Le partage de photographies sur Facebook : s’écrire, esthétiser sa vie

Depuis sa création, en 2004, le réseau social Facebook a reçu une attention médiatique dont l’ampleur est phénoménale. Avec des millions d’utilisateurs à son actif, le site est aussi devenu, dans certains milieux, presqu’incontournable. Malgré les appels à la prudence et à la vigilance dans l’utilisation de Facebook qui se multiplient – notamment concernant des enjeux de surveillance et de protection de la vie privée – nombre d’utilisateurs continuent d’y archiver des contenus, dont les photographies personnelles constituent une part importante. Ce mémoire propose d’explorer dans quelle mesure les pratiques associées à la photographie personnelle pourraient être comprises dans les processus de formation d’« éthiques de l’existence » (Foucault, 1984a; 1984b). Ces éthiques proposent aux individus des codes de conduite et des ensembles de valeurs à partir desquels le sujet s’adonne à un travail sur lui-même et se constitue en être « éthique » menant une existence « esthétique » (idem). Le terrain a pris la forme de séries de rencontres effectuées auprès de trois participantes. À la lumière de leurs pratiques photographiques, je suggère d’envisager la photographie personnelle comme un lieu où s’effectue la mise en oeuvre de techniques de soi. J’avance que de tels procédés favorisent la production d’un sujet se comprenant comme unifié et cohérent, tout comme ils participent à l’esthétisation de ce sujet et de son existence.

The law and ethics of ‘self-quantified’ health information: An Australian perspective

This exploratory article examines the phenomenon of the ‘Quantified Self’—until recently, a subculture of enthusiasts who aim to discover knowledge about themselves and their bodies through self-tracking, usually using wearable devices to do so—and its implications for laws concerned with regulating and protecting health information. Quantified Self techniques and the ‘wearable devices’ and software that facilitate them—in which large transnational technology corporations are now involved—often involve the gathering of what would be considered ‘health information’ according to legal definitions, yet may occur outside the provision of traditional health services (including ‘e-health’) and the regulatory frameworks that govern them. This article explores the legal and regulatory framework for self-quantified health information and wearable devices in Australia and determines the extent to which this framework addresses privacy and other concerns that these techniques engender, along with suggestions for reform.

Sexualities and sensitivities: Queer(y)ing the ethics of youth research in the field

In contemporary Western societies, the years between childhood and young adulthood are commonly understood to be (trans)formative in the reflexive project of sexual self-making (Russell et al. 2012). As sexual subjects in the making, youthful bodies, desires and sexual activities are often perceived as both volatile and vulnerable, thus subjected to instruction and discipline, protection and surveillance. Accordingly, young people’s sexual proximities are closely monitored by social institutions and ‘(hetero)normalising regimes’ (Warner 1999) for any signs that may compromise the end goal of development—a ‘normal’ reproductive heterosexual monogamous adult...

Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

Kierkegaardian intersubjectivity and the question of ethics and responsibility

Kierkegaardian Intersubjectivity and the Question of Ethics and Responsibility By Kevin Krumrei. Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy are generally admitted and recognized as valuable in the history of Western philosophy, both as one of the great anti-Hegelians, as the founder (arguably) of existentialism, and as a religious thinker. However valid this may be, there is similarly a generally admitted critique of Kierkegaard in the Western tradition, that Kierkegaard's philosophy of the development of the self leads the individual into an isolated encounter with God, to the abandonment of the social context. In other words, a Kierkegaardian theory of intersubjectivity is a contradiction in terms. This is voiced eloquently by Emmanuel Levinas, among others. However, Levinas' own intersubjective ethics bears a striking resemblance to Kierkegaard's, with respect to the description and formulation of the basic problem for ethics: the problem of aesthetic egoism. Further, both Kierkegaard and Levinas follow similar paths in responding to the problem, from Kierkegaard's reduplication in Works of Love, to Levinas' notion of substitution in Otherwise than Being. In this comparison, it becomes evident that Levinas' reading of Kierkegaard is mistaken, for Kierkegaard's intersubjective ethics postulates, in fact, the inseparability and necessity of the self s responsible relation to others in the self s relation to God, found in the command, "you shall love your neighbour as yourself."

Youth engagement: the ethics of inclusion and exclusion

This study focuses on the engagement of children and youth in their communities and the ways they are included in and excluded from community life. Using a content analysis of a small town United States newspaper over a one-year period, examples of engagement were identified and classified into 12 categories: programs, clubs and special events; fundraising and community service; business and community support; participation in community events; school events; athletic and other performances; employment; involvement in local planning and decision making; serving as a community representative; visibility and recognition; criminal activity and accidents; and use of public space. Examples of community exclusion were identified as well. Young people were engaged primarily through activities that were adult-directed or supervised, or organized through schools, churches, and youth clubs. There was little involvement in local planning, decision making, or activism. Some evidence existed of peer teaching, leadership, and self-initiated activities, as well as intentional efforts by adults to give youth a greater voice in community activities. Implications include several ethical issues regarding the role of young people in community life, particularly young children, and the need for greater awareness on the part of communities of the contributions young people can make.

Leadership ethics and the problem of Dirty Hands in the political economy of contemporary Africa

Cet article discute des problèmes de gouvernance et de corruption en Afrique dans le cadre d’un débat politique et philosophique large entre universalisme et relativisme, idéalisme et réalisme, ainsi que entre individualisme et communautarisme. Premièrement, je défends que l’approche réaliste de l’éthique politique et du leadership ne permet pas de différencier entre les éléments descriptifs et prescriptifs de la gouvernance et peut aisément être utilisée pour justifier « les Mains Sales » des dirigeants au nom de l’intérêt supérieur de la nation, même dans les cas où l’intérêt personnel est la seule force motivationnelle pour les actions qui sapent les codes sociaux et éthiques ordinaires. Deuxièmement, l’article montre la faillite de la confiance publique dans le gouvernement et la faiblesse de l’Etat renforce les politiques communautariennes sub-nationales qui tendent à être fondées sur l’ethnie et exclusive, et par conséquent, qui viole le cœur de l’éthique publique, c’est-à-dire l’impartialité. Finalement, l’article suggère que les principes d’éthique universels pour les services publiques soient introduits en complément plutôt qu’en concurrence avec les éthiques locales, socialement et culturellement limitée au privé. Cela requière, d’une part, que nous comprenions mieux la complexité historique, les circonstances économiques et sociales et les arrangements politiques transitionnels dans les pays africains. D’autre part, un nous devons investir dans une éducation éthique civique et professionnel réflexive qui adopte un point de vue nuancé entre le réalisme politique et l’idéalisme comme point de départ des réformes institutionnelles, aussi bien que modalité de changement des comportements à long terme.

The metaphysics of self in Praśastapāda's differential naturalism

In A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics is metaphysics, and that epistemic practice is ethical practice.

What can the philosophy of science contribute to the ethics of science and technology?

Nascida para permitir que seus criadores possam atender suas próprias necessidades, a técnica científica sempre desempenhou papel significativo na civilização humana. Este é o contexto em que podemos vislumbrar o advento da tecnociência moderna, que tem contribuído significativamente para o incremento do controle humano sobre a natureza. Este estudo tem por objetivo analisar, sob o enfoque da bioética, reflexões sobre como a filosofia da ciência entende a neutralidade da ciência e sua convergência com a racionalidade epistêmica, bem como relacionar essas reflexões ao processo de tomada de decisões na administração da tecnociência. O estudo levantou dúvidas sobre a capacidade do conhecimento tecnocientífico para legitimar e justificar as decisões no âmbito dos sistemas de ciência e tecnologia nacionais, sinalizando assim a necessidade de promover ligação entre a auto-regulação tecnocientífico e hetero-regulação bioética. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT