Experimental results on the nonlinear H(infinity) control via quasi-LPV representation and game theory for wheeled mobile robots

In this paper, nonlinear dynamic equations of a wheeled mobile robot are described in the state-space form where the parameters are part of the state (angular velocities of the wheels). This representation, known as quasi-linear parameter varying, is useful for control designs based on nonlinear H(infinity) approaches. Two nonlinear H(infinity) controllers that guarantee induced L(2)-norm, between input (disturbances) and output signals, bounded by an attenuation level gamma, are used to control a wheeled mobile robot. These controllers are solved via linear matrix inequalities and algebraic Riccati equation. Experimental results are presented, with a comparative study among these robust control strategies and the standard computed torque, plus proportional-derivative, controller.

A New Approach for Video Adaptation through Overlay Services Networks

Video adaptation is an extensively explored content providing technique aimed at appropriately suiting several usage scenarios featured by different network requirements and constraints, user`s terminal and preferences. However, its usage in high-demand video distribution systems, such as CNDs, has been badly approached, ignoring several aspects of optimization of network use. To address such deficiencies, this paper presents an approach for implementing the adaptation service by exploring the concept of overlay services networks. As a result of demonstrate the benefits of this proposal, it is made a comparison of this proposed adaptation service with other strategies of video adaptation.

Role of price and enforcement in water allocation: Insights from Game Theory

As many countries are moving toward water sector reforms, practical issues of how water management institutions can better effect allocation, regulation, and enforcement of water rights have emerged. The problem of nonavailability of water to tailenders on an irrigation system in developing countries, due to unlicensed upstream diversions is well documented. The reliability of access or equivalently the uncertainty associated with water availability at their diversion point becomes a parameter that is likely to influence the application by users for water licenses, as well as their willingness to pay for licensed use. The ability of a water agency to reduce this uncertainty through effective water rights enforcement is related to the fiscal ability of the agency to monitor and enforce licensed use. In this paper, this interplay across the users and the agency is explored, considering the hydraulic structure or sequence of water use and parameters that define the users and the agency`s economics. The potential for free rider behavior by the users, as well as their proposals for licensed use are derived conditional on this setting. The analyses presented are developed in the framework of the theory of ""Law and Economics,`` with user interactions modeled as a game theoretic enterprise. The state of Ceara, Brazil, is used loosely as an example setting, with parameter values for the experiments indexed to be approximately those relevant for current decisions. The potential for using the ideas in participatory decision making is discussed. This paper is an initial attempt to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing such situations but with a focus on the reservoir-canal system water rights enforcement.

A vaccination game based on public health actions and personal decisions

Susceptible-infective-removed (SIR) models are commonly used for representing the spread of contagious diseases. A SIR model can be described in terms of a probabilistic cellular automaton (PCA), where each individual (corresponding to a cell of the PCA lattice) is connected to others by a random network favoring local contacts. Here, this framework is employed for investigating the consequences of applying vaccine against the propagation of a contagious infection, by considering vaccination as a game, in the sense of game theory. In this game, the players are the government and the susceptible newborns. In order to maximize their own payoffs, the government attempts to reduce the costs for combating the epidemic, and the newborns may be vaccinated only when infective individuals are found in their neighborhoods and/or the government promotes an immunization program. As a consequence of these strategies supported by cost-benefit analysis and perceived risk, numerical simulations show that the disease is not fully eliminated and the government implements quasi-periodic vaccination campaigns. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Is YouTube telling or selling you something? Tobacco content on the YouTube video sharing website

The effectiveness of overt tobacco advertising and sponsorship bans is well established. The industry has responded to these bans by implementing “buzz” or “viral” marketing techniques, such as nightclub and dance party promotions. This paper analyses possible tobacco industry content on the burgeoning consumer generated media website, YouTube. Tobacco control efforts need to embrace this new medium in order to counter pro-smoking messages and maximize media advocacy opportunities.

Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

Inter-subband redundancy prediction using neural network for video coding

High performance video codec is mandatory for multimedia applications such as video-on-demand and video conferencing. Recent research has proposed numerous video coding techniques to meet the requirement in bandwidth, delay, loss and Quality-of-Service (QoS). In this paper, we present our investigations on inter-subband self-similarity within the wavelet-decomposed video frames using neural networks, and study the performance of applying the spatial network model to all video frames over time. The goal of our proposed method is to restore the highest perceptual quality for video transmitted over a highly congested network. Our contributions in this paper are: (1) A new coding model with neural network based, inter-subband redundancy (ISR) prediction for video coding using wavelet (2) The performance of 1D and 2D ISR prediction, including multiple levels of wavelet decompositions. Our result shows a short-term quality enhancement may be obtained using both 1D and 2D ISR prediction.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of sellers should those transfers be made is the key issue in the description of the algorithm. We assume additively separable utilities and introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with an exogenously defined quota, consuming more than one object but at most one unit of a seller`s good and having multi-dimensional payoffs. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the over-demanded sets than the constructions of these sets for the other assignment games. For this approach, our mechanism yields the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff, which equals the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The symmetry of the model allows to getting the seller-optimal stable payoff and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff can then be also derived.

Prospective randomized trial of EUS versus ERCP-guided common bile duct stone removal: an interim report (with video)

Background: EUS is being increasingly utilized for the diagnosis of choledocholithiasis and microlithiasis, especially in patients with biliary colic. Simultaneously, there is also a rising interest in the use of EUS for therapeutic interventions. Objectives: Our goal was to assess the effectiveness of EUS-directed common bile duct (CBD) stone removal to compare its safety and effectiveness with ERCP-directed intervention. Design: interim results of a prospective, randomized, single-center blinded clinical trial. Setting: A single tertiary care referral center. Patients: Fifty-two patients with uncomplicated CBD stones were prospectively randomized to CBD cannulation and stone removal under EUS or ERCP guidance. Main Outcome Measurements and Interventions: Primary outcome measure was the rate of successful cannulation of the CBD. Secondary Outcome measures included Successful removal of stones and overall complication rates. Results: CBD cannulation followed by stone extraction was successful in 23 of 26 patients (88.5%) in the EUS group (1) versus 25 of 26 patients (96.2%) in the ERCP group (11) (95% CI, -27.65%, 9.88%). Overall, there were 3 complications in the EUS group and 4 complications in the ERCP group. Limitation: The current study is an interim report from a single center report and performed by a single operator. Conclusions: Our preliminary analysis indicates that Outcomes following EUS-guided CBD stone retrieval are equivalent to those following ERCP EUS-related adverse events are similar to those following ERCP. ERCP and EUS-guided stone retrieval appears to be equally effective for therapeutic interventions of the bile duct. Additional studies are required to validate these preliminary results and to determine predictors of success of EUS-guided stone removal. (Gastrointest Endosc 2009;69:238-43.)