc networked devices. Game theory was used to analyze strategic interaction among independent devices with conflicting interests. Packet forwarding at the routing layer of autonomous ad hoc networks was investigated. Unlike existing reputation based or payment schemes, this model is based on repeated interactions. To enforce cooperation, a community enforcement mechanism was used, whereby selfish nodes that drop packets were punished not only by the victim, but also by all nodes in the network. Then, a stochastic packet forwarding game strategy was introduced. Our solution relaxed the uniform traffic demand that was pervasive in other works. To address the concerns of imperfect private monitoring in resource aware ad hoc networks, a belief-free equilibrium scheme was developed that reduces the impact of noise in cooperation. This scheme also eliminated the need to infer the private history of other nodes. Moreover, it simplified the computation of an optimal strategy. The belief-free approach reduced the node overhead and was easily tractable. Hence it made the system operation feasible. Motivated by the versatile nature of evolutionary game theory, the assumption of a rational node is relaxed, leading to the development of a framework for mitigating routing selfishness and misbehavior in Multi hop networks. This is accomplished by setting nodes to play a fixed strategy rather than independently choosing a rational strategy. A range of simulations was carried out that showed improved cooperation between selfish nodes when compared to older results. Cooperation among ad hoc nodes can also protect a network from malicious attacks. In the absence of a central trusted entity, many security mechanisms and privacy protections require cooperation among ad hoc nodes to protect a network from malicious attacks. Therefore, using game theory and evolutionary game theory, a mathematical framework has been developed that explores trust mechanisms to achieve security in the network. This framework is one of the first steps towards the synthesis of an integrated solution that demonstrates that security solely depends on the initial trust level that nodes have for each other.^

A vaccination game based on public health actions and personal decisions

Susceptible-infective-removed (SIR) models are commonly used for representing the spread of contagious diseases. A SIR model can be described in terms of a probabilistic cellular automaton (PCA), where each individual (corresponding to a cell of the PCA lattice) is connected to others by a random network favoring local contacts. Here, this framework is employed for investigating the consequences of applying vaccine against the propagation of a contagious infection, by considering vaccination as a game, in the sense of game theory. In this game, the players are the government and the susceptible newborns. In order to maximize their own payoffs, the government attempts to reduce the costs for combating the epidemic, and the newborns may be vaccinated only when infective individuals are found in their neighborhoods and/or the government promotes an immunization program. As a consequence of these strategies supported by cost-benefit analysis and perceived risk, numerical simulations show that the disease is not fully eliminated and the government implements quasi-periodic vaccination campaigns. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.