Tendering ethics : a study of collusive tendering from a marketing perspective

This thesis provides a behavioural perspective to the problem of collusive tendering in the construction market by examining the decision making factors of individuals potentially involved in such agreements using marketing ethics theory and techniques. The findings of a cross disciplinary literature review were synthesised into a model of factors theoretically expected to determine the individual's behavioural intent towards a set of collusive tendering agreements and the means of reaching them. The factors were grouped as internal cognitive (the individuals' value systems) and affective (demographic and psychographic characteristics) as well as external environmental (legal, industrial and organisational codes and norms) and situational (company, market and economic conditions). The model was tested using empirical data collected through a questionnaire survey of estimators employed in the largest Australian construction firms. All forms of explicit collusive tendering agreements were considered as having a prohibitive moral content by the majority of respondents who also clearly differentiated between agreements and discussions of contract terms (which they found to be a moral concern but not prohibitive) or of prices. The comparisons between those of the respondents that would never participate in a collusive agreement and the potential offenders clearly showed two distinctly different groups. The law abiding estimators are less reliant on situational factors, happier and more comfortable in their work environments and they live according to personal value and belief systems. The potential offenders on the other hand are mistrustful of colleagues, feel their values are not respected, put company priorities above principles and none of them is religious or a member of a professional body. The research results indicate that Australian estimators are, overall law abiding and principled and accept the existing codification of collusion as morally defensible and binding. Professional bodies' and organisational codes of conduct as well as personal value and belief systems that guide one's own conduct appear to be deterrents to collusive tendering intent and so are moral comfort and work satisfaction. These observations are potential indicators of areas where intervention and behaviour modification can increase individuals' resistance to collusion.

How nonprofit boards monitor, judge and influence organisational performance

The law and popular opinion expect boards of directors will actively monitor their organisations. Further, public opinion is that boards should have a positive impact on organisational performance. However, the processes of board monitoring and judgment are poorly understood, and board influence on organisational performance needs to be better understood. This thesis responds to the repeated calls to open the ‘black box’ linking board practices and organisational performance by investigating the processual behaviours of boards. The work of four boards1 of micro and small-sized nonprofit organisations were studied for periods of at least one year, using a processual research approach, drawing on observations of board meetings, interviews with directors, and the documents of the boards. The research shows that director turnover, the difficulty recruiting and engaging directors, and the administration of reporting, had strong impacts upon board monitoring, judging and/or influence. In addition, board monitoring of organisational performance was adversely affected by directors’ limited awareness of their legal responsibilities and directors’ limited financial literacy. Directors on average found all sources of information about their organisation’s work useful. Board judgments about the financial aspects of organisational performance were regulated by the routines of financial reporting. However, there were no comparable routines facilitating judgments about non-financial performance, and such judgments tended to be limited to specific aspects of performance and were ad hoc, largely in response to new information or the repackaging of existing information in a new form. The thesis argues that Weick’s theory of sensemaking offers insight into the way boards went about the task of understanding organisational performance. Board influence on organisational performance was demonstrated in the areas of: compliance; instrumental influence through service and through discussion and decision-making; and by symbolic, legitimating and protective means. The degree of instrumental influence achieved by boards depended on director competency, access to networks of influence, and understandings of board roles, and by the agency demonstrated by directors. The thesis concludes that there is a crowding out effect whereby CEO competence and capability limits board influence. The thesis also suggests that there is a second ‘agency problem’, a problem of director volition. The research potentially has profound implications for the work of nonprofit boards. Rather than purporting to establish a general theory of board governance, the thesis embraces calls to build situation-specific mini-theories about board behaviour.