Markets and microstructure

This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncovering parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theoretic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.

In chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empirical evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market counterparts.

In chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven Development is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects. While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and the final player--the targeted community member--decides between whistle blowing or not. Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid process with case studies which claim otherwise.

In chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.

Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

Distributed Optimal Control of Cyber-Physical Systems: Controller Synthesis, Architecture Design and System Identification

The centralized paradigm of a single controller and a single plant upon which modern control theory is built is no longer applicable to modern cyber-physical systems of interest, such as the power-grid, software defined networks or automated highways systems, as these are all large-scale and spatially distributed. Both the scale and the distributed nature of these systems has motivated the decentralization of control schemes into local sub-controllers that measure, exchange and act on locally available subsets of the globally available system information. This decentralization of control logic leads to different decision makers acting on asymmetric information sets, introduces the need for coordination between them, and perhaps not surprisingly makes the resulting optimal control problem much harder to solve. In fact, shortly after such questions were posed, it was realized that seemingly simple decentralized optimal control problems are computationally intractable to solve, with the Wistenhausen counterexample being a famous instance of this phenomenon. Spurred on by this perhaps discouraging result, a concerted 40 year effort to identify tractable classes of distributed optimal control problems culminated in the notion of quadratic invariance, which loosely states that if sub-controllers can exchange information with each other at least as quickly as the effect of their control actions propagates through the plant, then the resulting distributed optimal control problem admits a convex formulation.

The identification of quadratic invariance as an appropriate means of "convexifying" distributed optimal control problems led to a renewed enthusiasm in the controller synthesis community, resulting in a rich set of results over the past decade. The contributions of this thesis can be seen as being a part of this broader family of results, with a particular focus on closing the gap between theory and practice by relaxing or removing assumptions made in the traditional distributed optimal control framework. Our contributions are to the foundational theory of distributed optimal control, and fall under three broad categories, namely controller synthesis, architecture design and system identification.

We begin by providing two novel controller synthesis algorithms. The first is a solution to the distributed H-infinity optimal control problem subject to delay constraints, and provides the only known exact characterization of delay-constrained distributed controllers satisfying an H-infinity norm bound. The second is an explicit dynamic programming solution to a two player LQR state-feedback problem with varying delays. Accommodating varying delays represents an important first step in combining distributed optimal control theory with the area of Networked Control Systems that considers lossy channels in the feedback loop. Our next set of results are concerned with controller architecture design. When designing controllers for large-scale systems, the architectural aspects of the controller such as the placement of actuators, sensors, and the communication links between them can no longer be taken as given -- indeed the task of designing this architecture is now as important as the design of the control laws themselves. To address this task, we formulate the Regularization for Design (RFD) framework, which is a unifying computationally tractable approach, based on the model matching framework and atomic norm regularization, for the simultaneous co-design of a structured optimal controller and the architecture needed to implement it. Our final result is a contribution to distributed system identification. Traditional system identification techniques such as subspace identification are not computationally scalable, and destroy rather than leverage any a priori information about the system's interconnection structure. We argue that in the context of system identification, an essential building block of any scalable algorithm is the ability to estimate local dynamics within a large interconnected system. To that end we propose a promising heuristic for identifying the dynamics of a subsystem that is still connected to a large system. We exploit the fact that the transfer function of the local dynamics is low-order, but full-rank, while the transfer function of the global dynamics is high-order, but low-rank, to formulate this separation task as a nuclear norm minimization problem. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of future research directions, with a particular emphasis on how to incorporate the results of this thesis, and those of optimal control theory in general, into a broader theory of dynamics, control and optimization in layered architectures.