Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation
Data(s) |
25/11/2014
25/11/2014
06/12/2001
|
---|---|
Resumo |
We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
en_US |
Publicador |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
Relação |
Seminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE |
Direitos |
Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis. |
Palavras-Chave | #Rules #Discretion #Information provision #Manipulation #Monitoring #Processo decisório - Modelos econométricos #Econometria |
Tipo |
Working Paper |