Human Rights Histories

This review article considers Samuel Moyn’s book The Last Utopia:Human Rights in History in the context of recent trends in the writing of human rights history. A central debate among historians of human rights, in seekingto account for the genesis and spread of human rights, is how far current humanrights practice demonstrates continuity or radical discontinuity with previousattempts to secure rights. Moyn’s discontinuity thesis and the controversysurrounding it exemplify this debate. Whether Moyn is correct is importantbeyond the confines of human rights historiography, with implications for theirmeaning in law, as well as their political legitimacy. This review argues that Moyn’s book ultimately fails to convince, for two broad reasons. First, a more balanced judgment would conclude that the history of human rights is both one of continuity and discontinuity. Second, and more importantly, Moyn fails to offer a convincing account of the normativity of human rights. Undertaking a history of human rights requires a deeper engagement with debates on the nature and validity of human rights than Moyn seems prepared to contemplate.

Comparative International Human Rights Law

This chapter locates of international human rights in current discussion of comparative international law, and distinguishes comparative international human rights law from both the 'fragmentation' literature, and from comparative constitutional rights discourse.

Dignity, Rights and the Comparative Method

This chapter considers the role of dignity in the development of constitutional rights, and relates this to the use of the comparative method, which has long been associated with the development of constitutional rights.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Extractivism and the de jure and de facto ethno-territorial rights in Latin America: How important are the constitutions? : Extractivismo y derechos étnico-territoriales de jure y de facto en Latinoamérica: ¿Cuán importantes son las constituciones?

A growing number of Latin American rural groups have attained extended ethno-territorial rights, and sizeable territories were safeguarded by progressive constitutions. This trend was the product of extended cycles of protest at local, national and transnational levels; social movements struggle, with broader collective South-South collaboration. Nonetheless, the continent simultaneously experienced a resource extraction boom. Commonly, the extractivism takes place in protected areas and/or indigenous territories. Accordingly, economic interests clash with the safeguarding and recognition of constitutional rights. Through the analysis of selected illustrative cases across Latin America, this study analyses the (de jure) rights on paper versus the (de facto) rights in practice. 

Financial and Criminal Responsibility for Public Funds – Protection of the Constitutional Fundamental Social Law of Health

Abstract: The implementation of Fundamental Constitutional Health and Social Rights is necessary, appropriate and proportionate, following the demands of the population. Accountability and self-responsibility play a very important role. This requires the development of constitutional principles that protect public funds against corruption and offer a constitutional right to health protection. Financial and criminal liability might provide an incentive to improve the management of public funds and reinforce fundamental constitutional principles, particularly regarding the right to health. Constitutional, administrative and criminal issues, as well as public management and administration and the science of good governance, should be articulated in a single strategy also in the health sector. In Portugal and Brazil, as examples, the Federal Court / Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court / High Court of Justice or the Court of Auditors should be considered together.

Socio-Legal Aspects of the 3D Printing Revolution

Additive manufacturing or ‘3D printing’ has emerged into the mainstream in the last few years, with much hype about its revolutionary potential as the latest ‘disruptive technology’ to destroy existing business models, empower individuals and evade any kind of government control. This book examines the trajectory of 3D printing in practice and how it interacts with various areas of law, including intellectual property, product liability, gun laws, data privacy and fundamental/constitutional rights. A particular comparison is made between 3D printing and the Internet as this has been, legally-speaking, another ‘disruptive technology’ and also one on which 3D printing is partially dependent. This book is the first expert analysis of 3D printing from a legal perspective and provides a critical assessment of the extent to which existing legal regimes can be successfully applied to, and enforced vis-à-vis, 3D printing.

Not thinking straight? A critical discourse analysis of the 2006 Irish High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners and Attorney General

The recognition and protection of constitutional rights is a fundamental precept. In Ireland, the right to marry is provided for in the equality provisions of Article 40 of the Irish Constitution (1937). However, lesbians and gay men are denied the right to marry in Ireland. The ‘last word’ on this issue came into being in the High Court in 2006, when Katherine Zappone and Ann Louise Gilligan sought, but failed, to have their Canadian marriage recognised in Ireland. My thesis centres on this constitutional court ruling. So as to contextualise the pursuit of marriage equality in Ireland, I provide details of the Irish trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition for same-sex couples. In Chapter One, I discuss the methodological orientation of my research, which derives from a critical perspective. Chapter Two denotes my theorisation of the principle of equality and the concept of difference. In Chapter Three, I discuss the history of the institution of marriage in the West with its legislative underpinning. Marriage also has a constitutional underpinning in Ireland, which derives from Article 41 of our Constitution. In Chapter Four, I discuss ways in which marriage and family were conceptualised in Ireland, by looking at historical controversies surrounding the legalisation of contraception and divorce. Chapter Five denotes a Critical Discourse Analysis of the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. In Chapter Six, I critique text from three genres of discourse, i.e. ‘Letters to the Editor’ regarding same-sex marriage in Ireland, communication from legislators vis-à-vis the 2004 legislative impediment to same-sex marriage in Ireland, and parliamentary debates surrounding the 2010 enactment of civil partnership legislation in Ireland. I conclude my research by reflecting on my methodological and theoretical considerations with a view to answering my research questions. Author’s Update: Following the outcome of the 2015 constitutional referendum vis-à-vis Article 41, marriage equality has been realised in Ireland.

A intervenção dos orgãos de polícia criminal em sede de julgamento

Currently, Portugal assumes itself as a democratic rule of substantive law State, sustained by a legal system seeking the right balance between the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms constitutional foreseen in Portugal’s Fundamental Law and criminal persecution. The architecture of the penal code lies with, roughly speaking, a accusatory basic structure, “deliberately attached to one of the most remarkable achievements of the civilizational democratic progress, and by obedience to the constitutional commandment”, in balance with the official investigation principle, valid both for the purpose of prosecution and trial. Regarding the principle of non self-incrimination - nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare, briefly defined as the defendant’s right of not being obliged to contribute to the self-incrimination, it should be stressed that there isn’t an explicit consecration in the Portuguese Constitution, being commonly accepted in an implicit constitutional prediction and deriving from other constitutional rights and principles, first and foremost, the meaning and scope of the concept of democratic rule of Law State, embedded in the Fundamental Law, and in the guidelines of the constitutional principles of human person dignity, freedom of action and the presumption of innocence. In any case, about the (in) applicability of the principle of the prohibition of self-incrimination to the Criminal Police Bodies in the trial hearing in Court, and sharing an idea of Guedes Valente, the truth is that the exercise of criminal action must tread a transparent path and non-compliant with methods to obtain evidence that violate the law, the public order or in violation of democratic principles and loyalty (Guedes Valente, 2013, p. 484). Within the framework of the penal process relating to the trial, which is assumed as the true phase of the process, the witness represents a relevant figure for the administration of criminal justice, for the testimonial proof is, in the idea of Othmar Jauernig, the worst proof of evidence, but also being the most frequent (Jauernig, 1998, p. 289). As coadjutant of the Public Prosecutor and, in specific cases, the investigating judge, the Criminal Police Bodies are invested with high responsibility, being "the arms and eyes of Judicial Authorities in pursuing the criminal investigation..." which has as ultimate goal the fulfillment of the Law pursuing the defense of society" (Guedes Valente, 2013, p. 485). It is in this context and as a witness that, throughout operational career, the Criminal Police Bodies are required to be at the trial hearing and clarify the Court with its view about the facts relating to occurrences of criminal context, thus contributing very significantly and, in some cases, decisively for the proper administration of the portuguese criminal justice. With regards to the intervention of Criminal Police Bodies in the trial hearing in Court, it’s important that they pay attention to a set of standards concerning the preparation of the testimony, the very provision of the testimony and, also, to its conclusion. Be emphasized that these guidelines may become crucial for the quality of the police testimony at the trial hearing, thus leading to an improvement of the enforcement of justice system. In this vein, while preparing the testimony, the Criminal Police Bodies must present itself in court with proper clothing, to read before and carefully the case files, to debate the facts being judged with other Criminal Police Bodies and prepare potential questions. Later, while giving his testimony during the trial, the Criminal Police Bodies must, summing up, to take the oath in a convincing manner, to feel comfortable, to start well by convincingly answering the first question, keep an attitude of serenity, to adopt an attitude of collaboration, to avoid the reading of documents, to demonstrate deference and seriousness before the judicial operators, to use simple and objective language, to adopt a fluent speech, to use nonverbal language correctly, to avoid spontaneity responding only to what is asked, to report only the truth, to avoid hesitations and contradictions, to be impartial and to maintain eye contact with the judge. Finally, at the conclusion of the testimony, the Criminal Police Bodies should rise in a smooth manner, avoiding to show relief, resentment or satisfaction, leaving a credible and professional image and, without much formality, requesting the judge permission to leave the courtroom. As final note, it’s important to stress that "The intervention of the Police Criminal Bodies in the trial hearing in Court” encloses itself on a theme of crucial importance not only for members of the Police and Security Forces, who must welcome this subject with the utmost seriousness and professionalism, but also for the proper administration of the criminal justice system in Portugal.

O processo sumário e a reforma do Código do Processo Penal de 2013

The present work aims to develop the theme "The summary procedure and the reform of 2013". The purpose of its analysis serves the interest to understand the virtues and disadvantages of the changes introduced by Act n.º 20/2013 to our Code of Criminal Procedure, and the main focus of the present reflection is to further the impact of the measures taken by the legislator to the summary proceedings. The opening of the most serious crimes to summary procedure is a reform measure duly highlighted because it is a true innovation in the Portuguese penal system. Therefore, it urges to analyse not only the consequences of this measure, as well as if the objectives of its introduction in the summary procedure system are met. It should be noted that the legislator intends to promote speedy trial, and at the same time, ensure compliance with the Constitutional rights associated to the accused. At this point it is important to realize if there is a restriction of the accused essential guarantees. On the other hand, it should be noted that the typical characteristics of summary proceedings might have been invariably modified, due to the innovative aspect of the reform. That said, the changes might have fostered a mischaracterization of the typical format of the summary procedure, both in terms of the nature of the proceedings and in terms of its space and objectives within the penal system. Reflecting on the above will provide a deeper understanding of the volatile balance between the Portuguese governing prosecution efficiency and the Constitution, as well as the future of the criminal policy in Portugal.

La difficile réconciliation de la vérité et de l'équité dans la procédure pénale en matière d'agression sexuelle

Dans ce mémoire, nous nous interrogeons sur de nouvelles règles de preuve du Code criminel pour déterminer si elles ont complètement éliminé le phénomène de victimisation des plaignantes dans les procédures en matière d'agression sexuelle. Nous émettons l'hypothèse qu'elles n'ont pas éliminé le traitement inéquitable des victimes dans le procès pénal et que ce traitement inéquitable nuit autant à la recherche de la vérité qu'au respect des droits des plaignantes. Nous examinons d'abord les droits constitutionnels respectifs de la plaignante et de l'accusé dans le procès en matière de crimes sexuels et leur interaction avec des règles qui portent sur la réputation et l'état de santé des deux protagonistes dans de telles affaires. Nous observons que ces règles de preuve offriraient une symétrie apparente au sujet du traitement de la mauvaise réputation de l'accusé et de la réputation sexuelle et la santé mentale de la victime dans la procédure. Cette symétrie serait toutefois imparfaite, inappropriée ou biaisée par le caractère adversaire du procès et la priorité accordée aux droits constitutionnels de l'inculpé et ce, parfois même au détriment de la vérité et de la justice. Enfin, nous proposons des modifications aux règles actuelles de preuve et de procédure en matière d'agression sexuelle pour favoriser une meilleure recherche de la vérité et un respect accru des droits constitutionnels des victimes

La détention à des fins d'enquête en droit criminel canadien et son impact sur les droits constitutionnels

Le pouvoir de détenir une personne à des fins d'enquête n'est pas une technique d'investigation nouvelle et tire son origine du droit anglais. Mais cette méthode d'enquête, qui consiste à restreindre temporairement la liberté de mouvement d'une personne que l'on soupçonne pour des motifs raisonnables d'être impliquée dans une activité criminelle, ne fut reconnue officiellement au Canada qu'en juillet 2004 suite au jugement rendu par la Cour suprême dans l'affaire R. c. Mann. Au moment d'écrire ces lignes, cette stratégie d'enquête policière ne fait toujours pas l'objet d'une réglementation spécifique au Code criminel. L'approbation de cette technique d'enquête, en l'absence de toute forme de législation, ne s'est pas faite sans critiques de la part des auteurs et des commentateurs judiciaires qui y voient une intrusion dans un champ de compétences normalement réservé au Parlement. L'arrêt Mann laisse également en suspens une question cruciale qui se rapporte directement aux droits constitutionnels des citoyens faisant l'objet d'une détention semblable: il s'agit du droit d'avoir recours sans délai à l'assistance d'un avocat. Le présent travail se veut donc une étude approfondie du concept de la détention à des fins d'enquête en droit criminel canadien et de son impact sur les droits constitutionnels dont bénéficient les citoyens de notre pays. Pour accomplir cette tâche, l'auteur propose une analyse de la question en trois chapitres distincts. Dans le premier chapitre, l'auteur se penche sur le rôle et les fonctions dévolus aux agents de la paix qui exécutent leur mission à l'intérieur d'une société libre et démocratique comme celle qui prévaut au Canada. Cette étude permettra au lecteur de mieux connaître les principaux acteurs qui assurent le maintien de l'ordre sur le territoire québécois, les crimes qu'ils sont le plus souvent appelés à combattre ainsi que les méthodes d'enquête qu'ils emploient pour les réprimer. Le deuxième chapitre est entièrement dédié au concept de la détention à des fins d'enquête en droit criminel canadien. En plus de l'arrêt R. c. Mann qui fera l'objet d'une étude détaillée, plusieurs autres sujets en lien avec cette notion seront abordés. Des thèmes tels que la notion de «détention» au sens des articles 9 et 10b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, la différence entre la détention à des fins d'enquête et l'arrestation, les motifs pouvant légalement justifier une intervention policière de même que les limites et l'entendue de la détention d'une personne pour fins d'enquête, seront aussi analysés. Au troisième chapitre, l'auteur se consacre à la question du droit d'avoir recours sans délai à l'assistance d'un avocat (et d'être informé de ce droit) ainsi que du droit de garder le silence dans des circonstances permettant aux agents de la paix de détenir une personne à des fins d'enquête. Faisant l'analogie avec d'autres jugements rendus par nos tribunaux, l'auteur suggère quelques pistes de solutions susceptibles de combler les lacunes qui auront été préalablement identifiées dans les arrêts Mann et Clayton.

Le fichage de la délinquance sexuelle : une érosion des principes de justice criminelle et punitive

Dans ce mémoire, nous examinons le fichage de la délinquance sexuelle dont les divers régimes juridiques reposent sur l’idée que ces contrevenants présentent un risque réel de récidive criminelle. Les données scientifiques sur la délinquance sexuelle relativisent ce risque et attestent qu’il est quasi absent dans un très grand nombre de cas. Il existe donc une dichotomie entre les prémisses du droit et les connaissances issues des sciences sociales et humaines sur cette question. Le fichage de cette délinquance au Canada donne lieu à des mécanismes administratifs provinciaux en plus d’un régime fédéral contenu au Code criminel. Nous émettons l’hypothèse que le fichage provincial emporte de véritables conséquences pénales sur les délinquants sexuels, affectent leurs droits en vertu de l’article 7 de la Charte et contrecarre des principes de justice fondamentale. Ensuite, nous examinons le régime fédéral intégré au Code criminel et nous argumentons que ce mécanisme juridique crée une mesure punitive de la nature d’une peine. Par conséquent, le fichage fédéral devrait être aménagé de façon à satisfaire aux garanties constitutionnelles propres à la peine et aux principes généraux de la détermination de la peine en vertu de la Partie XXIII du Code criminel. Nous concluons que les législateurs successifs ont créé des régimes juridiques régissant le fichage de la délinquance sexuelle en écartant les principes fondamentaux administratifs, criminels et constitutionnels qui devraient présider à l’élaboration des règles concernant ce stigmate de la criminalité. Les tribunaux, par leur interprétation, ont également déqualifié cette stigmatisation de la criminalité sexuelle à titre de peine. Le droit relatif au fichage de la délinquance sexuelle donne donc lieu à une érosion des principes fondamentaux de la justice criminelle et punitive.

Environnement et légitimité morale de l'ordre constitutionnel libéral

The environmental crisis threatens the fundamental values of the political liberal tradition. As the autonomy, the security and the prosperity of persons and peoples are jeopardized by political inaction, the legitimacy of the liberal constitutional order is compromised. Because of important collective action problems, the democratic processes are unfit to address the present crisis and protect adequately the natural environment. Two institutional solutions deemed capable of preserving the legitimacy of the functional domination at the heart of social order are analyzed. The first is the constitutionalization of a right to an adequate natural environment, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of legislative power. The second is the declaration of a limited state of emergency and the use of exceptional powers, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of both legislative and judiciary powers. Despite their legitimacy, the diligent application of these political solutions remains improbable.