Endogenous supply of fiat money

We address whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a plan of action, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that such equilibrium is no longer possible when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that there is no monetary equilibrium where overissue happens only infrequently. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained in the presence of commitment.

Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.

Welfare and growth effects of alternative fiscal rules for infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the interplay between fiscal rules, public investment and growth in Brazil. It is investigated if it would make sense to raise public investment and, if so, under which fiscal rule it is best to do it — whether through tax financing, debt financing, or a reduction of public consumption. We construct and simulate a competitive general equilibrium model, calibrated to Brazilian economy, in which public capital is a component of the production function and public consumption directly affects individuals’ well-being. After assessing the impacts of alternative fiscal rules, the paper concludes that the most desirable financing scheme is the reduction of public consumption, which dominates the others in terms of output and welfare gains. The model replicates the observed growth slowdown of the Brazilian economy when we increase taxes and reduce public capital formation to the levels observed after 1980 and shows that the growth impact of the expansion of tax collection in Brazil was much larger than that of public investment compression.

Mobility, information, and bequest : the other side of the equal division puzzle

There is substantial empirical evidence that parental bequests to their children are typically equal in the US – a regularity inconsistent with the predictions of standard optimizing bequest models. The prior explanation for this puzzle is parents’ desire to signal equal affection given children’s incomplete information of parental preferences. However, parents also have incomplete information regarding children and the implications of this side of the information set have not previously been considered. Using a strategic bequest framework we show that when parents have sufficient uncertainty regarding children’s returns to relocation a separating equilibrium in which parents reward attentive heirs with larger bequests is precluded. We argue that such uncertainty is consistent with conditions in the contemporary US.

The market of academic journals : empirical evidence from data on French libraries

This paper analyzes the demand and cost structure of the French market of academic journals, taking into account its intermediary role between researchers, who are both producers and consumers of knowledge. This two sidedness feature will echoes similar problems already observed in electronic markets – payment card systems, video game console etc - such as the chicken and egg problem, where readers won’t buy a journal if they do not expect its articles to be academically relevant and researchers, that live under the mantra “Publish or Perish”, will not submit to a journal with either limited public reach or weak reputation. After the merging of several databases, we estimate the aggregated nested logit demand system combined simultaneously with a cost function. We identify the structural parameters of this market and find that price elasticities of demand are quite large and margins relatively low, indicating that this industry experiences competitive constraints.

Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation

We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Reality check for volatility models

Asset allocation decisions and value at risk calculations rely strongly on volatility estimates. Volatility measures such as rolling window, EWMA, GARCH and stochastic volatility are used in practice. GARCH and EWMA type models that incorporate the dynamic structure of volatility and are capable of forecasting future behavior of risk should perform better than constant, rolling window volatility models. For the same asset the model that is the ‘best’ according to some criterion can change from period to period. We use the reality check test∗ to verify if one model out-performs others over a class of re-sampled time-series data. The test is based on re-sampling the data using stationary bootstrapping. For each re-sample we check the ‘best’ model according to two criteria and analyze the distribution of the performance statistics. We compare constant volatility, EWMA and GARCH models using a quadratic utility function and a risk management measurement as comparison criteria. No model consistently out-performs the benchmark.

Earnings dynamics and inequality in Venezuela: 1995-1997

In this paper, we decompose the variance of logarithmic monthly earnings of prime age males into its permanent and transitory components, using a five-wave rotating panel from the Venezuelan “Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo” from 1995 to 1997. As far as we know, this is the first time a variance components model is estimated for a developing country. We test several specifications and find that an error component model with individual random effects and first order serially correlated errors fits the data well. In the simplest model, around 22% of earnings variance is explained by the variance of permanent component, 77% by purely stochastic variation and the remaining 1% by serial correlation. These results contrast with studies from industrial countries where the permanent component is predominant. The permanent component is usually interpreted as the results of productivity characteristics of individuals whereas the transitory component is due to stochastic perturbations such as job and/or price instability, among others. Our findings may be due to the timing of the panel when occurred precisely during macroeconomic turmoil resulting from a severe financial crisis. The findings suggest that earnings instability is an important source of inequality in a region characterized by high inequality and macroeconomic instability.

Phase transition of demand explained by the heterogeneity of consumers' intrinsic preferences

In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.

Using a panel structure to discuss the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle in developing countries

The purpose of this paper is to test the implications of current account solvency for the savinginvestment correlation in developing countries. Since solvency is a long-run phenomenon, and given that the power of the standard unit root and cointegration tests is low, we exploit the panel structure of the sample of 29 developing countries. We find evidence that saving and investment are cointegrated and that the current account is stationary. Therefore, the Feldstein-Horioka correlations are not a puzzle in the sense they reflect the intertemporal budget constraint. The same results are obtained for different subsamples (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and for different periods of time (1960-74 and 1975-96). We, then, suggest that an error correction model should distinguish between the long-run correlation, which reflects the solvency condition, and the short-run correlation, which could measure capital mobility.

Are the antiglobalizers right?: the issue of trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

This paper analyzes the determinants of expectational coordination on the perfect foresight equilibrium of an open economy in the class of one-dimensional models where the price is determined by price expectations. In this class of models, we relate autarky expectational stability conditions to regional integration ones, providing an intuitive open economy interpretation ofthe elasticities condition obtained by Guesnerie [11]. There, we show that the degree of structural heterogeneity trades-off the existence of standard efficiency gains -due to the increase in competition (spatial price stabilization)- and coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing price expectations). This trade-off provides a new rationale for an exogenous price intervention at the international levei. Through the coordinational concern of the authority, trading countries are ab]e to fully reap the bene:fits from trade. We illustrate this point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advise integration between two expectationally stable economies.

Portfolio choice with a correlated background risk : theory and evidence

We extend the static portfolio choice problem with a small background risk to the case of small partially correlated background risks. We show that respecting the theories under which risk substitution appears, except for the independence of background risk, it is perfectly rational for the individual to increase his optimal exposure to portfolio risk when risks are partially negatively correlated. Then, we test empirically the hypothesis of risk substitutability using INSEE data on French households. We find that households respond by increasing their stockholdings in response to the increase in future earnings uncertainty. This conclusion is in contradiction with results obtained in other countries. So, in light of these results, our model provides an explanation to account for the lack of empirical consensus on cross-country tests of risk substitution theory that encompasses and criticises all of them.