Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Capital structure, risk and asymmetric information : theory and evidence

This paper proposes a principal-agent model between banks and firms with risk and asymmetric information. A mixed form of finance to firms is assumed. The capital structure of firms is a relevant cause for the final aggregate level of investment in the economy. In the model analyzed, there may be a separating equilibrium, which is not economically efficient, because aggregate investments fall short of the first-best level. Based on European firm-level data, an empirical model is presented which validates the result of the relevance of the capital structure of firms. The relative magnitude of equity in the capital structure makes a real difference to the profits obtained by firms in the economy.

An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets

We study which factors in terms of trading environment and trader characteristics determine individual information acquisition in experimental asset markets. Traders with larger endowments, existing inconclusive information, lower risk aversion, and less experience in financial markets tend to acquire more information. Overall, we find that traders overacquire information, so that informed traders on average obtain negative profits net of information costs. Information acquisition and the associated losses do not diminish over time. This overacquisition phenomenon is inconsistent with predictions of rational expectations equilibrium, and we argue it resembles the overdissipation results from the contest literature. We find that more acquired information in the market leads to smaller differences between fundamental asset values and prices. Thus, the overacquisition phenomenon is a novel explanation for the high forecasting accuracy of prediction markets.

How Do Different Types of Investors React to New Financial Statement Information?

The study contributes to our understanding of the forces that drive the stock market by investigating how different types of investors react to new financial statement information. Using the extremely comprehensive official register of share holdings in Finland, we find that the majority of investors are more probable to sell (buy) stocks in a company after a positive (negative) earnings surprise, and show a bias towards buying after the disclosure of new financial statement information. Large investors, on the other hand, show behavior opposite to that of the majority of investors in the market. Further, foreign investors show behavior similar to that of domestic investors. We suggest investor overconfidence and asymmetric information as possible explanations for the documented behavior.

Philosophers and practical men: Charles Babbage, Irish merchants and the economics of information

Before the emergence of coordination of production by firms, manufacturers and merchants traded in markets with asymmetric information. Evidence suggests that the practical knowledge thus gained by these agents was well in advance of contemporary political economists and anticipates twentieth-century developments in the economics of information. Charles Babbage, who regarded merchants and manufacturers as the chief sources of reliable economic data, drew on this knowledge as revealed in the evidence of manufacturers and merchants presented to House of Commons select committees to make an important pioneering contribution to the theory of production and exchange with information asymmetries.

Nonpoint source pollution, space, time and asymetric information - a deposit refund approach

The incorporation of space allows the establishment of a more precise relationship between a contaminating input, a contaminating byproduct and emissions that reach the final receptor. However, the presence of asymmetric information impedes the implementation of the first-best policy. As a solution to this problem a site specific deposit refund system for the contaminating input and the contaminating byproduct are proposed. Moreover, the utilization of a successive optimization technique first over space and second over time enables definition of the optimal intertemporal site specific deposit refund system

A Markovian model market-Akerlof's lemons and the asymmetry of information

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Exploiting ground-based measurements of the Global Positioning System for numerical weather prediction

Data assimilation provides an initial atmospheric state, called the analysis, for Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP). This analysis consists of pressure, temperature, wind, and humidity on a three-dimensional NWP model grid. Data assimilation blends meteorological observations with the NWP model in a statistically optimal way. The objective of this thesis is to describe methodological development carried out in order to allow data assimilation of ground-based measurements of the Global Positioning System (GPS) into the High Resolution Limited Area Model (HIRLAM) NWP system. Geodetic processing produces observations of tropospheric delay. These observations can be processed either for vertical columns at each GPS receiver station, or for the individual propagation paths of the microwave signals. These alternative processing methods result in Zenith Total Delay (ZTD) and Slant Delay (SD) observations, respectively. ZTD and SD observations are of use in the analysis of atmospheric humidity. A method is introduced for estimation of the horizontal error covariance of ZTD observations. The method makes use of observation minus model background (OmB) sequences of ZTD and conventional observations. It is demonstrated that the ZTD observation error covariance is relatively large in station separations shorter than 200 km, but non-zero covariances also appear at considerably larger station separations. The relatively low density of radiosonde observing stations limits the ability of the proposed estimation method to resolve the shortest length-scales of error covariance. SD observations are shown to contain a statistically significant signal on the asymmetry of the atmospheric humidity field. However, the asymmetric component of SD is found to be nearly always smaller than the standard deviation of the SD observation error. SD observation modelling is described in detail, and other issues relating to SD data assimilation are also discussed. These include the determination of error statistics, the tuning of observation quality control and allowing the taking into account of local observation error correlation. The experiments made show that the data assimilation system is able to retrieve the asymmetric information content of hypothetical SD observations at a single receiver station. Moreover, the impact of real SD observations on humidity analysis is comparable to that of other observing systems.

The Impact of the EMU on International Portfolio Investments

This paper analyses the impact of the launch of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on the allocation of international portfolio investments. The initiation of the EMU provides an opportunity for comparison of competing theoretical explanations for investment behavior. Models stressing the diversification motive would predict that the increased dependence between countries participating in the EMU should reduce the attractiveness of portfolio holdings in other EMU countries. Models based on asymmetric information would instead emphasize the increased intensity in the flow of information resulting from an increase in cross border transactions between the EMU countries. The consequent decline in information asymmetry should increase, rather than reduce portfolio holdings in other EMU countries. Our results based on the allocation of Finnish foreign portfolio investment support the information-based explanation against predictions based on the diversification motive.

Comportamiento de las empresas respecto a la formación contínua de sus directivos

Este trabajo ha sido previamente presentado en las XVII Jornadas Luso-Espanholas de Gestao Científica, celebradas en Evora (Portugal) en febrero de 2006.