Contemporary issues in the government and administration of Latin American megacities

This paper is the first to systematically analyze and compare the structures of city governance and administration for seven major cities in Latin America, four of which are megacities (population of over 10 million), and three others are large national capitals. U.S. and U. K. models of city administration are reviewed as baseline models against which differences in Latin American may be explored. Structures of Government in Latin America show several important features and trends: 1) the lack of metropolitan (cross jurisdictional) authority; 2) the existence of strong mayors and weak councils"; 3) high levels of partisanship; 4) overlapping rather than interlocking bureaucracies; 5) pressures towards the privatization of city services, but continuing tension over the desirability of public versus private control; 6) greater fiscal responsibility and autonomy; and 7), a continuing marginalization of public participation in megacity governance.In spite of these features, many cities throughout the region (regardless of whether they are megacity size or national capitals), are actively intensifying their efforts to develop more effective, accountable and democratic governance structures.

Electronic government policies in Brazil: context, ICT management and outcomes

The State Reform processes combined with the emergence and use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) originated electronic government policies and initiatives in Brazil. This paper dwells on Brazilian e-government by investigating the institutional design it assumed in the state's public sphere, and how it contributed to outcomes related to e-gov possibilities. The analyses were carried out under an interpretativist perspective by making use of Institutional Theory. From the analyses of interviews with relevant actors in the public sphere, such as state secretaries and presidents of public ICT companies, conclusions point towards low institutionalization of e-gov policies. The institutional design of Brazilian e-gov limits the use of ICT to provide integrated public services, to amplify participation and transparency, and to improve public policies management.

How logrolling can explain the failure of the government coalition in Brazil

This article presents an analysis of the behavior of federal representatives in the Brazilian House of Representatives between 1995 and 1998, when a series of constitutional amendments were presented by the president to be voted on by Congress. The objective is to show that the lack of a stable government coalition resulted in costs to society that were not anticipated by the government. The study argues that a logroll - a trade of votes - was the strategy used by the government in order to guarantee the number of votes necessary to approve the amendments. This strategy created a vicious system in which representatives would only vote with the government if they had benefits in return.

Inovação aberta na gestão pública: análise do plano de ação brasileiro para a Open Government Partnership

Este estudo objetivou analisar o Plano de Ação brasileiro para o Governo Aberto, baseado na teoria da inovação aberta na gestão pública. Utilizou-se de uma pesquisa documental, com vistas a aprofundar o conhecimento do fenômeno em questão. O documento foi escolhido intencionalmente, por ser exemplo basilar das políticas públicas relacionadas à inovação aberta brasileira. Os resultados mostram que os compromissos firmados pelo governo brasileiro estão consoantes com o processo de inovação aberta pública. As ações previstas no Plano estão especificamente relacionadas a transparência, abertura de dados e preparação do corpo estatal para o processo aberto de inovação.

The institutional configuration of sport policy in Brazil: organization, evolution and dilemmas

Brazil has become the center of the spotlight of the whole world recently, amongst many other reasons, one of them was because it was chosen to host a series of mega sporting events - Pan American Games in 2007, Confederations Football Cup in 2013, Fifa Football World Cup 2014 Games and 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2016. However, little is known about the country's administrative governmental structure focused on sport policy. The available studies focus their analysis on the sport policies content, but not on the arrangement of its structural decision-making. The main aim of this article is indeed to describe, based on official documentation, the evolution and the current arrangements of the government responsible for the administrative structure for the planning and implementation of sports policies in Brazil. Thus, we tried to list the main problems arising from the organization of the Brazilian sports' management. These problems are: (1) inappropriate institutional structure in terms of human resources and obstacles to participation by other social actors beyond the officials (parliament and members of the Ministry of Sports) in the sports policy; (2) disarticulation between public institutions generating redundancies and conflicts of jurisdiction due to the poor division of labor between bureaucracy agencies; and (3) inadequate planning proved by the lack of organization of some institutions, and by the lack of assessment and continuity of public policies over time. Therefore, we must emphasize those problems from above, and due to these administrative arrangements, Brazilian sports' policy has big challenges in the sport development in this country, which includes the creation of a national "system" for sports and a priority investment in sport education.

Accountability and co-production of information and control: social observatories and their relationship with government agencies

Abstract:Through the development of a proposal to categorize accountability into four stages - classical, cross-sectional, systemic, and diffused -, this article aims to identify characteristics of co-production of information and socio-political control of public administration in the work of Brazilian social observatories in relationship with government control agencies. The study analyses data from 20 social observatories and, particularly, three experiences of co-production of information and control, based on a systemic perspective on accountability and a model with four categories: Political and cultural; valuing; systemic-organizational, and production. The conclusions summarize characteristics of these practices, specific phases in the accountability processes, as well as the potentialities and challenges of co-production of information and control, which not only influences, but it is also influenced by the accountability system.

Multi-agent negotiation for coalition formation and management in electricity markets

Negotiation is a fundamental tool for reaching understandings that allow each involved party to gain an advantage for themselves by the end of the process. In recent years, with the increasing of compe-titiveness in most sectors, negotiation procedures become present in practically all of them. One particular environment in which the competitiveness has been increasing exponentially is the electricity markets sector. This work is directed to the study of electricity markets’ partici-pating entities interaction, namely in what concerns the formation, management and operation of aggregating entities – Virtual Power Players (VPPs). VPPs are responsible for managing coalitions of market players with small market negotiating influence, which take strategic advantage in entering such aggregations, to increase their negotiating power. This chapter presents a negotiation methodology for the creation and management of coalitions in Electricity Markets. This approach is tested using MASCEM, taking advantage of its ability to provide the means to model and simulate VPPs. VPPs are represented as coalitions of agents, with the capability of negotiating both in the market, and internally, with their members, in order to combine and manage their individual specific characteristics and goals, with the strategy and objectives of the VPP itself.

Procedimentos e dinâmicas inerentes ao processo dos concursos públicos e à realização de "empreitadas de obras públicas, em Portugal"

Trabalho de relatório de Estágio de natureza científica para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil na Área de Especialização em Edificações

O impacto da adoção do SNC nas demonstrações financeiras das empresas públicas de transportes

Mestrado em Contabilidade

Newspaper coverage impact on cultural events: Porto 2001 and Guimarães 2012: European Cultural Capitals

Artigo baseado na comunicação proferida no 1st International Symposium on Media Studies, realizado na Akdeniz Universitesi Yayınları, Antalya, Turquia, 21-23 de novembro de 2013

Contributo das relações públicas na comunicação do plano estratégico de combate à fraude e evasão fiscais e aduaneira 2012/2014

Trabalho de projeto apresentado à Escola Superior de Comunicação Social como parte dos requisitos para obtenção de grau de mestre em Gestão Estratégica das Relações Públicas.

Regional governance: strategies and disputes in health region management

OBJECTIVE To analyze the regional governance of the health systemin relation to management strategies and disputes.METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES A qualitative study with health managers from 19 municipalities in the health region of Bahia, Northeastern Brazil. Data were drawn from 17 semi-structured interviews of state, regional, and municipal health policymakers and managers; a focus group; observations of the regional interagency committee; and documents in 2012. The political-institutional and the organizational components were analyzed in the light of dialectical hermeneutics.RESULTS The regional interagency committee is the chief regional governance strategy/component and functions as a strategic tool for strengthening governance. It brings together a diversity of members responsible for decision making in the healthcare territories, who need to negotiate the allocation of funding and the distribution of facilities for common use in the region. The high turnover of health secretaries, their lack of autonomy from the local executive decisions, inadequate technical training to exercise their function, and the influence of party politics on decision making stand as obstacles to the regional interagency committee’s permeability to social demands. Funding is insufficient to enable the fulfillment of the officially integrated agreed-upon program or to boost public supply by the system, requiring that public managers procure services from the private market at values higher than the national health service price schedule (Brazilian Unified Health System Table). The study determined that “facilitators” under contract to health departments accelerated access to specialized (diagnostic, therapeutic and/or surgical) services in other municipalities by direct payment to physicians for procedure costs already covered by the Brazilian Unified Health System.CONCLUSIONS The characteristics identified a regionalized system with a conflictive pattern of governance and intermediate institutionalism. The regional interagency committee’s managerial routine needs to incorporate more democratic devices for connecting with educational institutions, devices that are more permeable to social demands relating to regional policy making.

The Cornerstones of Modern Government Maps, Weights and Measures and Census in Liberal Portugal (19th century)

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor in History and Civilisation from the European University Institute

Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.