Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
09/05/2006
|
| Resumo |
We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options. |
| Formato |
23 982591 bytes application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Relação |
Working papers; 533.02 |
| Direitos |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l’institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Negociacions -- Models matemàtics #Mercat -- Anàlisi |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
