Quo vadis regulador? Uma análise das trajetórias profissionais e políticas dos reguladores estaduais no Brasil.

As agências reguladoras independentes (ARIs) foram instituídas para regular serviços públicos e setores econômicos e sociais, nas três esferas de governo. Providas de autonomia decisória, administrativa e financeira, com mandatos fixos para seus dirigentes e não coincidentes com os do Executivo, possuem uma “identidade” própria a fim de garantir a independência inerente à atividade da regulação. Partindo da premissa que a qualidade de regulações depende da qualidade dos reguladores, principais tomadores de decisão no âmbito das agências reguladoras, o presente estudo buscou compreender algumas dimensões importantes relacionadas à autonomia tal como esta se manifesta na prática: os níveis de expertise dos reguladores e a dinâmica de captura dos mesmos. Com este fim, foi construído um banco de dados com informações relativas aos reguladores estaduais, destacando características relacionadas com as ARIs e características individuais dos reguladores, desde áreas de formação, experiência prévia e cursos de pós, conduções e reconduções de mandato, até a colocação profissional pós-agência. A análise, de natureza descritiva, indica que quase 50% dos reguladores estaduais são engenheiros e economistas, o resto se distribuindo entre várias profissões, com destaque para a área de direito, indicando uma tradição legalista nas ARIs brasileiras. Boa parte dos indicados para assumir o cargo de dirigente comprova experiência prévia no setor regulado. Entretanto, a expertise difere de acordo com a região do país e o tipo de agência reguladora, sendo menor na região norte e maior na região sudeste, onde também predominam agências mais especializadas unissetorial ou bissetorial. Também se observa a tendência de criação de uma rede de regulocratas: reguladores que se destacam por uma trajetória profissional entre agências. Quando os dados são olhados a partir das teorias de captura, destaca-se que, diferentemente dos reguladores norte-americanos, a maior parte dos reguladores estaduais permanece no setor público após o cargo na diretoria colegiada. As conduções e reconduções partidárias indicam predominância de partidos como PSDB e PMDB, contudo percebe-se que as reconduções acontecem independente de corrente partidária, indicando a solidez do modelo brasileiro.

Os limites do desenho institucional: uma investigação empírica dos mecanismos da influência presidencial sobre as agências reguladoras independentes no Governo Federal brasileiro

O trabalho investiga empiricamente o tema da influência presidencial sobre as agências reguladoras independentes (ARIs) no Governo Federal brasileiro, no período 1997-2014, como foco nos processos de nomeação para os cargos de direção destes órgãos, por meio de um método misto de caráter sequencial, combinando técnicas qualitativas e quantitativas. Primeiramente, utilizando a técnica do process tracing, uma análise histórico-comparativa da gênese e consolidação das dez ARIs federais no Brasil busca demonstrar a importância das hipóteses do credible commitment e da emulação institucional como variáveis explicativas da adoção do modelo. Em seguida, a influência política presidencial sobre as ARIs é mensurada analisando-se o padrão das vacâncias de cargos de direção, taxas de conclusão de mandato, bem, como o processo de aprovação das indicações presidenciais pelo Senado Federal. Por fim, são analisados os dados empíricos relativos ao perfil dos nomeados para cargos de direção nas ARIs no período estudado, incluindo variáveis como filiação partidária e qualificação profissional, buscando-se ainda verificar indícios de existência de trade-off entre estas duas dimensões.

Os conflitos de competência normativa do estado regulador brasileiro no setor administrado pela ANP

The dissertation has by objective describe the administrative activity of regulation exercised by independent regulatory agencies, observing that this activity was already done before this structures creation, however, after a really deep administrative reform that had as objective built a Public Administration with more efficiency, it passed to be done with some own peculiarities of these new structures of regulation. The work gave especial attention to what concern the conflicts of normative competency that really often happen between ANP (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis) and the legislatives organs of the Republic Federative of Brazil, because energetic area has unbelievable mater to any country, and the fact of some juridical norm be against the law and be accepted is very dangerous, it affronts the constitutional principle of the legality e may put in risk the democratic Estate of law, them, regulatory dogmatic must be scientifically knows, and developed, thought and especially there are so many doctrinaires divergences about regulation constitutionality. As a theorist point, the investigation got the Logical nocontradiction principle, according Hans Kelsen and Lourival Vilanova thought, doing a philosophical reflection about the system of positive law, in which there are many antinomies, or conflicts of norms, what include the conflicts of the administrative acts expedited by ANP and the legislation of the brazilian regulatory Estate. For a better understanding and exemplify some perplexities treated by the doctrinaire angle, this work did a lucubration about a possibility of a normative conflict between a ANP resolution and the municipal legislation in a specific case, also, brought several jurisprudences for the brazilians courts of justice, that confirm the empiric existence of normative conflicts among ANP s administrative norms and federal legislation. Finally, concludes observing that the regulation is not a legislative competency delegation to regulatory agencies, is just a new exercise of the administrative function, it is a technical specialization of the public administration, that using this know-how can acting with more efficiency, however the normative power of regulatory agencies must respect the empire of law, so in this terms, the dissertation suggests the ponderation of the constitutionals principles of efficiency and legality how form to harmonizing the democratic legitimate inherent to legal norm supremacy, with the perspective of an efficient economic and institutional development

A Competência normativa das agências reguladoras e seus limites principiológicos no direito brasileiro

The transition of the liberal state to welfare state, globalization and the crisis of funding from the government spending on the multiple roles demanded an overhaul of the means of intervention in the economic domain and structure organizational of the Public Administration by enhancing the performance of regulatory functions. Therefore appear in Brazilian law independent regulatory agencies with legal administrative particular that gives autonomy increased, with fixed terms and stability of its leaders, police and competencies, normative and administrative judges. In this scenario, given the autonomy granted by the laws of the creation of regulatory agencies, the legislative competence becomes the most contentious issue, as not infrequently is innovation in the legal system. The main foundations of innovative extension producible by regulatory agencies, which diverges doctrine, are the constitutional attribution of own competence of the Public Administration and the discretionary power. Thus, it is necessary to delimit the constitutional and legal foundations of special legislative powers of these autarchies in our legal system, seeking ways to limit and control the production rules of those entities, for the purpose of position them before the powers constitutionally constituted. We note that with the constitutionalisation of administrative law regulatory agencies found limits to its performance in the normative constitutional principles, especially through the principles of efficiency, morality and proportionality, which has enabled a more effective control of their normative acts

Democracia participativa e regulação econômica: uma questão de legitimidade

This work presents an analysis about the legitimation of independent regulatory commission`s rulemaking power by participation procedure. It is observed that political and administrative decentralization and fragmentation of State, with the purpose of approaching citizens and provide, more efficiently, the functions acquired by the passage of the Welfare State, leads to a deficit of legitimacy (democratic crisis), which is noticeable in the making of legal norms by directors of independent regulatory commission to regulate specific economic sector. However, we understand that this crisis stems from the observation of the contemporary world from dogmas and legal institutions of the eighteenth century, without their evolution and adaptation to the modern world. The legitimacy must be perceived as the justification of power, relation command /obedience, which, from the Modern State, has the democracy as standard. Therefore, just as the world has evolved and demanded political and administrative decentralization to accompany him, it is necessary to the development of the idea of representative democracy (formal legitimacy) to participatory democracy (legitimacy stuff). Legitimacy is not confused with the legality: as the legality is on observance to internal legal system, the "rules of play"; legitimacy, as inputs to be fed into this system, the selection of the different expectations in the environment. Nevertheless, the legitimacy will take place by legality, through introduction of rational and communicative procedures: procedures get fundamental importance because these will be the means to select the expectations to be introduced in the legal system in order to make decisions more fair, rational and qualified towards society. Thus, it is necessary to its opening to the environment for dialogue with the government. In this context, we try to make an analysis of constitutional norms based on systematic and teleological interpretation of these norms to build these arguments. According to the Constitution of 1988, participatory democracy is a result of the democratic principle (sole paragraph of art. 1 of the Constitution), and it is an expression of citizenship and political pluralism, both foundations of Republic (respectively Art. 1st, inc . V and II of the Constitution), as well as the national consciousness. From another point of view, that principle consists of an evolution in the management public affairs (principle of Republic). The right of interested participate in the rulemaking process derives both the principle of popular participation (part of the democratic principle) and the republican principle as the due process constitutional (art. 5, LIV and LV, CF/88) and the right to petition (Art . 5 °, inc. XXXIV, "a", CF/88), and it is the duty of the State not only be open to participation and encourage it. Ignoring stakeholder involvement in procedures and / or expressions compiled can be causes of invalidation of the rule of law produced by addiction of procedure, motive, motivation and/or because of the administrative act. Finally, we conclude that the involvement of stakeholders in the process of making rules within the independent regulatory commission is the legitimacy and the validity of rules; and that, despite of the expressions do not bind the decision making, they will enter the system as juridical fact, balancing the field of technical discretionary of agencies

The stakes of politics and electoral administration : a comparative study of Southeast Asian democracies

Elections play a crucial role in political stability in post-democratization, and electoral administrations are the key to the electoral process. However, not all newly democratized countries have established reliable electoral administration. New democracies in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, have independent election commissions which have different characteristics, especially in terms of neutrality. Based on three cases, this paper claims that the stakes of politics are the major determinant of the variations in neutrality. The high stakes of politics in Thailand brought about the partisan election commission, while the low stakes in Indonesia made the electoral system relatively neutral. Like Thailand, the high stakes of politics in the Philippines also cause political intervention in the electoral administration.

PipX, the coactivator of NtcA, is a global regulator in cyanobacteria

To modulate the expression of genes involved in nitrogen assimilation, the cyanobacterial PII-interacting protein X (PipX) interacts with the global transcriptional regulator NtcA and the signal transduction protein PII, a protein found in all three domains of life as an integrator of signals of the nitrogen and carbon balance. PipX can form alternate complexes with NtcA and PII, and these interactions are stimulated and inhibited, respectively, by 2-oxoglutarate, providing a mechanistic link between PII signaling and NtcA-regulated gene expression. Here, we demonstrate that PipX is involved in a much wider interaction network. The effect of pipX alleles on transcript levels was studied by RNA sequencing of S. elongatus strains grown in the presence of either nitrate or ammonium, followed by multivariate analyses of relevant mutant/control comparisons. As a result of this process, 222 genes were classified into six coherent groups of differentially regulated genes, two of which, containing either NtcA-activated or NtcA-repressed genes, provided further insights into the function of NtcA–PipX complexes. The remaining four groups suggest the involvement of PipX in at least three NtcA-independent regulatory pathways. Our results pave the way to uncover new regulatory interactions and mechanisms in the control of gene expression in cyanobacteria.

Public utilities reports.

Editors: 1915-46, H.C. Spurr; 1946-<54> E. Nichols (with H.C. Spurr, 1946-<54>).

Independent mobility of catalytic and regulatory domains of myosin heads

The recent determination of the myosin head atomic structure has led to a new model of muscle contraction, according to which mechanical torque is generated in the catalytic domain and amplified by the lever arm made of the regulatory domain [Fisher, A. J., Smith, C. A., Thoden, J., Smith, R., Sutoh, K., Holden, H. M. & Rayment, I. (1995) Biochemistry 34, 8960–8972]. A crucial aspect of this model is the ability of the regulatory domain to move independently of the catalytic domain. Saturation transfer–EPR measurements of mobility of these two domains in myosin filaments give strong support for this notion. The catalytic domain of the myosin head was labeled at Cys-707 with indane dione spin label; the regulatory domain was labeled at the single cysteine residue of the essential light chain and exchanged into myosin. The mobility of the regulatory domain in myosin filaments was characterized by an effective rotational correlation time (τR) between 24 and 48 μs. In contrast, the mobility of the catalytic domain was found to be τR = 5–9 μs. This difference in mobility between the two domains existed only in the filament form of myosin. In the monomeric form, or when bound to actin, the mobility of the two domains in myosin was indistinguishable, with τR = 1–4 μs and >1,000 μs, respectively. Therefore, the observed difference in filaments cannot be ascribed to differences in local conformations of the spin-labeled sites. The most straightforward interpretation suggests a flexible hinge between the two domains, which would have to stiffen before force could be generated.

Major recent and independent changes in levels and patterns of expression have occurred at the b gene, a regulatory locus in maize

The b locus encodes a transcription factor that regulates the expression of genes that produce purple anthocyanin pigment. Different b alleles are expressed in distinct tissues, causing tissue-specific anthocyanin production. Understanding how phenotypic diversity is produced and maintained at the b locus should provide models for how other regulatory genes, including those that influence morphological traits and development, evolve. We have investigated how different levels and patterns of pigmentation have evolved by determining the phenotypic and evolutionary relationships between 18 alleles that represent the diversity of b alleles in Zea mays. Although most of these alleles have few phenotypic differences, five alleles have very distinct tissue-specific patterns of pigmentation. Superimposing the phenotypes on the molecular phylogeny reveals that the alleles with strong and distinctive patterns of expression are closely related to alleles with weak expression, implying that the distinctive patterns have arisen recently. We have identified apparent insertions in three of the five phenotypically distinct alleles, and the fourth has unique upstream restriction fragment length polymorphisms relative to closely related alleles. The insertion in B-Peru has been shown to be responsible for its unique expression and, in the other two alleles, the presence of the insertion correlates with the phenotype. These results suggest that major changes in gene expression are probably the result of large-scale changes in DNA sequence and/or structure most likely mediated by transposable elements.

Department of Housing and Urban Development, and certain independent agencies appropriations for fiscal year 1984 : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, on H.R. 3133, an act making appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes.

Item 1033, 1033-A (microfiche).

Independent offices appropriation bill for 1935. : Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Seventy-third Congress, second session, on H.R. 6663, a bill making appropriations for the executive office and sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, and offices for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1935, and for other purposes.

Carter Glass, chairman of subcommittee.

Independent offices appropriation bill for 1942. : Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, on H.R. 2788, a bill making appropriations for the Executive Office and sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, and offices for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1942, and for other purposes.

Carter Glass, chairman.

Regulatory multiplicities in telecommunications reforms in Indonesia and China

Telecommunications is a key component in any country's economic infrastructure, requiring a vast amount of capital injection and ongoing technical support and innovation. Many developing countries experience handicaps in accessing capital and sustaining the required technical capability in their industralisation process. Therefore, attracting both capital investments and expertise by attuning the developing country's economic policies and legal environment to meet investors' expectations is a priority. Privatisation has been seen as a triumph by international institutions such as the World Bank, and a major requirement for developing economies to industrialise. However from a regulatory perspective, this process is far from straightforward. Implementing economic policies requires a number of regulations and regulatory instruments to be in place. Apart from the need for an independent regulator, regulatory outcomes are often dependent on the willingness of various stakeholders to comply with the course of actions undertaken by authorities. This article examines the factors steering the processes and changes in the telecommunication reforms of Indonesia and China.

Regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas – who takes the stronger line?

A key part of corporate governance reforms in Australia, as represented by CLERP 9, addresses concerns over the audit function and the role of independent auditors in monitoring managers and providing useful information to stakeholders about the financial position of the company. In comparing the regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas, there have been claims that CLERP 9 is less ‘stringent’ than the reforms imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US. This paper looks at three particular situations that have been the subject of recent reform to strengthen independence: the mandatory rotation of auditors, recruitment of former auditors as board members, and provision of non-audit services to clients. In each case, we compare the similarities and differences of the regulatory response between Australia and US, to distil the efficacy of the CLERP 9 approach.