Poetics of Subjectivity : Existence and Expressivity in Simone de Beauvoir's Philosophy

In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn attention to and re-evaluated the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir (1908 1986). Her philosophical practice has been described as non-systematic, and her literary writing has been viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir s philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir s philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity, paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also clarifies Beauvoir s main reason to turn to literature in order to express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of life. In addition, the thesis gives examples of how Beauvoir s literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. I use the expression poetics of subjectivity to refer to the systematic relation between Beauvoir s existential and phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works, and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in the novel. The thesis is divided into five chapters, of which the first three investigate Beauvoir s philosophy of existence at the intersection of the modern traditions of thought that began with René Descartes and Søren Kierkegaard s intuitions about subjectivity. Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir s notion of ambiguity, as compared to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of Beauvoir s philosophy through a study of her response to early French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My analysis shows that Edmund Husserl s distinction between different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir s understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she uses. Chapter 4 is a study of Beauvoir s reflections on the expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter 5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete subjectivity; Beauvoir s conceptual study of femininity in Le deuxième sexe and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel L Invitée. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir s original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as imaginatively.

Certainty or Faith? Arendt's and Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesian Foundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism has for centuries attempted to unify all scientific inquiry into the context of one grand science, the first philosophy. One of the most important tasks of this tradition has been to ground all knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. In this master s thesis I ask the following question: To what extent and under what conditions is it possible to achieve absolute certainty in the sense of the attempts of Cartesian foundationalism? By examining how the 20th century philosophers, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) interpret the epistemological methodology of René Descartes, I claim that the Cartesian achievement of absolute certainty rests on the implicit presupposition of an epistemologically prior form of faith in the world and trust (pistis) in other conscious beings. I show that knowledge is possible only within the context of a common world that is inhabited by several conscious beings that share a common linguistic system. This threefold element is shown to be the bedrock condition for any kind of philosophical inquiry. The main literature sources for this thesis are The Life of the Mind by Hannah Arendt, Le Visible et l invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae by René Descartes and Erfahrung und Urteil by Edmund Husserl.

Eläimen tuttuus ja vieraus : Fenomenologisen empatiateorian uudelleentulkinta ja sen sovellus vieraslajisia eläimiä koskevaan kokemukseen

Within the field of philosophy, animals have traditionally been studied from two perspectives: that of self-knowledge and that of ethics. The analysis of the differences between humans and animals has served our desire to understand our own specificity, whereas ethical discussions have ultimately aimed at finding the right way to treat animals. This dissertation proposes a different way of looking at non-human animals: it investigates the question of how non-human animals appear to us humans in our perceptual experience. The analysis focuses on the empathetic, embodied understanding of animals diverse movements and other expressions. The theoretical point of departure for the research is phenomenological philosophy, in particular Maurice Merleau-Ponty s phenomenology of the body. Edmund Husserl s and Edith Stein s analyses of empathy and embodiment are also crucial to the work. In this tradition, empathy means understanding the other s experience through her bodily expressions and seeing the other body as living, as well as motivated and directed towards the surrounding world. The dissertation both explicates and criticizes the earlier phenomenological notions of empathy and human specificity. In order to elucidate the fundamental structures of our experience of non-human animals, it also applies the phenomenological method, which consists of a phenomenological reduction and a free variation of the different aspects of experience. It is shown that our experiences of non-human animals involve a recognition of both similarities and differences. This recognition, however, is not primarily based on intellectual comparisons but is lived as an embodied relationship to another body, and its manifestations vary from one instant to the next. The analysis also reveals that the object of empathy is not the other s experience as such, not even as it is manifested by the other s movements, but rather the other s embodied situation, enriched by elements that remain outside the scope of the other s experience. The dissertation shows that human existence is intertwined with the existence of non-human animals on four levels: those of empathetic sensations, reciprocal communication, experience of the surrounding world and self-definitions. The animals different modes of perception prove to expand our understanding of what is perceivable and how things can be perceived. The presence of non-human animals in our perceptual world is revealed as something that both shows us the limits of our own embodiment and enables us to overcome these limits in empathetic acts. Finally, it is demonstrated that the life of non-human animals is intertwined with ours in a far more complex way than has been presupposed in traditional descriptions of human-animal differences.

Falling in love outwards: Eco-social work and the sensuous event

Summary: Social work is a discipline that focuses on the person-in-the-environment. However, the social domains of influence have traditionally received more attention from the profession compared with the impact of the natural world on human well-being. With the development of ecological theories, and growing threats to the environment, this gap has been addressed and now the notion of eco-social work is attracting more interest. This article builds on this corpus of work by exploring, and augmenting, the thinking of the philosopher, David Abram, and his phenomenological investigation of perception, meaning, embodiment, language and Indigenous experience. The implications for eco-social work are then addressed.

Findings: The development of Abram’s philosophical thesis is charted by reviewing his presentation of the ideas of the European phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It is argued that Abram uses phenomenology to explore the character of perception and the sensual foundations of language which, in Indigenous cultures, are connected with the natural world. A gap in Abram’s thinking is then revealed showing the need to set human perception and language within an understanding of power. Overall, this re-worked thesis is underpinned by a meta-narrative in which ecology engages with philosophy, psychology and Indigenous experience.

Applications: By grounding such ideas in Slavoj Žižek’s construct of the sensuous event, three applications within social work are evinced, namely: (i) reflecting on the sensuous event in social work education; (ii) rekindling the sensuous event with Indigenous Peoples; and (iii) instigating the sensuous event with non-Indigenous populations.

Statut et légitimité du Moi pur dans la phénoménologie husserlienne

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Ernst Schroeder and Zermelo’s Anticipation of Russell’s Paradox

Ernst Zermelo presented an argument showing that there is no set of all sets that are members of themselves in a letter to Edmund Husserl on April 16th of 1902, and so just barely anticipated the same contradiction in Betrand Russell’s letter to Frege from June 16th of that year. This paper traces the origins of Zermelo’s paradox in Husserl’s criticisms of a peculiar argument in Ernst Schroeder’s 1890 Algebra der Logik. Frege had also criticized that argument in his 1985 “A Critical Elucidation of Some Points in E. Schroeder Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik”, but did not see the paradox that Zermelo found. Alonzo Church, in “Schroeder’s Anticipation of the Simple Theory of Types” from 1939, cricized Frege’s treatment of Schroeder’s views, but did not identify the connection with Russell’s paradox.

Heidegger and the Japanese connection

This collection of new essays on phenomenological themes reviews aspects of the philosophical movement which began with the publication in 1900-01 of Edmund Husserl's path-breaking Logical Investigations. A broad survey of phenomenology is particularly timely given that this philosophical movement is reaching a hundred years of its existence. The thirteen contributions represent a wide range of approaches and interests within the phenomenological framework. Some present approaches to Husserl, while others explore aspects of the fundamental texts of phenomenology and provide critical discussions of later thinkers such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida whose relation to Husserl receives particular attention. The final section relates phenomenology to other disciplines and to broader issues in social thought and cultural studies. This book will enable students and professional philosophers alike to explore the various strands of this widely influential school of thought.

Transcendental arguments about other minds and intersubjectivity

This article describes some of the main arguments for the existence of other minds, and intersubjectivity more generally, that depend upon a transcendental justification. This means that our focus will be largely on ‘continental’ philosophy, not only because of the abiding interest in this tradition in thematising intersubjectivity, but also because transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous in continental philosophy. Neither point holds for analytic philosophy. As such, this essay will introduce some of the important contributions of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Karl-Otto Apel, all of whom use transcendental reasoning as a key part of their analyses of intersubjectivity, and we also consider the work of Peter Strawson who does likewise in the analytic tradition.

A decisão intuitiva nas organizações formais contemporaneas : uma analise de suas possibilidades

Jà há algum tempo o ocidente se vê questionado nos fundamentos que estruturam o saber e, consequentemente. o universo das ciências . ... A chamada razão. até então o pardigma absoluto. vem sendo contraposta a intuição como forma igualmente válida de alicerçar a ação humana na busca do conhecimento verdadeiro. Na Administração, tanto quanto em outros campos do conhecimento. a intuição vem sendo abordada por diversos estudiosos das organizações no seu ponto mais nevrálgico: a decisão gerencial. O presente trabalho discute esta questão a partir de uma análise crítica dos modelos racionais de decisão preconizados. estes fundamentados sobre uma compreensão funcionalista de organização e intenciona acrescentar às discussões já existentes a noção de intuição como método de pensamento do humano, portanto tão lógico quanto a dedução. Para tal, este estudo se vale de alguns referenciais postos por pensadores mais contemporâneos, destacando a Fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl. São abordados ainda estruturadas na direção fundamento da ação humana, à compreensão husserliana algumas configurações organizacionais da validação da intuição também como mesmo que nao necessariamente atreladas de intuição. O trabalho ainda defende a noção de supra-realidade, noção esta que traduz a síntese das diversas lógicas e não a mera agregação delas. Procura, assim. abrir espaço para reflexões na direção da necessidade da construção de novos arranjos organizacionais que reflitam essa síntese.

O conceito de liberdade em o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre

This dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. After presenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion of responsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy of action. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion of consciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being. From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initself is defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us. The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turn being For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itself has as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartre shows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comes the notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands a very special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another. Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a new existential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion of conflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another- For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations with others. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation of ownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of my conduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others as things, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference, desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the major theme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your way of being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms of autonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just may be picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be the symptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as one being distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedom and takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he is totally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is not predetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption the action. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action is the basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with an approach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher on the practical aspects of life

Percepção e impercepção: a experiência sensível na tradição fenomenológica

In this paper, we circumscribe a domain of theoretical research on the combination dynamics between the dimensions of presence and absence, visibility and invisibility, which emerges in the phenomenology of perception as an essential trait which marks both our experience of the perceived world and our subjective and intersubjective experience. We prioritize a theoretical axis that integrates Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s thinking into Renaud Barbaras’ recent contributions. To this philosophical framework, we link contributions especially of psychology, outlining the circular movement observed between the phenomenology of perception and phenomenological psychology, Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive sciences and neurosciences.

Um estudo sobre licenciatura de matemática oferecida na modalidade à distância

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Fenomenologia e neurociência: uma relação possível

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

The structuring body : a critical study in the description & explanation of perceptual experience

The aims of the dissertation are to find the right description of the structure of perceptual experience and to explore the ways in which the structure of the body might serve to explain it. In the first two parts, I articulate and defend the claim that perceptual experience seems direct and the claim that its objects seem real. I defend these claims as integral parts of a coherent metaphysically neutral conception of perceptual experience. Sense-datum theorists, certain influential perceptual psychologists, and early modern philosophers (most notably Berkeley) all disputed the claim that perceptual experience seems direct. In Part I, I argue that the grounds on which they did so were poor. The aim is then, in Part II, to give a proper appreciation of the distinctive intentionality of perceptual experience whilst remaining metaphysically neutral. I do so by drawing on the early work of Edmund Husserl, providing a characterisation of the perceptual experience of objects as real, qua mind-independent particulars. In Part III, I explore two possible explanations of the structure characterising the intentionality of perceptual experience, both of which accord a distinctive explanatory role to the body. On one account, perceptual experience is structured by an implicit pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as a body engaged in perceptual activity. An alternative account makes no appeal to the metaphysically laden concept of a bodily self. It seeks to explain the structure of perceptual experience by appeal to anticipation of the structural constraints of the body. I develop this alternative by highlighting the conceptual and empirical basis for the idea that a first-order structural affordance relation holds between a bodily agent and certain properties of its body. I then close with a discussion of the shared background assumptions that ought to inform disputes over whether the body itself (in addition to its representation) ought to serve as an explanans in such an account.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 75 - Korrespondenzen u.a. mit Armin Hodler (p. II 9, 1-88b)

37 Briefe und Beilage zwischen Armin Hodler und Max Horkheimer, 1935-1948; 14 Briefe und Beilage zwischen Hans Honegger und Max Horkheimer, 1941-1946; 1 Brief und Beilage von Max Horkheimer an Paul Honigsheim, 1943; 9 Briefe zwischen Hans Horkheimer und Max Horkheimer, 1945-1948 sowie 1 Reisebericht, Peru, 1939; 2 Briefe zwischen Susanna Huber-Weisser und Max Horkheimer, 1949; 5 Briefe zwischen Helen MacGill-Hughes vom The American Journal of Sociology und Max Horkheimer, 1949; 1 Briefabschrift von Max Horkheimer an Edmund Husserl, 28.10.1931; 1 Brief von Elizabeth Husserl-Rosenberg, 06.01.1948;