Modelos de crescimento kaleckianos: uma apreciação

The purpose of this article is to survey the main papers that founded a kaleckian approach of the economic growth. It presents a certain moment of the historical evolution of the non-neoclassical macrodynamics. This analysis can be understood under the political economy tradition in putting together social classes (capitalists and workers), distributive conflict and the relationship between distribution and accumulation.

A persistência da indexação no Brasil pós-Real

The paper analyzes the shortcomings of the Real Plan combining political science and economics, considering evidences on difficulties in implementing a complete plan of deindexation, namely: the distributional conflict, the corporatist relations between the State and society and the bureaucratic isolation of a highly specialized technocracy. The announcement of the plan triggered defensive reactions, fueling distributive tensions during the URV period, forcing the economic team to take measures that contradicted the overall guidelines followed. The persistence of indexation mechanisms indicate the resulting obstacles in seeking a reform of the State through a stabilization plan, even though the latter has the former as a precondition.

Recueil de lettres et de pièces originales, et de copies de pièces indiquées comme telles dans le dépouillement qui suit.

Contient : 1 Deux lettres du roi « LOYS » XI à « Du Bouchage », écrites l'une « aux Forges, le XIIIIe jour de fevrier », l'autre « à Bel Esbat, le XIIIIe jour de may » ; 2 « Coppie du pouvoir donné par le roy LOUIS unziesme, pris sur son original, à Imbert de Batarnay, seigneur Du Bouchage, pour traicter avec le roy d'Arragon... Donné à Paris, le XXIIIe jour de mars mil quatre cens soixante et quatorze » ; 3 Lettres patentes de « LOYS » XI, donnant « plain povoir... à Ymbert de Baternay, escuier, seigneur Du Bouchaige », sur la ville de Perpignan. « Donné à Paris, le XXIIIe jour de mars mil CCCC. soixante et quatorze » ; 4 Minute d'un discours tenu au nom du roi Louis XI aux états de Bourgogne, après la mort de Charles le Téméraire ; 5 « Roole des pensionnaires » de l'État sous Louis XI. Copie ; 6 « Memoire » diplomatique sur une négociation secrète relative aux affaires de France, de Bourgogne et d'Angleterre, avec des observations en marge ; 7 Fragment d'un mémoire sur une levée de troupes suisses, avec notes en marge ; 8 « Memoire à monseigneur d'Esneval, de parler à Greffin, et savoir de lui la maniere comment il a fait la monstre des Souyces » ; 9 Mémoire de « ce que est à depescher » d'argent ; 10 Négociations du pape Alexandre VI avec Bajazet, et « Articles de l'accord entre le pape et le roi de France, et nommement pour Gem sultan, frere du Grand Turc » ; 11 État de l'artillerie des villes de Paris et Amiens ; 12 Lettre d'« YMBERT DE BATARNAYE », seigneur DU BOUCHAGE. « Fait à Compiegne, le Xe jour d'apvril, l'an mil quatre cens quatre vings et XIII, apres Pasques » ; 13 Placet présenté au roi en faveur de « Bertran le Clerc », franc archer, pour obtenir l'exemption de tout impôt ; 14 Projet de lettres closes pour accorder une prébende à « N[icolas] Lecourt », frère de « maistre Jehan Lecourt », secrétaire du roi ; 15 Lettre de Mr « LA QUEULHE,... à Du Bouchage,... Escript à Aiguesperse, le derrenier jour de decembre » ; 16 Lettre de « SYMON DE QUINGEY » à « monsieur l'escuier » Imbert de Batarnay, seigneur Du Bouchage. « Escript au Crotoy, le IXe jour d'aoust » ; 17 « Extrait des lectres des permutacions, eschanges, pactions et transpors faiz entre monseigneur Jehan, Daulphin de Viennois, et les seigneurs d'Authon, pour eulx et leurs ayans cause... Données le second jour de fevrier, l'an mil III.C. et XV... confirmées par le roy Charles [VIII]... à Lyon, ou moys d'avril l'an mil IIII.C. IIII.XX. et VI... et... par le roy [Louis XII]... à Paris, ou moys d'octobre l'an mil IIII.C. IIII.XX. XVIII » ; 18 Copie des lettres patentes et procès-verbaux relatifs à l'exécution faite sur les receveurs des deniers de la comté de Fézensac et autres seigneuries confisquées sur Jean et Jacques d'Armagnac, au profit d'Imbert de Batarnay, seigneur Du Bouchage. 1484, 1485, 1487 ; 19 Lettre italienne de « PETRUS GALLERATUS » ; 20 Liste de noms propres, italiens et espagnols ; 21 Copie des lettres patentes du roi LOUIS XI pour le payement des gages de « Jaques Alart,... receveur de la table de la bule à Parpignen » ; 22 « Oppynion » sur l'interprétation des « articles de l'ordre des Freres chevaliers de Sainct Michel » ; 23 Minute de deux lettres closes du roi LOUIS XI en faveur de « Frere Laurens Albert », son chapelain ordinaire ; 24 « Ce sont les choses dont supplie et requiert Me JEHAN DE XAINCOINS à monseigneur Du Bouchage » ; 25 Lettre close du roi « LOYS » XI au « sire de La Rochefoucault,... Namur, le XXIIIe jour d'octobre » ; 26 Lettre de « COSME SASSET,... à monseigneur Du Bochage,... A Lyon, ce XXVe jour de decembre » ; 27 Copie d'une lettre « de GEORGE [de Bade], evesque de Mets », à « monseigneur Du Bouchage,... Bruxelles, le XXIIIIe jour de septembre » 1478 ; 28 Copie d'une lettre latine de « JACOBUS ENSMINGEN,... vicarius metensis... domino de Boulcrilge,... In Bruxellis, vicesima IIIa mensis septembris, anno, etc., LXXVIII ». 1478 ; 29 Copie d'une lettre de « GEORGE [de Bade], evesque de Mets... à monseigneur Du Bouchage,... Bruxelles, ce VIIe jour d'octobre, l'an LXXVIII ». 1478 ; 30 Minute des lettres patentes de « LOYS, Daulphin de Viennoys », ordonnant de lever la saisie mise sur les terres de « Gabriel de Bernes » ; 31 Demande adressée au roi par « monsieur DE RAY », pour obtenir la seigneurie de « Chatillon sur Seynne » ; 32 Minute du sauf-conduit délivré par « Charles, seigneur de Payenne, lieutenant pour monseigneur Des Cordes, cappitaine general de Picardie », aux ambassadeurs du duc d'Autriche, pour qu'ils puissent assister aux conférences de Boulogne. « Octobre, l'an mil IIII.C..LXXVIII » ; 33 Mémoire pour « monseigneur le duc de Nemours, conte de La Marche, et... monseigneur Jehan d'Armaignac, frere dudict monseigneur le duc... contre messire Aigne de La Tour, et madame Anne de Beaufort, sa femme » ; 34 « Lo comte de me Jehan Mauri, recebedor de las chastelanias de Castelnou, de Melet, d'Anglais et de Cussac, per lo tres hault e poyssant princip monsignor lo duc de Nimors, comte de La Marcha ». 1467-1468

Recueil de copies de pièces.

Contient : 1 « Coppie du traité de mariage d'entre monseigneur le Daulphin [François, fils de Henri II], et la royne d'Escosse [Marie Stuart], du XIXe avril 1558, à laquelle sont inserez les pouvoirs, et de madame la duchesse duairiere de Guise et des depputez des trois estats d'Escosse, suivant lesquelz ilz ont respectivement assisté et consenty audict mariage » ; 2 Instructions, pouvoirs, dépêches concernant la négociation du traité de Cateau-Cambrésis, depuis le commencement de ladite négociation jusqu'au « XXVIe de novembre 1558 » ; 3 « Retranchement » fait par le roi Henri II dans sa maison, dans celle de la reine et des enfants de France. 1556 ; 4 « Traitté de paix entre le roy de France Henry 2e et Philippes [II], roy d'Espagne. Avril 1559 »

An investigation of the emotion assumptions of just-world theory /

The purpose ofthis study was to investigate the emotion assumptions underlying just-world theory. This theory proposes that people have a need to believe in a just world - a world where people get what they deserve. The first emotion assumption is that people, therefore, find injustices (Le., undeserved outcomes) threatening and thus emotionally arousing. Second, it is this arousal that is assumed to drive subsequent strategies for maintaining the belief in a just world. One strategy an individual may use to maintain this belief is derogating victims of injustice, or seeing their character in a more negative light. To test these two assumptions, 102 participants viewed a video depicting either a victim who presumably presented a high threat to people's belief in ajust world (she was innocent and, therefore, undeserving of her fate) or low threat (she was not innocent and, therefore, more deserving of her fate) while their heart rate and EDA was measured. Half of the participants were then given the opportunity to help the victim whereas the other half were not given this opportunity. The manipulations were followed by both explicit and indirect measures of evaluations ofthe victim as well as self-report measures of affect experienced while watching the victim video, and an individual difference scale assessing the strength of participants' just-world beliefs (as well as other measures that were part ofa larger study). Results indicated that participants did report feeling more threatened by the innocent victim. Although there was some evidence of victim derogation on the implicit measure of victim evaluation, there was no evidence that emotional arousal drove the negative evaluations of the victim who could not be helped. Some interaction effects with individual differences in just-world beliefs did occur, but these were not entirely consistent with the rationale behind the individual difference scales. These results provide only weak support for the first emotion assumption ofjust-world theory. Implications of these findings as well as limitations of the study and future directions concerning just-world theory are discussed.

The Myth of Labour-Management Partnerships and the Risk to Labour: A CAMI Automotive Study

The purpose of this study is to examine and explore the level of risk that CAMI workers confront under their existing labour-management partnership arrangement. Risk is explored using two distinct categories, distributive and political. Distributive risk is expressed as tangibly substantive, reflecting the real terms and conditions of employment, and the changing social relations of production on the floor. The second type of risk is political and is concerned with the effects that labour-management partnerships have on the displacement of unions as legitimate agents of/for workers within the workplace. Data was collected using three methods; content analysis, cross-sectional survey and focus group interviews. The study revealed that CAMI workers are exposed to both distributive and political risk under their current LMP arrangement.

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.