Capital structure, risk and asymmetric information : theory and evidence
Data(s) |
15/09/2016
15/09/2016
2010
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Resumo |
This paper proposes a principal-agent model between banks and firms with risk and asymmetric information. A mixed form of finance to firms is assumed. The capital structure of firms is a relevant cause for the final aggregate level of investment in the economy. In the model analyzed, there may be a separating equilibrium, which is not economically efficient, because aggregate investments fall short of the first-best level. Based on European firm-level data, an empirical model is presented which validates the result of the relevance of the capital structure of firms. The relative magnitude of equity in the capital structure makes a real difference to the profits obtained by firms in the economy. |
Identificador |
Ibrahimo, M.V. e Carlos Pestana Barros (2010). "Capital structure, risk and asymmetric information : theory and evidence". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 05/2010/DE/UECE/CESA 0874-4548 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
ISEG : Departamento de Economia |
Relação |
DE Working papers;nº 05/2010/DE/UECE/CESA |
Direitos |
openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #Risk #asymmetric information #credit #capital structure |
Tipo |
workingPaper |