Using panel data to test for fiscal sustainability within the European Union

Most empirical evidence suggests that the sustainability hypothesis, stating that government revenues and expenditures should cointegrate with a unit slope on expenditures, does not hold within the European Union, a finding at odds with many theoretical models. This paper argues that these results can be attributed in part to the use of in-appropriate time-series techniques, and that the use of panel data can generate more accurate tests. By using newly devised panel unit-root and cointegration techniques it is shown that the sustainability hypothesis cannot be rejected when applied to a panel composed of 15 European countries between 1970 and 2004. © 2009 Mohr Siebeck.

The Territoriality of Fiscal Solidarity: Comparing Swiss Equalisation with European Union Structural Funding

This article theorises the territorial solidarity and fiscal federalism and compares Switzerland with the European Union. While inter-territorial solidarity is a prerequisite for legitimate fiscal equalisation, such equalisation in turn also contributes to the legitimacy of and solidarity within federal political systems. By cutting across territorial and ethno-national communities, fiscal transfers often contribute to both a “civic” sense of belonging and a “cosmopolitan” identity. After placing types and degrees of (inter-)territorial solidarity at the heart of our conceptual perspective, we discuss the effects of such solidarity through an analysis of two different forms of “federal” equalisation. Comparing the recently reformed Swiss fiscal equalisation system with the EU structural funds allows us to infer if, and how, the fiscal dimension of federalism matters for feelings of solidarity, reciprocity, unity and, ultimately, for the legitimacy of the very (nation-state or Union) structures that are to contribute to the ever-growing prosperity and happiness of their people(s). In Switzerland, a civic understanding of nationhood and cross-cutting cleavages were necessary conditions for extensive, effective and legitimate fiscal equalisation. We infer that, for the EU, this means that strengthening the equalisation component of the structural funds would contribute to an ever closer Union in a political sense: because fiscal equalisation and inter-territorial solidarity are interdependent, reinforcing the one also means cementing the other. Future studies of the EU and federal-type arrangements are advised to pay more explicit attention to the solidarity-element of territoriality – or the territoriality of (fiscal) solidarity.

Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact. CEPS Working Document No. 381, August 2013

This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

Fiscal adjustment and economic growth in the European Union

The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the welldesigned adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic growth.

Gázolaj-jövedékiadó verseny az Európai Unióban (Fiscal competition on the market for diesel fuel in the European Union)

A tanulmány azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy versenyeznek-e az európai kormányok gázolajra vonatkozó jövedékiadó-kulcsaikkal a nagyobb adóbevételekért, és ha igen, befolyásolja-e az országok mérete kormányaik adóztatási stratégiáját. Az üzemanyagturizmussal szembesülő kormányok adókivetési magatartását egy kétországos adóverseny modellel jelezzük előre, amelyben a standard modellektől eltérően a fogyasztók kereslete árrugalmas. Megmutatjuk, hogy ha a kereslet nem teljesen rugalmatlan, mint Nielsen [2001], illetve Kanbur-Keen [1993] modelljeiben, akkor a nagy ország kormányának egyensúlyi viselkedése nemcsak abban különbözik a kicsiétől, hogy nagyobb adót állapít meg, hanem abban is, hogy válaszfüggvénye meredekebb. Az aszimmetrikus adóverseny általunk használt modelljét a dízelüzemanyagoknak 16 európai ország 1978 és 2005 közötti jövedékiadó-adatain vizsgáljuk. Az 1995 és 2005 közötti időszakra vonatkozó becslési eredményeink megerősítik, hogy az európai országok szomszédaik adókulcs-változtatásának hatására változtattak saját adókulcsaikon, és hogy a területileg/gazdaságilag kisebb országok kisebb intenzitással reagáltak szomszédaik adóváltoztatásra, mint a nagyobbak. Tanulmányunk ezzel magyarázatot nyújt arra is, hogy miért erősödött fel a tagállamok jövedéki adókulcsainak méret szerinti differenciálódása az elmúlt bő tíz évben, valamint hogy miért nem sikerült az Európai Uniónak a minimumadószintre vonatkozó előírásával előbbre lépnie az egységes adóztatás megvalósításában. / === / The paper assesses spatial competition in diesel taxation among European governments. By adding an extension to the standard model, it is shown that asymmetric competition – small countries undercutting large – implies that small countries respond less strongly to tax changes by their neighbours than large countries do. An estimate is then made of the fiscal reaction functions for national governments, employing a first-difference regression model with a weighting scheme constructed from road-traffic density data at national borders. Data from 16 countries (EU-15 minus Greece plus Norway and Switzerland) between 1978 and 2005 provides evidence that European governments set their diesel tax interdependently, and moreover, that small European countries tend to react less strongly to changes in their competitors' tax rate than large countries do.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

The Development of Public Finances and Role of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union: Example eurozone

This thesis is about the development of public debt and deficit in the eurozone, which has been in the center of attention for much of the new millennium. The debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios have changed significantly during the period of the European monetary integration, with sharp increases in the levels since the beginning of the financial crisis. We view the levels both before and after the establishment of the European Central Bank. The subject is complemented by a study of the restrictions on fiscal policy in the eurozone. The thesis begins with a review of the most central agreements in the Economic and Monetary Union, namely the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact. We study the instructions and requirements provided by these contracts, with the emphasis being on the debt and deficit values. Furthermore, we view two theories that aim to provide us with information, whether the fiscal restrictions are useful or not. The second and empirical part consists of review on the debt and deficit levels in practice. We take a close look on the values for each of the currency union members. The third and last part summarizes the findings, and analyzes the reasons behind the changes. The result of the thesis is, that even though the levels of public debt and deficit have worsened since the beginning of the financial crisis, tight rules on fiscal policy might not be the best possible solution. Private sector has played a crucial part in the increase of the debt levels, and tight rules have their impact on the long awaited economic growth in the eurozone. It is obvious, though, that some form of fiscal guidelines with scientific ground are needed in order to avoid excessive and harmful debt and deficit levels. The main task is to make these guidelines a more essential part of the fiscal policy in each of the member countries.

Essays on macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy rules

Economic and Monetary Union can be characterised as a complicated set of legislation and institutions governing monetary and fiscal responsibilities. The measures of fiscal responsibility are to be guided by the Stability and Growth Pact, which sets rules for fiscal policy and makes a discretionary fiscal policy virtually impossible. To analyse the effects of the fiscal and monetary policy mix, we modified the New Keynesian framework to allow for supply effects of fiscal policy. We show that defining a supply-side channel for fiscal policy using an endogenous output gap changes the stabilising properties of monetary policy rules. The stability conditions are affected by fiscal policy, so that the dichotomy between active (passive) monetary policy and passive (active) fiscal policy as stabilising regimes does not hold, and it is possible to have an active monetary - active fiscal policy regime consistent with dynamical stability of the economy. We show that, if we take supply-side effects into ac-count, we get more persistent inflation and output reactions. We also show that the dichotomy does not hold for a variety of different fiscal policy rules based on government debt and budget deficit, using the tax smoothing hypothesis and formulating the tax rules as difference equations. The debt rule with active monetary policy results in indeterminacy, while the deficit rule produces a determinate solution with active monetary policy, even with active fiscal policy. The combination of fiscal requirements in a rule results in cyclical responses to shocks. The amplitude of the cycle is larger with more weight on debt than on deficit. Combining optimised monetary policy with fiscal policy rules means that, under a discretionary monetary policy, the fiscal policy regime affects the size of the inflation bias. We also show that commitment to an optimal monetary policy not only corrects the inflation bias but also increases the persistence of output reactions. With fiscal policy rules based on the deficit we can retain the tax smoothing hypothesis also in a sticky price model.

Should Fiscal Policy be different in a Non-Competitive Framework?

Published as an article in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, issue 6, pages 1311-1331.

Estudio sobre la eficacia del régimen fiscal cooperativo portugués

El ordenamiento jurídico portugués consagra un régimen fiscal especial para el sector cooperativo, basado, al igual que otros ordenamientos como el español o el italiano, en la protección de la mutualidad como forma de organización empresarial especialmente benéfica en el plano social. Para alcanzar ese objetivo, el régimen fiscal cooperativo debe ser selectivo, lo que significa que al legislador se le plantea el reto de establecer criterios para separar, dentro del marco cooperativo, lo que debe ser protegido de lo que no merece protección fiscal. El legislador portugués optó por un modelo basado en dos grupos de ramos cooperativos claramente diferenciados según los beneficios fiscales aplicables, ambos con amplias exenciones fiscales. El presente trabajo no se centra en el contenido de los beneficios aplicables sino en las condiciones que las cooperativas deben reunir para acogerse a esos regímenes fiscales favorables. Estos criterios son: i) una división entre operaciones con socios y operaciones con terceros; ii) una delimitación de las operaciones o actividades cooperativas según estén o no vinculadas con el “fin propio de la cooperativa”; y iii) una estructura prevalentemente mutualista del factor trabajo. Esta fórmula legal tiene su raíz en una legislación de 1929 y se ha mantenido hasta el día de hoy debido en parte a un fenómeno de inercia legislativa. El presente trabajo, basándose en la metodología de la sociología jurídica, asienta en una encuesta dirigida a 64 cooperativas, por la que se buscaba indagar hasta qué punto estos criterios (de acuerdo con los que se seleccionan las cooperativas que pueden acogerse a los regímenes fiscales favorables) cuadran con la realidad cooperativa actual. Como era de esperar, la vetustez del régimen hizo que se encontraran desajustes muy significativos, que reclaman una reforma urgente.

Fiscal Year 2013-14 Accountability Report

The University of South Carolina at Union reports to the Office of State Budget its annual accountability report that includes an executive summary, a description of the leadership system, customer focus and satisfaction and other performance criteria, mission, and program descriptions and budgets.

Planeamento fiscal abusivo: exemplificação de alguns esquemas

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças sobre a orientação do Doutor José Campos Amorim.

Electoral opportunism and fiscal policy before and after the EMU

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

O sigilo bancário e a fraude fiscal

Tax evasion and fraud threaten the economic and social objectives of modern tax systems, precluding the state funding for the satisfaction of collective needs and the fair distribution of wealth, being a violation of basic principles and values of our society. In tax law, to give tax administration the necessary powers to supervise and control the information provided by taxpayers and combat tax evasion and fraud, over the last years the grounds for a derogation of bank secrecy without judicial authorization have been extended, which raises some constitutional compatibility issues. Similarly, this tendency of making this legal regime more flexible and increasing automatic exchange of information has been followed by the European Union and the international community. Banking secrecy, as a professional secrecy, is an instrument to protect the right to privacy but also appears as an anti-abuse and repressive mechanism of evasive and fraudulent behaviors. Because of the conflict of interests will always be necessary to make a practical agreement between them, ensuring the legality and the due guarantees of the taxpayers but also an effective way to combat tax evasion and fraud. Bank secrecy cannot be one method to, behind the right to privacy, taxpayers practice illegal activities. But the practice of these irregular conducts also does not justify a total annihilation of the right to banking secrecy, uncovering all documents and bank information’s. Although considering the legislative changes, the administrative derogation of bank secrecy will always be what the tax administration does of it.