Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly

In a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibria. Subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model. In the presence of intense multiproduct activity, and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms, strategies tend to confirm the non-cooperative multiproduct solution.

Multi-Objective and Financial Portfolio Optimization of Carrier-Sense Multiple Access Protocols with Cooperative Diversity

8th International Workshop on Multiple Access Communications (MACOM2015), Helsinki, Finland.

La ricerca del valore nell'impresa cooperativa di lavorazione e trasformazione: cooperative e imprese capitalistiche a confronto

La ricerca si propone un duplice obbiettivo: 1. provare, attraverso l’applicazione di un metodo teorico tradizionale di analisi economico-finanziaria, il livello ottimale di equilibrio finanziario fra accesso al credito esterno e capitale proprio; 2. mostrare l’utilità di alcuni strumenti finanziari partecipativi per la ricapitalizzazione dell’impresa cooperativa. Oggetto di studio è l’impresa cooperativa che si occupa di una o più fasi del processo di lavorazione, trasformazione e prima commercializzazione del prodotto agricolo conferito dai soci, confrontata con le imprese di capitali che svolgono la medesima attività. La società cooperativa e quella capitalistica saranno, pertanto analizzate in termini di liquidità generata, redditività prodotta e grado di indebitamento, attraverso il calcolo e l’analisi di una serie di indici, tratti dai rispettivi bilanci d’esercizio. È opportuno sottolineare che nella seguente trattazione sarà riservato uno spazio al tema della ricerca del valore nell’impresa cooperativa inteso come espressione della ricchezza creata dai processi aziendali in un determinato periodo di tempo tentando di definire, se esiste, una struttura finanziaria ottimale , ossia uno specifico rapporto tra indebitamento finanziario e mezzi propri, che massimizzi il valore dell’impresa. L’attenzione verso la struttura finanziaria, pertanto, non sarà solo rivolta al costo esplicito del debito o dell’equity, ma si estenderà anche alle implicazioni delle scelte di finanziamento sulle modalità di governo dell’impresa. Infatti molti studi di economia aziendale, e in particolar modo di gestione d’impresa e finanza aziendale, hanno trattato il tema dell’attività di governo dell’impresa, quale elemento in grado di contribuire alla creazione di valore non solo attraverso la selezione dei progetti d’investimento ma anche attraverso la composizione della struttura finanziaria.

Energy efficient adaptive cooperative communications in wireless sensor networks

Energy efficiency is one of the most important performances of a wireless sensor network. In this paper, we show that choosing a proper transmission scheme given the channel and network conditions can ensure a high energy performance in different transmission environments. Based on the energy models we established for both cooperative and non-cooperative communications, the efficiency in terms of energy consumption per bit for different transmission schemes is investigated. It is shown that cooperative transmission schemes can outperform non-cooperative schemes in energy efficiency in severe channel conditions and when the source-destination distance is in a medium or long range. But the latter is more energy efficient than the former for short-range transmission. For cooperative transmission schemes, the number of transmission branches and the number of relays per branch can also be properly selected to adapt to the variations of the transmission environment, so that the total energy consumption can be minimized.

Evaluation of the Efficacy of a Dental Plaque Control Program in Autistic Patients

The aim of this study was to verify the efficacy of a programme for dental plaque control in autistics. Patients were evaluated on five occasions over a period of 180 days using the following instruments: OHI-S, DMF-T, the Fonnes brushing technique and diet questionnaire. Participants were divided into two groups according to level of co-operation on the programme: Group A (co-operative) and Group B (non-cooperative). A statistically significant improvement (p < 0.001) in Oral Hygiene was attained, with 84.2% showing regular or satisfactory hygiene at study end-point. Conclusion: Groups A and B both showed improvement in hygiene (p < 0.001 and p = 0.004), but improvement was significantly higher among co-operative patients (p < 0.001 at 180 days), who also had a higher mean age (p = 0.02).

Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

O regime fiscal cooperativo – análise crítica e desafios

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação de Doutora Deolinda Meira e Doutora Nina Aguiar

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.

Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.