Coopetitive advantage – How firms create and appropriate value by collaborating with their competitors

Collaboration between competing firms (coopetition) has emerged as an important issue forn business practice in many industries. Extant literature has examined coopetition on many levels of analysis, but lacks clarity in distinguishing it explicitly from cooperation between noncompeting organizations. Because of this, the performance implications of coopetition from the perspective of an individual firm are still ambiguous – some research suggests positive results whereas other studies suggest detrimental outcomes. The aim in this dissertation is to narrow these gaps by exploring how firms create and appropriate value through collaboration with their competitors. The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part comprises an overview of the relevant literature, as well as the conclusions of the whole study, and the second part includes six research publications. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies are utilized. The results suggest that coopetition embodies the distinctive logic of value creation and appropriation from the perspective of an individual firm, and thus differs in terms of performance implications from cooperation between non-competitors. The distinction comes from the fact that competitors have somewhat similar understanding, capabilities and interest related to certain markets, which is potentially both challenging and beneficial in terms of the individual firm’s competitiveness. It appears from the findings that there are distinctive firm-external and firm-specific factors affecting the success of a coopetition strategy. This study makes three main contributions. First, on the conceptual level it shows the distinction between coopetition and cooperation between non-rivals as a collaborative inter-organizational relationship. Secondly, it sets out a framework and propositions that enhance understanding of how value is created and appropriated in coopetition from the perspective of an individual firm. Thirdly, it offers empirical evidence of how coopetition affects firms’ innovation and market performance, and identifies the focal internal and external factors involved. In general terms, the thesis adds to our knowledge of how a firm can successfully utilize a coopetition strategy in its pursuit of improved performance.

Coopetition as a lead generating mechanism: design, modelling and simulation

The aim of this research is to develop a tool that could allow to organize coopetitional relationships between organizations on the basis of two-sided Internet platform. The main result of current master thesis is a detailed description of the concept of the lead generating internet platform-based coopetition. With the tools of agent-based modelling and simulation, there were obtained results that could be used as a base for suggestion that the developed concept is able to cause a positive effect on some particular industries (e.g. web-design studios market) and potentially can bring some benefits and extra profitability for most companies that operate on this particular industry. Also on the basis of the results it can be assumed that the developed instrument is also able to increase the degree of transparency of the market to which it is applied.

Zero-sum problems in finite cyclic groups

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate some open problems in the area of combinatorial number theory referred to as zero-sum theory. A zero-sequence in a finite cyclic group G is said to have the basic property if it is equivalent under group automorphism to one which has sum precisely IGI when this sum is viewed as an integer. This thesis investigates two major problems, the first of which is referred to as the basic pair problem. This problem seeks to determine conditions for which every zero-sequence of a given length in a finite abelian group has the basic property. We resolve an open problem regarding basic pairs in cyclic groups by demonstrating that every sequence of length four in Zp has the basic property, and we conjecture on the complete solution of this problem. The second problem is a 1988 conjecture of Kleitman and Lemke, part of which claims that every sequence of length n in Zn has a subsequence with the basic property. If one considers the special case where n is an odd integer we believe this conjecture to hold true. We verify this is the case for all prime integers less than 40, and all odd integers less than 26. In addition, we resolve the Kleitman-Lemke conjecture for general n in the negative. That is, we demonstrate a sequence in any finite abelian group isomorphic to Z2p (for p ~ 11 a prime) containing no subsequence with the basic property. These results, as well as the results found along the way, contribute to many other problems in zero-sum theory.

The von Neumann Minimax Theorem and its relatives and a study of externality in on-line auctions

This work consists of a theoretical part and an experimental one. The first part provides a simple treatment of the celebrated von Neumann minimax theorem as formulated by Nikaid6 and Sion. It also discusses its relationships with fundamental theorems of convex analysis. The second part is about externality in sponsored search auctions. It shows that in these auctions, advertisers have externality effects on each other which influence their bidding behavior. It proposes Hal R.Varian model and shows how adding externality to this model will affect its properties. In order to have a better understanding of the interaction among advertisers in on-line auctions, it studies the structure of the Google advertisements networ.k and shows that it is a small-world scale-free network.

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.