860 resultados para teaching of philosophy
Resumo:
Since the late 1990’s, a group of moral doctrines called prioritarianism has received a lot of interest from many moral philosophers. Many contemporary moral philosophers are attracted to prioritarianism to such an extent that they can be called prioritarians. In this book, however, I reject prioritarianism, including not only “pure” prioritarianism but also hybrid prioritarian views which mix one or more non-prioritarian elements with prioritarianism. This book largely revolves around certain problems and complications of prioritarianism and its particular forms. Those problems and complications are connected to risk, impartiality, the arbitrariness of prioritarian weightings and possible future individuals. On the one hand, I challenge prioritarianism through targeted objections to various specific forms of prioritarianism. All those targeted objections are connected to risk or possible future individuals. It seems to me that together they give good grounds for believing that prioritarianism is not the way to go. On the other hand, I challenge prioritarianism by pointing out and discussing certain general problems of prioritarianism. Those general problems are connected to impartiality and the arbitrariness of prioritarian weightings. They may give additional grounds for believing that all prioritarian views should be rejected. Prioritarianism can be seen as a type of weighted utilitarianism and thus as an extension of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is morally ultimately concerned, and morally ultimately concerned only, with some kind of maximization of utility or expected utility. Prioritarianism, on the other hand, is morally ultimately concerned, and morally ultimately concerned only, with some kind of maximization of priority-weighted utility, expected priority-weighted utility or priority-weighted expected utility. Thus prioritarianism, unlike utilitarianism, is a distribution-sensitive moral view. Besides rejecting prioritarianism, I reject also various other distribution-sensitive moral views in this book. However, I do not reject distribution-sensitivity in morality, as I end up endorsing a type of distribution-sensitive hybrid utilitarianism which mixes non-utilitarian elements with utilitarianism.
Resumo:
It is common that people disagree on a question which athlete or team was the best in a particular sport competition. This thesis attempts to clarify these disputes by analysing the concept of betterness in the context of sport competitions. Betterness can be interpersonal, intrapersonal or a combination of the two. I focus on interpersonal betterness, that is, on superiority. For example, interpersonal betterness may be contested in a football match between the national teams of Germany and Argentina. My aim is to provide a philosophical account of interpersonal betterness. The account has two functions: descriptive and normative. It describes the shapes and forms in which superiority is instantiated in sport competitions. It also provides a consistent and accurate way to discuss superiority. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first part, I introduce, elaborate and illustrate my account, which in turn consists of three elements: (1) relations of superiority, (2) standards for the relations of superiority and (3) types of competition. I also discuss my account’s relevance to issues of sport ethics through the example of gender equity and women’s ski jumping. I conclude that this account will not end the disputes over which team or athlete was better in a particular competition. Instead, it provides tools for a more consistent discussion of the disputed issues. The second part of the thesis includes five reprinted original articles. The account presented in the first part is based on these publications.
Resumo:
Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, shapes, sounds, touches, tastes and smells. According to the appearance/reality distinction, the world of perception is the apparent realm, not the real external world. However, the distinction does not necessarily refute the existence of the external world. We have a causal connection with the external world via mind-internal particulars, and therefore we have indirect knowledge about the external world through perceptual experience. The research especially concerns the reasons for George Berkeley’s claim that material things are mind-dependent ideas that really are perceived. The necessity of a perceiver’s own qualities for perceptual experience, such as mind, consciousness, and the brain, supports the causal theory of perception. Finally, it is asked why mind-internal entities are present when perceiving an object. Perception would not directly discern material objects without the presupposition of extra entities located between a perceiver and the external world. Nevertheless, the results show that perception is not sufficient to know what a perceptual object is, and that the existence of appearances is necessary to know that the external world is being perceived. However, the impossibility of matter does not follow from Berkeley’s theory. The main result of the research is that singular knowledge claims about the external world never refer directly and immediately to the objects of the external world. A perceiver’s own qualities affect how perceptual objects appear in a perceptual situation.
Resumo:
Global climate change and intentional climate modification, i.e. geoengineering include various ethical problems which are entangled as a complex ensemble of questions regarding the future of the biosphere. The possibilities of catastrophic effects of climate change which are also called “climate emergency” have led to the emergence of the idea of modifying the atmospheric conditions in the form of geoengineering. The novel issue of weather ethics is a subdivision of climate ethics, and it is interested in ethical and political questions surrounding weather and climate control and modification in a restricted spatio-temporal scale. The objective of geoengineering is to counterbalance the adverse effects of climate change and its diverse corollaries in various ways on a large scale. The claim of this dissertation is that there are ethical justifications to claim that currently large-scale interventions to the climate system are ethically questionable. The justification to pursue geoengineering on the basis of considering its pros and cons, is inadequate. Moral judgement can still be elaborated in cases where decisions have to be made urgently and the selection of desirable choices is severely limited. The changes needed to avoid severe negative impacts of climate change requires commitment to mitigation as well as social changes because technical solutions cannot address the issue of climate change altogether. The quantitative emphasis of consumerism should shift to qualitative focus on the aspiration for simplicity in order to a move towards the objective of the continuation of the existence of humankind and a flourishing, vital biosphere.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College.
Resumo:
In this thesis, I argue that there are public cultural reasons that can underpin public justifications of minority rights of indigenous and national minorities in a constitutionaldemocracy. I do so by tackling diverse issues facing a liberal theory of multiculturalism. In the first essay, I criticize Will Kymlicka’s comprehensive liberal theory of minority rights and propose a political liberal alternative. The main problem of Will Kymlicka’s theory is that it builds on the contestable liberal value of individual autonomy and thus fails to take diversity seriously. In the second essay, I elaborate on the Rawlsian political liberalism assumed here by criticizing Chandran Kukathas’s version of political liberalism as overly accommodating to diversity. In the third essay, I discuss questions of method that arise for a political liberal approach to the moral-political foundations of multiculturalism, and propose a certain understanding of the political liberal enterprise and its crucial standard of reasonableness. In the fourth essay, I dwell on the political liberal ethic of citizenship and propose a strongly inclusionist interpretation of the duty of civility. In the fifth and last essay, I introduce a certain understanding of ethnocultural justice and propose a view on certain cultural reasons as public cultural reasons. Cultural reasons are public when they are based on necessarily established cultural marks of a democratic polity, as specified by the cultural establishment view; and when they are crucial for the societal cultural bases of self-respect of citizens. The arguments in this thesis support, and help to spell out, moral-political rights of indigenous and national minorities as formulated in international legal documents, such as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations 2007) or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 1966).
Resumo:
The present contribute aims to reconstruct, using the methodology of intellectual history, the broad spectrum of metaphysical doctrines that Kant could know during the years of the formation of his philosophy. The first part deals with the teaching of metaphysics in Königsberg from 1703 to 1770. The second part examines the main characteristics of the metaphysics in the various handbooks, which were taught at the Albertina, in order to have an exhaustive overview of all metaphysical positions.
Resumo:
The role of animals in the philosophy of mind is primarily to help understand the human mind by serving as practical examples of cognition that differs from ours either in kind or in degree. Kant regarded animals as beings that only have the faculty of sensibility. By examining what Kant writes about animal experience we gain knowledge concerning the role of sensibility in experience, free from the influence of understanding and reason. I look at Kant’s view of animals in the historical context of alternative views presented by Descartes’ and Hume’s views. Kant’s view can be seen as a counterargument against Descartes’ doctrine of animal machines according to which animals do not have minds and they do not think. I suggest that while it can be argued that some kind of elementary experience could be possible in the physiological level, this only makes sense when it is possible to become conscious of the unconscious sensation, and this requires a mind. A further option is to claim that there is only a difference in degree between human and animal cognitive capacities. This is Hume’s view. I argue that even though Kant’s and Hume’s view on the cognitive capacities of animals seems to depart from each other to a considerable extent, the differences between them diminish when the focus is on the experience these capacities enable. I also briefly discuss the relation of the metaphysics of animal minds to animal ethics.